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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL ~W. CT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN Ml]) FOR THE COUNf\ct~VERCE
STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)
)
)

Plaintiff,

v.

)

6(.,j

(1£D~0 b£;~1'UJS
Defendant.

)

THIS MATTER IS SET FOR A FINAL PRETRIAL CONFERENCE ON TUESDAY, THE
LQ·H'bAY OF

lSLptttVvt;eJ(20jl, AT 3:30 p.m. A JURY TRIAL IS TO
~t tt,~

COMMENCE ON THURSDAY, THE 8-r00AY OF
hour of 8:30 a.m. before the Honorable Judge

~~lll

20ll-, at the

.

THE PROSECUTOR, DEFENSE COUNSEL, AND D FENDANT MUST BE PRESENT
PROMPTLY AT 3:30 p.m. FOR THE FINAL PRETRIAL CONFERENCE AND REMAIN UNTIL
EXCUSED BY THE COURT.

THE FOLLOWING CASE SCHEDULE IS HEREBY ORDERED:
~

ALL MOTIONS MUST BE FILED WITHIN 21 DAYS OF THE DATE OF THIS ORDER.

~

DISCOVERY MUST BE COMPLETED 21 DAYS PRIOR TO THE DATE OF TRIAL.

~

PROPOSED JURy INSTRUCTIONS MUST BE SUBMITTED TO THE COURT 5 DAYS
PRIOR TO TRIAL PURSUANT TO IDAHO CRIMINAL RULE 30{b) AND, AT THE
PRETRIAL CONFERENCE, THE PARTIES MUST PROVIDE THE COURT WITH A
DISC OR E-MAIL CONTAINING PROPOSED INSTRUCTIONS IN FINAL FORM.

(discs will be returned at the end of trial)

DATED THIS

X

5

~;t-'L" -.: :l('-b=1~'-L~ ___- - - 20_':........\'----

day of _ _

MAGISTRATE JtdbGE
IES

TO:

l J'\

i.e V\vu,"\

\

• Prosecutor \.IV
•
Defense Counsel-,-(S"-4U1J-,-=O-=~"""V,--,r\L""",f?,-""L.l-\I\~______
D~~AL NOTICE AND PRETRIAL ORDER

-X
--X

SE

JUDICAL DISTRICT, STATE OF l[
COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE
PRETRIAL MOTION, ORDER, AND JUDGMENT
CASE NO. CR2011-000~\9L

-IE STATE OF IDAHO VS. GEORGE J. BESAW JR.
DDRESS:
.O.B.
[CKET NO. 42178

Lewiston, ID 83501
S.S.N.
,
AGENCY: Idaho State Police

ED

JJL '0

D.L.N.

1'''' q.

1\7

The prosecutor or defendant moves the Court as follows:
( ) For a bench warrant; defendant failed to appear.
( ) bond set at $_ _ _ __
( ) any existing bond forfeited.
() For default judgment; defendant failed to appear
() To amend the charge to ayiol4i.On of Idaho Code _ _ _ __
(f) To set this matter on -@8 i!
at
for:
C71 continuance (I) with waiver of speedy trial ()Trial by ( )court or by ( ) jury
() To dismiss the charge in the interests of justice.
() Posted bond of
be forfeited and the case closed.
() I waive my right to Jury Trial

!:::m

1.

,

Defendant understands the consequences of a guilty plea:

eX) The plea is voluntary. (X) Defendant has been informed of maximum and minimum penalties.
(X) Defendant waives the right against compulsory self-incrimination, the right to trial by jury and the right to confront
witnesses against defendant. (X) Defendant has been informed of the nature of the charge. eX) NO promises have
been made other than the plea bargaining agreement set out below. (X) Defendant understands that this court IS NOT
bound by the agreement. eX) Defendant gives up the right to appeal the judgment. (X) Defendant understands that
he/she has the right against compulsory self-incrimination during any court ordered evaluation.
MY CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS WERE GIVEN TO ME AT ARRAIGNMENT. I UNDERSTAND THOSE RIGHTS AND
GIVE THEM UP. I PLEAD GUILTY TO THE CHARGE(S) SET FORTH ABOVE. I ADMIT TO THE TRUTH OF THE
ALLEGATIONS AND AGREE TO THE RECOMMENDED SENTENCE.
[II.

Plea bargain and/or RECOMMENDED sentence:
( )Fine $_ _ _--'I$ _ _ _ _suspended () Jail _ _----->/____ suspended ( ) Community Service_ _ _ __
( )

With the following recommendations:
( )Report to the Probation Department within 48 hours of today's date.
( )Commit no Crime.
( )Sign a probation agreement and abide by all the terms and conditions of that Agreement.
( )Notify the Court, in writing, of any change of address.
( )Obtain alcohol evaluation
( )Refuse no evidentiary test for the presence of drugs or alcohol
( )Other
)Driver's License Suspension _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
)Restitution to be paid in the sum of 'f' _ _ _ _ _ to _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
Restitution to be paid in monthly installments of
$
Imonth beginning
and to be paid in futl on or before end of defendant's probationary
period. Restitution to be paid to the Nez Perce County Clerk of the Court, P.O. Box 896, LeWiston, 10 83501, or at the
window on the second floor of the Nez Perce County Courthouse in the form of a money order and/or cashier checks.
( )OTHER:

(
DATED

o

--'--------,~_,(;;C__+f,t
1c------;<+----:1£.-.....s-...;:~~=--

DEJ>eNSE ATTORNEY
( ) APPROVED
DATED

ontact Order remain in effect

()

( )

DEFENDANT'S SIGNATURE

wI

~

.

~'1l t:
~---r::fj IJl (jl;~

PROSECUTOR

~.~

~

'?;IJfK/RiAL MOTION, ORDER ANfj~pJt!i~~f1SNttDGE ----=:z'5~~""::::::::::"l-====44-::\'1"Cf"'"""
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE

STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff,
v.

)
)

)
)
)
)

GEORGE 1. BESAW, JR.,

)

CASE NO. CRI1-00419
OPINION AND ORDER
ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO
DISMISS AND/OR SUPPRESS
AND/OR IN LIMINE

)

Defendant.

)

This matter is before the Court on Defendant's Motion to Dismiss and/or Suppress and/or
in Limine. The Court heard oral arguments on this matter on May 6, 2011. Briefing was
completed by the parties on June 17,2011. Plaintiff State ofIdaho was represented by Nez
Perce County deputy prosecutor Justin 1. Coleman. Defendant George J. Besaw was represented
by attorney Charles M. Stroschein. The Court, having read the motion, affidavits, and briefs
filed by the parties, having heard the testimony presented and the oral arguments of counsel, and
being fully advised in the matter, hereby renders its decision.

State v. Besaw
Opinion & Order on Motion to Dismiss/Suppress

FACTUAL BACKGROUND
In the early morning hours of January 16,2011, Idaho State Patrol Trooper Jeffory
Talbott was on patrol duty and traveling on 21 st Street in Lewiston, Idaho, when he observed a
1

vehicle fail to signal and fail to maintain its lane oftrave1. Trooper Talbott initiated a stop of
the vehicle and made contact with the driver, who had pulled into a parking lot. The driver was
subsequently identified by his driver's license as George Besaw. As the trooper talked to Besaw,
he could smell the odor of an alcoholic beverage coming from the vehicle and observed Besaw's
eyes were bloodshot. After running a driver's check, Trooper Talbott asked Besaw to perform
field sobriety evaluations. Besaw agreed and got out of his vehicle. Trooper Talbott checked
Besaw's eyes for horizontal gaze nystagmus and had Besaw perform a one-leg stand evaluation
and a walk-and-turn evaluation.
Based on his observations, Trooper Talbott formed the opinion that Besaw was under the
influence of alcohol. The trooper then placed Besaw under arrest and, after handcuffing him,
placed him in the back of his patrol vehicle. Trooper Talbott then left the back patrol car door
open, stood next to Besaw and, leaning against the vehicle, turned facing Besaw so that he could
read him the advisory form and observe him for IS-minutes before having him provide breath
samples for testing. As Trooper Talbott was observing Besaw, he programmed the Lifeloc-FC20
breath testing instrument. During the IS-minute observation period, Trooper Talbott was
contacted by a Lewiston City Police officer and a brief conversation ensued. Trooper Talbott's

I The facts as articulated by the Court were gleaned from the May 6, 2011, hearing transcript, the video and other
evidence admitted at hearing, and the officer's probable cause documents filed in the case.

2
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attention was also briefly directed toward a passenger in Besaw's vehicle and to an individual
who arrived to transport one of Besaw's passengers.
After the IS-minute observation period, Trooper Talbott had Besaw submit three (3)
breath samples into the Lifeloc-FC20 instrument. The instrument tested Besaw's blood alcohol
content and reported results of 0.219 and 0.201, with a third breath sample testing as insufficient.
Trooper Talbott then informed Besaw he was under arrest for driving under the influence of
alcohol. The trooper then transported Besaw to the Nez Perce County jail.
On February 4, 2011, counsel for Besaw filed a Notice Pursuant to Idaho Criminal Rules
of Evidence Rule 803(24) that included a number of attachments. On February 15,2011,
Besaw's counsel filed a Motion to Dismiss and/or Suppress and/or in Limine. A hearing on the
Motion was scheduled for May 6, 2011. On the day of the hearing, defense counsel filed a
second Notice Pursuant to Idaho Criminal Rules of Evidence Rule 803(24) and an affidavit of
counsel. Both filings included a number of attachments. At the end of the hearing, during which
Trooper Talbott was called as a witness and a number of evidentiary items were admitted, the
Court established a post-hearing briefing schedule. The parties timely filed their post-hearing
briefs with defense counsel again attaching a large number of documents to his filings.

ANALYSIS

The analysis the Court must make in this matter includes not only allegations of specific
error on the part of Trooper Talbott during his contact with Defendant Besaw, but also
generalized allegations of malfeasance on the part of the forensic department of the Idaho State
Police. The Court is cognizant of the importance of the issues presented and, having carefully
reviewed the voluminous material presented by the Defendant, will attempt to articulate its
3
State v. Besaw
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analysis and rulings in an organized manner, so as to address all relevant issues raised by the
Defendant.
(A)

FIELD SOBRIETY TESTS
Defendant Besaw asks the Court to find the field sobriety tests inadmissible, arguing the

accuracy ofthe tests is questionable based on: (1) how the tests were administered; (2) the
environment at the time of perfonnance, and (3) because the science purporting to establish a
link between poor test performance and alcohol intoxication has been questioned. The
Defendant cites the Court to case law from outside jurisdictions and secondary sources where the
reliability offield sobriety tests has been questioned. The Defendant further argues that
admissibility of field sobriety tests has never been analyzed under Idaho Rule of Evidence 702
and, until such an analysis is made, law enforcement officers should not be allowed to testify
regarding field sobriety tests for the purpose of proving a driver was impaired due to the
influence of alcohol.
Under Idaho Code § 18-8004, it is a criminal offense for a person to operate a motor
vehicle while under the influence of alcohol. The offense may be established under either of two
alternative theories of proof: (1) by evidence of impairment of ability to drive due to the
influence of alcohol; or (2) by forensic testing of the driver's breath, blood or urine showing a
blood alcohol content of 0.08 or greater. State v. Edmondson, 125 Idaho 132,134,867 P.2d
1006 (Ct.App.1994). Idaho's appellate courts have consistently held field sobriety tests
admissible as evidence of impairment, so long as an officer's testimony is limited to the
observations of the officer during the testing and to any opinion formed by the officer based on

4
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his training, experience and observations. 2 An officer may not, however, testify that
performance of the tests, or more precisely an inability to perform the tests, is evidence of a
specific level of intoxication. 3
Idaho's courts recognize the basic battery offield sobriety tests as including the HGN,
4

the walk-and-turn, and the one leg stand. Of the tests commonly utilized by police in DUI
investigations, only the HGN is scientific in nature. In detennining its admissibility, Idaho's
Supreme Court has analyzed HGN evidence under the Frye test and has noted the applicability
of evidence Rule 702 to the admissibility analysis. See State v. Garrett, 119 Idaho 878, 811 P.2d
488 (1991); State v. Gleason, 123 Idaho 62, 844 P.2d 691 (1992). Nevertheless, Defendant
contends Idaho's courts have failed to test the reliability offield sobriety testing under I.R.E.702,
in particular HGN testing.
Idaho Rule of Evidence 702 reads, "If scientific, technical, or other specialized
knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a
witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify
thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise." The Rule requires a witness to qualify as an
expert before testifying about scientific evidence. It does not establish the standard by which the
science is scrutinized for reliability. "The inquiry under I.R.E. 702 is whether the expert will
testify to scientific knowledge that will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to
determine a fact in issue, 'not whether the infonnation upon which the expert's opinion is based
2 Whether the field sobriety tests evidence impainnent is a factual detennination made by the jury. However, an
officer may testifY to his training regarding the tests along with his observations and opinions fonned during the
driver's perfonnance of the tests.
3 Field sobriety tests are, nevertheless, admissible as evidence of probable cause for an arrest when, as in the instant
matter, an officer has obtained forensic testing indicating a blood alcohol level of 0.08 or greater. State v. Garrett,
119ldabo 878, 881, 811 P.2d 488 (1991).
4 Police officers may also request a driver perfonn additional tests to detennine physical and cognitive ability, such
as alphabet recitation, counting tests, finger-to-nose, etc. State v. Garrett, 119 Idaho 878, 879, 811 P.2d 488 (1991).

5
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is commonly agreed upon. '" State v. Perry, 139 Idaho 520, 522, 81 P.3d 1230 (2003), quoting

State v. Merwin, 131 Idaho 642, 646, 962 P.2d 1026, 1030 (1998).
The fact that the conclusion from a scientific study is not universally accepted
does not preclude use of that study by experts in forming their opinions. The
question under the evidence rule is simply whether the expert's knowledge will
assist the trier of fact; not whether the information upon which the expert's
opinion is based is commonly agreed upon. Even under the holding in Daubert,
the focus of the court's inquiry is "on the principles and methodology, not on the
conclusions that they generate."

State v. Merwin, 131 Idaho 642, 646, 962 P.2d 1026, 1030 (1998), quoting Daubert at 595, 113
S.Ct. at 2797.
After extensive analysis, the Idaho Supreme Court held in Garrett that HGN testing is
reliable, generally accepted in the scientific community, and admissible in DUI prosecutions for
the limited purpose of drawing certain inferences. s Garrett at 882. While other jurisdictions
may question the admissibility, reliability and science behind field sobriety testing, the holding
in Garrett remains the law in Idaho and is binding upon this Court. Therefore, until Idaho's
appellate courts steer Idaho law in a new direction, a police officer may testify to his or her
observations during the administration of field sobriety tests and may testify to any opinion he
may form based on his observations and training, provided a proper foundation is first laid
showing the officer is trained in conducting field sobriety testing and that the tests were correctly
administered. A defendant may, thereafter, challenge the weight of the evidence.
In the instant matter, Trooper Talbott testified that he received training in DUI detection
and investigation from a field training officer in 2005, received additional training while
5 Once the issue of reliability was answered by Idaho's Supreme Court in Garrett, it became unnecessary for Idaho's
trial courts to re-analyze the reliability question with every DUI case. However, in regards to HGN testing,
"Garrett allows the use of HGN test evidence only in conjunction with evidence from other field sobriety tests, and
pem1its the arresting officer to testify only that nystagmus may be an indicator of intoxication, not that it is
conclusive evidence. Garrett limits the scope ofthe admissibility ofHGN-related evidence, forbidding its use to
establish or infer any particular correlative BAC level, because nystagmus does stem from causes other than the
ingestion of alcohol." State v. Gleason, 123 Idaho 62, 66, 844 P.2d 691 (1992).

6
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attending P.O.S.T., and in 2010 attended a sixteen (16) hour advanced roadside impairment
detection enforcement class. Trooper Talbott further testified to receiving specific training as to
the standards for administering the HGN test, walk and tum test, and one leg stand test.
Therefore, based on the evidence presented, the Court finds the officer is sufficiently trained in
administering the tests, the tests in the instant matter were properly administered, the officer's
specialized knowledge regarding field sobriety tests and alcohol impairment will likely assist the
trier of fact to understand the evidence and, therefore, the officer may testify regarding the field
sobriety test under a Rule 702 analysis.
Finally, in challenging the admissibility of the field sobriety tests the Defendant contends
the tests were administered in an environment not conducive to good performance, i.e. that it was
raining and the ground was not level. However, the Defendant has presented the Court with no
legal suppOli for his theory that, because we live in the northwest where the seasons change and
because vehicles are a means of mobile transport subject to the weather conditions, that a
driver's ability to perform field sobriety tests is of no value unless conducted on a perfectly flat
and lined paved surface during a bright and sunny day.
Field sobriety tests allow a police officer to make a determination regarding a driver's
intoxication, or lack thereof, and are of value for purposes of determining the probability that a
driver is intoxicated. Idaho's cOUlis have consistently recognized field sobriety tests as
important investigative tools for officers for detennining whether probable cause for an arrest
exists and for evaluating a driver's level of impairment. "The state's interest in stopping drunk
driving is 'compelling,' because protecting citizens from life-threatening danger is a 'paramount
concern'''. State v. Ferreira, 133 Idaho 474, 480,988 P.2d 700 (Ct.App.1999). "[W]e hold that
field sobriety tests are the least intrusive means reasonably available to verify or dispel the
7
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officer's suspicion in a short period of time that a driver is in violation of I.e. § 18-8004." !d. at
483. There simply is no legal requirement that field sobriety tests be conducted only in a perfect
environment, nor would such a requirement be reasonable given the roadside nature of a DUI
investigation. As was stated by the Ferreira Court, "Field sobriety tests are, by their very
definition, done in the 'field' typically on the side of a public thoroughfare and are ordinarily
perfonned contemporaneously with a traffic stop." Ferreira at 133 Idaho 480.
(B) FIFTEEN MINUTE OBSERVATION PERIOD

The Defendant contends the mandatory fifteen (15) minute observation period required
prior to breath testing was flawed, as the officer was distracted by various individuals and by
traffic on the road adjacent to the parking lot where the Defendant was stopped. In the instant
matter, the arresting officer handcuffed Defendant Besaw and placed him in the back seat of his
patrol vehicle. Then, leaving the back door open, the officer stood approximately two to three
feet away from the Defendant, facing him at all times so that he could observe him for fifteen
(15) minutes before administering breath testing. The officer testified he did not take his focus
off of the Defendant and did not move away even though he was briefly distracted by a Lewiston
police officer, again by a passenger in the Defendant's vehicle, and finally by an individual
arriving to pick up another passenger. The event, as testified to by the officer, was captured on
the officer's patrol video camera and was reviewed by the Court.
In State v. Remsburg, 126 Idaho 338,882 P.2d 993 (Ct.App.1994), the Court held that a
brief diversion of an officer's attention does not negate the fifteen (15) minute observation
period. The Remsburg Court held that the standard "does not require that the observer never take
his eyes off the subject, only that the subject be observed closely." Remsburg at 341. More

8
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recently in State v. DeFranco, 143 Idaho 335,144 P.3d 40 (Ct.App.2006), the Court reiterated its
holding in Remsburg, stating:
Two prior decisions of this Court are instructive. The first is Remsburg, where
the issue was whether the subject was 'closely observed' as required by the
training manual for the Intoximeter 3000. During the last seven minutes
preceding the tests, the officer had programmed the Intoximeter and read the
DUI advisory form to the defendant. The defendant argued that she was not
closely observed because the officer's sight was, during the above events,
directed elsewhere. This Court disagreed. Key to the decision was the fact that
the officer was standing or sitting next to the defendant at all times. This Court
declined to adopt a rule that an officer is required to "stare fixedly" at the subject
for the entirety of the relevant time period in order for the subject to be closely
observed. ld. at 340, 882 P.2d at 995. Instead, we held that in light of the
purposes of the requirement, "observation" could include not only visual
observation but use of other senses as well. Because the officer was continually
in a position to use all of his senses, not just sight, to detennine that the
defendant did not belch, burp or vomit during the observation period, we
concluded that the defendant had been closely observed in compliance with the
training manual instructions.

State v. DeFranco, 143 Idaho 335, 337, 144 P.3d 40 (Ct.App.2006).
The DeFranco Court then contrasted the facts in Remsburg with the facts in State v.

Carson, 133 Idaho 451, 988 P.2d 225 (Ct.App.1999), where the Court found the defendant was
not sufficiently observed as the officer's primary focus was on driving his vehicle, making him
unable to utilize visual observation or his other senses, which were impeded by the officer's
hearing impainnent and the various noises created by a moving vehicle. The facts in the instant
matter are more analogous with those in Remsburg and distinguishable from those in Carson and

DeFranco, where the Court found the officer was rummaging through the trunk of his patrol car
during the observation period and "was not always in a physical position to use either his sight
or, altematively, his senses of smell and hearing, to accomplish the purpose of the monitoring
period." DeFranco at 338.
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In the instant matter, the officer was within two to three feet of Defendant Besaw, was
facing him at all times, putting himself in a physical position that allowed him to utilize not only
his sight but all his senses to accomplish the purpose ofthe monitoring period, which is to
detennine if a defendant belches, burps or vomits. Therefore, the Court finds the fi fteen (15)
minute observation period was properly conducted, as the officer's attention was not impeded to
such a degree that his various senses were diverted from the Defendant.
(C) DRIVER'S LICENSE SUSPENSION NOTICE
Defendant Besaw presents argument asserting the officer in the instant matter failed to
correctly give him notice as to the consequences to his commercial driver's license should he
refuse or fail blood alcohol testing. Though the relevance of his assertion is unclear, the Court
assumes Defendant's position is that failed or inadequate notice should result in his breath test
results being inadmissible in the criminal charge.
Idaho Code §§ IS-S002 and IS-S002A require a driver to be substantially informed that
refusal to perform testing for alcohol or other intoxicating substances, or failing such testing, will
result in a suspension of his or her driver's license. The two statutes, commonly referred to as
Idaho's implied consent statutes, provide that any person who operates or is in physical control
of a motor vehicle in Idaho has by such acts impliedly consented to testing to determine
concentrations of alcohol or other intoxicating substances, when such testing is administered by a
law enforcement officer who has reasonable grounds to believe a driver is committing the
criminal offense ofDUl pursuant to I.C. § 18-8004. The implied consent statutes ofLC. §§ lS8002 and lS-S002A authorize a civil license suspension of one's driver's license upon refusal to
perform, or upon failing, testing for alcohol or other intoxicating substances. The same notice

iO
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requirement, however, is not found in the code sections that comprise Idaho's criminal DUI
statutes. 6
The notice of suspension is a statutory requirement relative to an administrative civil
suspension ofa driver's license, but has no bearing or import on the criminal prosecution of the
offense of DUI.
Thus, under Section 18-8002, "anyone who accepts the privilege of operating a
motor vehicle upon Idaho's highways has consented in advance to submit to a
BAC test.. .. " In re McNeely, 119 Idaho at 187,804 P.2d at 916. See also In re
Goerig, 121 Idaho 26, 29, 822 P.2d 545, 548 (Ct.App.1992). It follows that
where reasonable grounds for the request exists, and the test is conducted in a
reasonable manner, a motorist has no legal right to refuse an alcohol
concentration test. Even if the officer did not notify the defendant of the
consequences of the refusal as required by I.e. § 18-8002(3), the results of
the evidentiary test will be admissible in a criminal prosecution. Woolery,
supra; Burris, 125 Idaho at 291,869 P.2d at 1386.

State v. Harmon, 131 Idaho 80, 85, 952 P.2d 402 (Ct.App.l998)[ emphasis added].
The Court finds it unnecessary to make a determination of whether the notice provided
in the instant matter was sufficient, as the notice requirement found in

I.e. §§

18-8002 and 18-

8002A has no relevance to the prosecution of the criminal offense ofDUI, the notice requirement
being a prerequisite only to the civil driver's license suspension under Idaho's implied consent
statute.
CD) PERFORMANCE VERIFICA nON S AND THE LIFELOC-FC20
In the instant matter, Trooper Talbott conducted forensic breath testing to deterrninethe
Defendant's blood alcohol content utilizing a portable breath testing instrument known as the

6

Idaho Code §§ 18-8004, 18-8004A, 18-8004C, 18-8005, and 18-8006.
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7

Lifeloc-FC20. The instrument has been authorized for use by the Idaho State Police and
standard operating procedures (SOP)8 established for its use pursuant to I.C. § lS-S004( 4).9
Trooper Talbott was certified as a breath testing specialist on the Lifeloc-FC20 on August 27,
2010, his certification not expiring until October 31,2012. 10 The results of Defendant's breath
tests using the Lifeloc-FC20 were 0.219 and 0.206. Defendant contends Trooper Talbott failed
to follow the SOP requirements for perfonnance verification, making the breath test results
inadmissible.
The accuracy of breath testing instruments is to be checked regularly by conducting
accuracy verifications utilizing a simulator and a perfonnance verification solution. The
standards to be followed for perfonnance verifications are located at section 5.1 in the current
SOP booklet.!! Performance verification ofthe Lifeloc-FC20 instrument may be perfonned
using either a O.SO solution or a 0.20 solution and must be run within 24 hours before or after an
evidentiary test. However, contrary to the arguments asserted by the Defendant, the standards
make clear that a performance verification utilizing the 0.20 solution should not be run routinely
to satisfy the 24 hour requirement, but is instead only required once per calendar month with the
results to be logged on the Instrument Operations Log.!2 The solution is to be replaced with
fresh solution after approximately 25 verifications or upon expiration of the solution, whichever
occurs first. Section 5.1.9 ofthe SOP then states, "The official time and date ofthe performance
IDAPA 11.03.01.014
Exhibit #3.
9 I.e. § 18-8004(4) reads in relevant part: "Analysis of blood, urine or breath for the purpose of determining the
alcohol concentration shall be perfom1ed by a laboratory operated by the Idaho state police or by a laboratory
approved by the Idaho state police under the provisions of approval and certification standards to be set by that
department, or by any other method approved by the Idaho state police." [emphasis added].
10 Defendant's Exhibit #1.
II Defendant's Exhibit #3.
12 Section S.lA, page 10 of Defendant's Exhibit #3. The requirement that a 0.20 perfom1ance verification be run
and logged "once per calendar month" meets the requirements for charges brought pursuant to I.e. § 18-8004C. See
also Defendant's Exhibit #6, the Simulator Solution Log.
7

R Defendant's
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verification is the time and date recorded on the printout, or the time and date recorded in the log,
whichever corresponds to the perfonnance verification reference in section 5.1.3 or 5.1.4.1."
Defendant contends there is conflicting evidence as to when a 0.20 perfonnance
verification was perfonned on the Lifeloc-FC20 breath testing instrument utilized by Trooper
Talbott to test Defendant Besaw's blood alcohol content. Defendant Besaw contends the
printout produced immediately following his breath testing indicates the last 0.20 perfonnance
verification of the instrument occurred on August 26,2009, and that there is no evidence ofa
more recent 0.20 perfonnance verification. 13 The Court disagrees.
The August 2009 event listed on the instrument printout is not the date of a performance
verification but rather, it is the date and time of the last calibration of the instrument. 14 The
Idaho Lifeloc-FC20 Reference Manual, found in the record as Defendant's Exhibit #2, states
clearly that calibration of the instrument is done solely by the Idaho State Police laboratories and
is password-protected. IS Only the most recent performance verification will appear on the
instrument print-out, which will more often be a 0.08 performance verification rather than a 0.20
verification, in compliance with Standard Operating Procedures. Records of performance
verifications utilizing a 0.20 solution are found on the Instrument Operations Log, in compliance
with section 5.1.9 of the SOP, and will only appear on the print-out if it was the most recent
verification perfonned.
The Instrument Operations Log relevant in the instant matter is found in the record as
Defendant's Exhibit #4 and evidences a 0.20 perfonnance verification was conducted on the
Lifeloc-FC20 at issue on January 4,2011, just twelve (12) days prior to Defendant's testing, and

13
14
15

Defendant's Exhibit #5.
See page 27 of the Idaho Lifeloc-FC20 Reference Manual (Defendant's Exhibit #2) and Defendant's Exhibit #5.
Page 24 of the Idaho Lifeloc-FC20 Reference Manual.
13
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a 0.08 performance verification was conducted less than two (2) hours after Defendant's
evidentiary testing was completed. 16 Therefore, the Court finds the Standard Operating
Procedures were followed, as the appropriate performance verifications were timely conducted
on the Lifeloc-FC20 instrument at issue and the verifications were properly logged as required
by the SOP manual.
(E) THE RECENT VERSION OF THE STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES
The Defendant in his motion challenges the credibility of the procedures utilized by the
Idaho State Police Forensics Department during its most recent update of the Idaho Standard
Operating Procedure Breath Operating Testing booklet. The Defendant further contends the
language utilized in many portions of the updated SOP 'water down' the standards until they are
barely recognizable as standards. The Defendant is unclear in his Motion as to how his
challenge is relevant to the specific pending charge against him. Nevertheless, the Court will
address Defendant's challenge to the degree his issues are discemable and relevant.
Pursuant to Idaho Code § 18-8004(4) J7, the legislature has charged the Idaho State
Police with the duty of promulgating standards for the administration of breath alcohol testing.

Masterson v. Idaho Department o/Transportation, 150 Idaho 126,244 P.3d 625 (Ct.App.2010).
In order to meet its statutory responsibility, the Idaho State Police have issued IDAPA
regulations covering the requirements for the performance of breath testing and have issued
16

See also Defendant'S Exhibit #6, Simulator Solution Log.

17

I.e. § 18-8004(4) reads, "For purposes of this chapter, an evidentiary test for alcohol concentration shall be based

upon a fonnula of grams of alcohol per one hundred (100) cubic centimeters of blood, per two hundred ten (210)
liters of breath or sixty-seven (67) milliliters of urine. Analysis of blood, urine or breath for the purpose of
determining the alcohol concentration shall be perfom1ed by a laboratory operated by the Idaho state police or by a
laboratory approved by the Idaho state police under the provisions of approval and certification standards to be set
by that department, or by any other method approved by the Idaho state police. Notwithstanding any other provision
of law or rule of court, the results of any test for alcohol concentration and records relating to calibration, approval,
certification or quality control perfom1ed by a laboratory operated or approved by the Idaho state police or by any
other method approved by the Idaho state police shall be admissible in any proceeding in this state without the
necessity of producing a witness to establish the reliability of the testing procedure for examination."
14
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Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) establishing the procedures for maintenance and operation
of breath testing instruments authorized for use by the Idaho State Police (ISP).
While courts are often called upon to interpret the regulations and SOP's issued by ISP,
the Court finds no authority which allows courts to dictate the process by which ISP establishes
its regulations and SOP's, or to dictate the language to be utilized in the writing ofISP's
regulations and SOP's. Despite copious arguments by the Defendant as to why he is personally
offended by the process and language chosen by ISP in updating its SOP, the Defendant fails to
cite the Court to any authority that gives the Court the power to dictate the process and language
to be used by ISP in fulfilling its legislative mandate.
Finally, the Defendant contends that because the most recent version of the SOP was
issued after Trooper Talbott last recertified as a breath testing specialist, he lacked sufficient
training on the current standards. The Court is not persuaded, as the arguments proffered by the
Defendant are circular and in conflict. On one hand, the Defendant contends the most current
version of SOP's has been so watered down by discretionary language that there are essentially
no standards. The Defendant then argues that because Trooper Talbott had not received training
using the newest version of the SOP's, he was not sufficiently trained to meet the requirements
of a celiified breath testing specialist. If the Court were to accept the Defendant's first premise,
that the SOP's are so watered down that there are in essence no standards, then it would naturally
flow that Trooper Talbott was if anything, overly trained as he was operating using much more
stringent standards than were required. The Defendant simply cannot have it both ways. In the
instant matter, the State has presented evidence showing Trooper Talbott was certified and
sufficiently trained as a breath testing specialist on the day he administered breath testing to the
Defendant and therefore, the required standards were met.
15
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ORDER
For the reasons stated in the above Opinion of the Court, Defendant's Motion to Dismiss
and/or to Suppress and/or in Limine is hereby DENIED.
DATED thiS.:1il- day of July, 201

[;.----,L--.=.

Certificate of Mailing
I hereby certify that on this
delivered to the following:

~

day of July, 2011, a true copy of the foregoing was

_ _ U. S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
_--j,IvValley Messenger Service
Hand Delivery
Facsimile

Charles Stroschein
Attomey at Law
P.O. Box 285
Lewiston, ID 83501

_ _ U. S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
~ley Messenger Service
_ _ Hand Delivery
Facsimile
Justin Coleman
County Prosecutor's Office
P.O. Box 1267
Lewiston, ID 83501
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COURT MINUTES
CR-2011-0000419
State of Idaho vs. George Joseph Besaw, Jr.
Hearing type: Jury Trial- Driving \Vhile Under the Influence (Excessive)
Hearing date: 9/8/2011
Time: 8 :33 am
Judge: Jay P. Gaskill
Courtroom:
Court reporter: None
Minutes Clerk: Evans
Tape Number: Courtroom3
Defense Attorney: Charles Stroschein
Prosecutor: Justin Coleman

083 347

083549
083600
083630

083946
084000
084117
084124
084159
094206
084301

Justin Coleman present on behalf of the State
Charles Stroschein present representing George 1. Besaw, Jr. who IS
present
State and Defense are ready to proceed
Court addresses jurors
Clerk calls the roll of jurors
Present: Jodi Rae Beardsley, Charles Woodrow Blakeley, Gary Lee
Bohnsack, Darci Jean Braun, Ashley N. Billings Burman, Theresa Louise
Currin, Andena Jewel Hibbard, Suzan Kerrie Johnson, Gary William
Jones, William Arvid Lahti, Kimberlee Ann Lavin, Sharon Joy Lewis,
Michael A. Madrid, Phillip John Moser, Haylee Davmielle Moses, Sandra
Sue Peer, Christian Paul E . Reel, Kenneth Allen Roughton, Terri Lynn
Sterling, Patricia Squires Surgeon, Belinda Lee Turner and Harleigh Mark
Williams
State and Defense have no challenges to the panel.
Clerk administers the voir dire oath
Clerk selects at random the names of 14 jurors
Selected: #1 Andena Jewel Hibbard, #2 Patricia Squires Surgeon, #3
Charles Woodrow Blakeley, #4 William Arvid Lal1ti, #5 Theresa Loui se
Currin, #6 Ashley N. Billings-Burman, # 7 Kimberlee Ann Lavin, #8
Christian Paul E. Reel, #9 Jodi Rae Beardsley, #10 Belinda Lee Turner,
# 11 Sharon Joy Lewis, #12 Harleigh Mark Williams, # 13 Sandra Sue Peer
and #14 Michael A. Madrid
Court makes initial comments regarding jury service.
Court introduces himself, clerk and bailiff
Court introduces Mr. Coleman - Attorney for the State
Coleman introduces himself and states who works in his office
Court introduces Mr. Stroschein
Stroschein introduces himself and states who works in his office
Voir Dire Examination:
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084725

084808
084826
084847
084900
084955

090607
090615
092758
092804
093721
093735
094349

094457
094607
094630
100629
100718
100855
101711
101900
101914
101946
102231
103335
103358
103438
104704
104769
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Juror #8 Christian Reel states that he knows the Defendant and it would
prevent him from acting with impartiality
Stroschein does not object to l\1r. Reel being excused
Clerk draws Haylee DaVvnielle Moses to replace juror #8 Mr. Reel who is
excused
Court questions Ms. Moses
Juror #11 Sharon Lewis states that she does not remember things and is
not good at taking notes
Stroschein has no objection to Ms . Lewis being excused
Court excuses Ms. Lewis
Clerk draws Terri Lynn Sterling to replace juror #11 Ms. Lewis
Court addresses Ms. Sterling
Questions by Counsel:
State questions the jury
Jurors Rachel Ann Kennedy and Patrick Warren Hohnstein arrive during
the State's questioning of the jury (Michael Anthony Barros does not
appear for jury duty today.)
State passes jury for cause
Stroschein questions the jury
Stroschein passes jury for cause
Juror # 14 addresses Stroschein and Stroschein continues questioning
Jurors
Stroschein confIrms that he passes the jury for cause
No challenges for cause
Court is off the record
Court states the 6 remaining names:
#1 Harleigh Mark Williams, #2 Belinda Lee Turner, #3 Charles Woodrow
Blakeley, #4 William Arvid Lahti, #5 Sandra Sue Peer and #6 Ashley N
Billings Burman
All jurors not selected are excused by the Court
Jury exits
Court is in recess
Court is back on the record and the jury enters
Explanation of Procedures
Preliminary Instructions
Clerk reads the complaint
Clerk ends
States opening statements
Stroschein objects - opening statement must be factual and not argument;
Court overrules the objection
Stroschein - opening statements
Clerk swears in the trial jurors
State calls Trooper Je(forv Talb ott (ISP); Sworn in by clerk
State - direct exam
Stroschein objects - best evidence is the video; Court overrules objection
Stroschein objects -leading; Comi overrules objection

COlJRT MIl\TUTES
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104915
105929
111010
111 031
111133

111254
111332
111427
111536
111649

111726
111745
112333
112523
121209
121226
121325
121354
013151

013222
013318
013327
013341
013741
014035
014345
014906
014952
015524
020439

020559
021334
021915

Stroschein objects - Jack of foundation; Court overrules objection
Stroschein objects - best evidence is the video; Court allows witness to
demonstrate
Stroschein objects - hearsay; Court sustains objection
State's Exhibit 1 is shown to Stroschein and given to witness
State moves for admission of State's Exhibit 1; Stroschein asks question in
aid of objection; Stroschein has no objection; Court admits State's
Exhibit 1
Stroschein objects - best evidence; Court overrules objection
Stroschein objects - foundation and hearsay; Court overrules objection
Stroschein objects - hearsay and best evidence; Court overrules objection
State's exhibit 2 is shown to Stroschein and given to witness
State moves for admission of State's Exhibit 2; Stroschein has no
objection; Court admits State's Exhibit 2
State requests recess to set up the video for the jury to view it
Court admonishes the jury
Jury exits
Court is in recess
Court is back on the record and the jury enters
State plays the video of the traffic stop (State's Exhibit 2) for the jury
Video is completed
Court admonishes jury before court takes a lunch recess
Jury exits
Court is in recess
Court is back on the record. Jury instruction conference held on the lunch
hour. Jury instructions are being repaired.
State and Defense have no objection to the jury instructions
Jury enters
State ends direct exam
Trooper Jeffory Talbott is back on the witness stand and is reminded that
he is still under oath
Stroschein - cross exam of Jeffory Talbott
State objects - argumentative; Court sustains objection
State objects - asked and answered; Court overrules objection
Defendant's Exhibit A handed to ",ritness
State objects - relevance; Court overrules
Defendant's Exhibit B handed to \vitness
Defendant' s Exhibit C handed to witness
Stroschein moves for admission of Defendant's Exhibit A, B and C; State
objects to Defendant's Exhibit A because it is not relevant but has no
objection to B and C
Court sustains the State's objection to State's Exhibit A and admits States
Exhibit B andC
State objects - speculation; Court allows answer
State - what Stroschein is asking may not be relevant; Court will allow
witness to demonstrate the one leg stand for 30 seconds
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022048
023441
023510
023944
024015
024025
024105
024134
024649
024726
025126
025223
025950
030537
030559
033056
033108
033635
033718
033730
033809
033841
033943
034052
042706
042740
042801
042851
044130
044148
044227
044247
044331
044346
044508
044709
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State objects - asked and answered; Court sustains objection
Stroschein continues cross exam
Stroschein ends cross exam
State - redirect of Trooper Talbott
State ends redirect; Stroschein has no recross; Witness steps down
State rests
Stroschein has no witnesses
Court admonishes jury; Jury exits
Court takes a short recess
Court is back on the record; Jury enters
Court reads jury instructions
Stroschein requests to approach; Stroschein and State approach the bench
Court continues to read the jury instructions
State - closing argument
State ends closing argument
Stroschein - closing argument (part of State's Exhibit 2 is played for
Stroscheins' closing argument)
Stroschein ends closing argument
State - rebuttal
Stroschein objects - evidence no in record; Court overrules objection
State ends rebuttal
Clerk administers the bailiff s oath
Jury exits to deliberate
Stroschein objects to inconsistency in instructions #5 and #6
Court notes objection and overrules
Recess
Court is back on the record for a vYTitten question from the jury
Instruction #17 pertains to the question
Stroschein states that the jury should be told to "yes and instructed to read
jury instruction #17".
State responds
Court writes back to the jury instructing them to review instruction #17
Recess
Court is back on the record and the jury has reached a verdict
Jury enters
Presiding juror presents Court with the verdict
Clerk reads the verdict of guilty for the DUI and the alcohol level of
.20 or over
Jury states that this is the verdict of all
Jury is polled. Each juror states the finding
Jury is excused
Court sets sentencing for 10-25-2011 at 1:30 p.m. and instructs l'v1r. Besaw
to obtain an alcohol evaluation prior to that date.
Recess
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LAW OFFICES OF

CLARK AND FEENEY, LLP
LEWISTON, IDAHO 63501

INSTRUCTION NO. _1_

You are instructed that if evidence in this case as to any of the material allegations of the
Complaint is susceptible of two constructions or interpretations, each of which appears to you to be
reasonable, and one of which points to the guilt of Mr. Besaw and the other to his innocence, it is
your duty under the law, to adopt that interpretation which will admit of Mr. Besaw's innocence, and
reject that which points to his guilt.

CALJIC (4th ed.) 52.02.
State v. Price, 93 Idaho 615, 616-617, 469 P.2d 544 (1970).
State v. Marcoe, 33 Idaho 284, 286, 193 P.80 (1920).

Given
Refused
Modified
Covered
Other----------

X

JUDGE
DEFENDANT'S REQUESTED JURY INSTRUCTIONS

INSTRUCTION NO. -L
A complaint is but a formal method of accusing a citizen of a crime. It is not evidence of any
kind against the accused.
There are two types of evidence from which a jury may properly find a citizen guilty of a crime,
one is direct evidence such as the testimony of an eye witness. The other is circumstantial evidence,
the proof of a chain of circumstances pointing to the commission of the offense.
As a general rule, the law makes no distinction between direct and circumstantial evidence, but
simply requires that, before convicting a citizen, the jury must be satisfied of the citizen's guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt from all ofthe evidence in the case.

Given
~---------------------Refused
--------------------Modified_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
Covered
-------------------Other

---------------------

JUDGE

DEFENDANT'S REQUESTED JURY INSTRUCTIONS
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INSTRUCTION NO.l
A witness may be impeached by showing that he or she has been previously convicted of a felony,
or by C1vidence which is contradictory to that given by him or her or by evidence that his general
reputation for truth, honesty, or integrity is bad, or by evidence that he or she has made at other times
statements inconsistent with his or her present testimony.
To "impeach" means to produce proof that the witness is not worthy of belief, or to put in
question his or her truthfulness. Impeachment of a witness in the way mentioned does not
necessarily mean that the witness's testimony is completely deprived of value, or that its value is
destroyed in any degree. The effect, if any, of impeachment upon the credibility of the witness is for
you to determine.

Refused
---------------------Modified
--------------------Covered
---------------------Other

----------------------JUDGE

DEFENDANT'S REQUESTED WRY INSTRUCTIONS

INSTRUCTION NO. _4_

It is not a crime to consume alcohol and then drive in the state of Idaho.

Idaho Code § 18-8004.

Given
--------------------Refused
------------------Modified
------------------Covered
------------------Other

---------------------

JUDGE
DEFENDANT'S REQUESTED JURY INSTRUCTIONS

INSTRUCTION NO. _5_
A citizen in a criminal trial has a constitutional right not to be compelled to testify. The decision
whether to testify is left to the citizen, acting with the advice and assistance of the citizen's lawyer.
You must not draw any inference of guilt from the fact that the citizen does not testify, nor should
this fact be discussed by you or enter into your deliberations in any way.

Icn 301

Given
----------------------Refused
---------------------Modified
-------------------Covered
--------------------Other_______________________

JUDGE
DEFENDANT'S REQUESTED JURY INSTRUCTIONS

INSTRUCTION NO. _6_
The testimony of a police officer is not entitled to any greater weight than that of any other
witness.

United States v. Bush, 375 F.2d 602,605, N. 6 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
United States v. Reid, 410 F.2d 1227, 1228.
State v. Melvin, 49 Wis.2d 294 181 N.W.2d 490 (1970).

Given
--------------------Refused
------------------Modified
------------------Covered
------------------Other

---------------------

JUDGE
DEFENDANT'S REQUESTED JURy INSTRUCTIONS

INSTRUCTION NO.l
George Besaw comes into court protected, as every citizen of the State is, by the presumption of
the law that he is innocent of any crime, and particularly that he is innocent of the crime charged
against him in this Complaint. That he has been suspected and charged with perpetration of a crime
does not tend to any degree to show his guilt or remove from him the presumption of innocence,
which the law throws about him. That he has had a complaint filed against him is not evidence of
his guilt. It is a mere accusation and the jury should not permit themselves, to any extent, to be
influenced against Mr. Besaw because of or on account of it.

Refused
---------------------Modified
--------------------Covered
---------------------Other

-----------------------

JUDGE
DEFENDANT'S REQUESTED JURY INSTRUCTIONS

INSTRUCTION NO. _8_
It is not essential to a conviction in this case that the testimony of the arresting officer be
corroborated by other evidence, provided that from all the evidence you are convinced beyond a
reasonable doubt ofthe citizen's guilt. However, a charge such as that made against the citizen in
this case is one which, generally speaking, is easily made, and once made, difficult to disprove even
if the citizen is innocent. From the nature of the case such as this, the arresting officer and the
citizen usually are the only witnesses. Therefore, I charge you that the law requires you to examine
the testimony of the arresting officer who was the witness in the case with caution.
In giving "this" instruction I do not mean to imply an opinion of my o"\vn as to the credibility of
any witness.
The fact that the charge here made is one difficult to disprove should not deter you from rendering
a verdict of guilty if you are convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the citizen is guilty as
charged.

People v. Frevtos, 321 P.2d 782.

Given
-----------------------Refused
---------------------Modified
--------------------Covered
---------------------Other

------------------------

JUDGE

DEFENDANT'S REQUESTED JURY INSTRUCTIONS

INSTRUCTION NO. L
You should consider whether the field sobriety tests were reliable. Whether the person who
administered the field sobriety tests followed scientifically acceptable procedures, when the tests
were given. Whether the physical and medical condition ofMr. Besaw, when the tests were given,
did not cause the test results to be unreliable. Whether scientifically acceptable procedures or
procedures adapted by the National Highway Transportation Safety Administration were followed
in the instruction, performance, and evaluation of the field sobriety tests.

State v. Gleason, 123 Idaho 62 (1992).
State v. Garrett, 119 Idaho 878 (1991).
State v. Parkinson, 128 Idaho 29, 909 P.2d 647 (Ct. App. 1996).

Given
---------------------Refused._______________
Moilified___________________
Covered
---------------Other

-----------------

JUDGE
DEFENDANT'S REQUESTED JURY INSTRUCTIONS

IN THE DISTRICT C01JRT OF THE SECO:N-U J1JDICLAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN Mv FOR THE COuNTY OF NEZ PERCE
STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff,

GEORGE J. BESAW, JR.,
Defendant.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CR 20 Ii -419
v"ERDICT

---------------------------)
We, the Ju..ry, duly sworn, empanelled to try the above-entitled cause, for our verdict say
that we find the Defendant, George I. Besaw, II.,
DRIVlNG lJ:NvER THE INFLUENCE OF ALCOHOL, Idaho Code Section 18-8004
NOT GUILTY
GlJILTY of Driving Under the Influence of Alcohol.
If you indicated above that the defendant was "GUILTY", please answer the following
question:
Q1JESTION: Did you fInd beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant, George J.
Besaw, JI., was cLriving with an alcohol concentration of .20 or more as sho\VIl by an analysis of
his breath?
No

L

Yes

DATED this 8Tl\day of September, 2011.

)~'"

4,s!uY~

Presldmg Juror

(..;....'=-::..

~~!::'.~-

,

:"

VERDICT

a~-·
/

38

AMENDED
The defendant was advised of all rights and potential penalties, in compliance with the provisions of LC.R. 11 and LM.C.R.5(f).

DEFENDANT:
,
S
Is represented by counsel
( ) Waived right to counsel
( ) Waived rig
=jury nEfF
(><I Understands nature of the charge, right of confrontation, and consequences of plea
/~ -~
-r1
C/) Waived right against incrimination
( ) Waived all defenses
( ) Acknowledge~jea is ~un~

e./)

8

.
f£ERT ENTERS:
~udgment after plea of guilty

V1,

-N

V:) Judgment after trial - guilty

( ) Withheld judgment on conditions listed below
THE

~r'\
Q

DEFENDAl~T

IS ORDERED TO PAY THE FOLLOWING:
.
c'i.0........
i
' (")" I~.
~ine"--(iZ) Costs $ ' , '60, h xLc
( ) Reimbursement for public defender services
( ) To be paid
Pay
( ) Restitution

begin: _ _ _ _ _ __
_ _ _ _ _ per month

BE INCARCERATED AS FOLLOWS:
Credit _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ days/months
(~Jail
months
( ) Report to jail _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
( ) Work Release _ _ _ _~_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
( )ill-homeLuu,HH'JL~··o _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

m

( ) Complete
of

Efl

hours of community service

_ _ _ _ _, and pay workers compensation insurance in the amount

e

HAVE DRIVING PRIv'lLEGES (~ended for
day~ont§Jommencing _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
Reinstatement of driving privileges must be accomplished before you can drive - apply to:
Driver's Services, Post Office Box 7129, Boise, ID 83707-1129.
( ) Temporary driving privileges granted upon application.

Izs-4f

PRO:BATION ORDERED/CONDITlONS:
Length
Y
Termination date to
I~
,170~,nonths of jail time is suspended and lor ~ $ 25C:) of the fme is suspendect'and will ~ot have
~ I or paid if the defendant complies with the terms of probation.

'"y

ex>

* Meet with Probation Officer within 48 hours.

TY CLERK AND INCLUDE CASE :NUMBER", "

qj~

FILED
1

2
3
4

5

uJj)!I!l4lhJ/~ /

CHARLES M. STROSCHEIN
CLARK and FEENEY, LLP
Attorneys for Defendant
1229 Main Street
P.O. Drawer 285
Lewiston, Idaho 83501
Telephone: (208)743-9516
Idaho State Bar No. 3058

I.. :

.~_

6

7

IN THE DISTRlCT COURT OF THE SECOl\TD JUDICIAL DISTRlCT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE

8
9

STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff,

10
11

vs.

12

GEORGEJ. BESAW, JR.
13
14
15

Defendant.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CR 2011-0000419
ORDER FOR STAY OF CDL
LICENSE SUSPENSION

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that any license suspension of the Class A driver's

16

license of George J. Besaw, JR., is stayed pending the appeal ofthe issues in this case. Mr.
17
18

Besaw has a Class A or commercial driver's license, and there are issues that are pending

19

in this case that are similar to the issues that are set out in Mr. Besaw's Judicial Review of

20

his Administrative License Suspension and his CDL suspension that are both being heard

21

22
23

in the District Court, Case Numbers CV11-00641 and CV 2011-00364.
THEREFORE, it is in the interest of justice that the license suspension associated

24
25

ORDER TO STAY ON CDL
LICENSE SUSPENSION

26
LAW OFFICES OF

CLARK

AND

FEENEY, LLP

LEWISTON, IDAHO 83501

II

I'
with the DUI conviction be stayed pending the outcome ofthe appeal ofthe issues in this

1

case. The Idaho Transportation Department is directed to stay the license suspension of

2

Mr. Besaw's Class A license. This stay will tenninate in 6 months unless counsel brings

3

forward Motion to Extend the Stay. This requirement will allow the Court to keep track

4

of the appeal. The sentence regarding the j ail time, fines, and court costs are also stayed.
5
6

"'"""' of October, 2011.
DATED this ~ay

7
8
9

10
11

12

CERTIFICAT

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the o~ day of October, 2011, I caused to be served a true
and correct copy of the foregoing document by the method indicated below, and addressed
to the following:

13
14
15
16

17
18

19
20
21
22
23

ICE

~U.S.Mail

Justin 1. Coleman
Deputy Prosecutor
Nez Perce County Prosecutor's Office
P.O. Box 1267
Lewiston, ID 8350 1

o
o

Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail
Telecopy

~ U.S. Mail

Idaho Transportation Department
Driver Services Section
POBox 7129
Boise ID 83707
Facsimile: (208) 332-7810

o

o
o

Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail
Telecopy

o

Charles M. Stroschein
Clark and Feeney, LLP
Attorneys at Law
P.O. Box 285
Lewiston ID, 83501

U.S. Mail
~ Hand Delivered
o Overnight Mail
o
Telecopy

24

25
26
LAW OFFICES OF

ORDER TO STAY ON CDL
LICENSE SUSPENSION

CLARK
2

A ND

FEENEY, LLP

LEWISTON. IDAHO 83501

F\LED
1

2
3

4
5

CHARLES M. STROSCHEIN
CLARK and FEENEY, LLP
Attorneys for Defendant
1229 Main Street
P. O. Drawer 285
Lewiston, Idaho 83501
Telephone: (208)743-9516
Idaho State Bar No. 3058

'lOll roT 2.5' P[f\

't 23

.~
~L=,,'0VttcUdm
D:::?~ll'

6
7

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE

8

9

STATE OF IDAHO,

10
11

Plaintiff,
vs.

12
13
14
15

GEORGE J. BESAW, JR.
Defendant.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CR 2011-0000419
ORDER FOR STAY OF CDL
LICENSE SUSPENSION

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that any license suspension of the Class A driver's

16

license of George J. Besaw, JR., is stayed pending the appeal of the issues in this case. Mr.
17
18

Besaw has a Class A or commercial driver's license, and there are issues that are pending

19

on this appeal that are similar to the issues that are set out in Mr. Besaw's Judicial Review

20

of his Administrative License Suspension and his CDL suspension that are both being

21
22
23

heard in the District Court, Case Numbers CV11-00641 and CV 2011-00364.
THEREFORE, it is in the interest of justice that the license suspension associated

24

25
26

ORDER TO STAY ON CDL
LICENSE SUSPENSION

LAW OFFICES OF

CLARK

AND

FEENEY, LLP

LEWISTON, !DAHO 83501

1

with the DDI conviction be stayed pending the outcome of the appeal of the issues in this

2

case. The Idaho Transportation Department is directed to stay the license suspension of

3

Mr. Besaw's Class A license.

4

5

'-7"~

DATED this c::-:::> day of October, 2011.

6
7

8
9

10
11

12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22

the~

I hereby certify on
day of October, 2011, a true copy
of the fore~oing instrument
was:
V Mailed
Faxed
Hand delivered
Overnight mail to:

:=iZ

Justin 1. Coleman
Deputy Prosecutor
Nez Perce County Prosecutor's Office
P,O. Box 1267
Lewiston, ID 83501
Idaho Transportation Department
Driver Services Section
POBox 7129
Boise ID 83707
Facsimile: (208) 332-7810

23
24

25
26

ORDER TO STAY ON CDL
LICENSE SUSPENSION

2
LAW OFFICES OF

CLARK

AND

FEENEY, LLP

LEWISTON, IDAHO 83501

1

2
3
4
5

Charles M. Stroschein
Clark and Feeney, LLP
Attorneys at Law
P.O. Box 285
Lewiston ID, 83501

6
7

8

9

10
11

12

13

14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21

22
23
24
25
26

ORDER TO STAY ON CDL
LICENSE SUSPENSION

3

LAW OFFICES OF

CLARK

AND

FEENEY, LLP

LEWISTON, IDAHO 83501

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEC01'-.lJ) JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STA TE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE
CR-2011-0000419
State ofIdaho vs. George Joseph Besaw Jr
Hearing type: Sentencing
Hearing date: 10/25/2011
Time: 1:37 pm
Judge: Jay P. Gaskill
Courtroom: 3
Court reporter: None
Minutes Clerk: Evans
Tape Number: courtroom3
Defense Attorney: CharJes Stroschein
Prosecutor: Justin Coleman
Court Services: Kyle Peterson
013740
BE IT KNOWN THAT THE FOLLOWING PROCEEDINGS WERE HAD, TO WIT: Has Eva!.
Most of the sentence is stayed pending the outcome of the appeal. The only part of the sentence that is not stayed is the
probation. The probation is for 1 year and began today.
Defendant present for sentenClll2. [X] with Counsel 0 without Counsel
Notification of Penalties reviewed and signed by Defendant

[XJ

JudQIDent after trial- Quilty Excessive Dill

Court Orders: Fine: $ 1000.00
P.D. Reimbursement: $ NA
License Suspension:
Jail: 180 d

12 mo
Suspended:

0

[X] YES

NO

Withheld JudQIDent entered

Court Costs: $ 182.50
Total: $

Suspended: $ 250.00
To Pay: To Be Determined after appeal

Commence on date:
170 d

o

To Be Determined after appeal
Report Date: To Be Determmed after appeal. The stay on the

CDL is for 60 days and then a review should be requested bv Stroschein so the Court can stay informed.
Community Service imposed - NA

$ NA

hours

Community Service Fee imposed

Complete by date: NA
Due by date: NA

PROBATION ORDERED/CONDITIONS: Length 1 year Termination date 10-25-2012

0

(l2J) 170 l2J days
months of jail time is suspended and / or (l2J ) $ 250.00 ofthe fine is suspended and
will not have to be served and 1 or paid if the defendant complies with the terms of probation.
• Meet with Probation Officer within 48 hours.
•
Sign Probation Agreement and abide by all terms and conditions of probation.
• Notify the Court, in writing, of any change of address
(l2J ) Other
(l2J ) Other
(l2J ) Other
015147
Recess

Court Minutes

Complete anv and all treatment counsellin2. or follow up at PO's discretion
No alcohol. drugs or bars
Submit to random evidentiarY testmg which Mr. Besaw is to pay for.

1

2
3

4

5

CHARLES M. STROSCHEIN
CLARK and FEEt'n~Y, LLP
Attorneys for Defendant
1229 Main Street
P. O. Drawer 285
Lewiston, Idaho 83501
Telephone: (208)743-9516
Idaho State Bar No. 3058

6
7

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF t-.TEZ PERCE

8

9

STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff,

10
11

vs.

12

GEORGE J. BESAW, JR.
13

Defendant.

14
15

TO:

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CR 2011-0000419
NOTICE OF APPEAL

THE STATE OF IDAHO, the above-named Respondent, and to Justin

16

Coleman, Deputy Prosecuting Attorney for Nez Perce County, and to the Clerk of the
17
18
19
20

above-entitled court:
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that:
1.

The above named Appellant, George J. Besaw, Jr., appeals to the District

21
22

Court from that certain Opinion and Order of Defendant's Motion to Dismiss and/or

23

Suppress and/or In Limine entered in the above entitled action on the 28 th day of July,

24

2011, the Honorable Jay Gaskill presiding, the Judgement of Conviction was entered on

25
26

NOTICE OF APPEAL

/;1 (i""l '0':
LAW OFFICES OF

CLARK AND FEENEY, LLP
LEWISTON, IDAHO 83501

1

2

3

October 25, 2011.
2.

That the party has a right to appeal to the District Court from the

magistrate's decision to deny the issues raised at the pre-trial hearing in this case.

4

5

3.

A preliminary statement of the issues on appeal which the Appellant then

6

intends to assert in the appeal; provided, any such list of issues on appeal shall not prevent

7

the Appellant from asserting other issues on appeal.

8

A)

Whether the court abused its discretion by not suppressing the breath test.

B)

Whether the court abused its discretion by not suppressing the field sobriety

9

10
11

12

test or limiting the use of field sobriety tests by the State.
C)

Whether the court abused its discretion in its failure to find a lack of

13

14

standards in breath testing as required by the Idaho Code § 18-8004(4).

15

4.

No order has been entered sealing all or any portion of the record.

16

5.

The standard reporter's transcript has already been prepared ofthe hearing.

6.

I certify:

(a)

That the transcript fonn the Motion Hearing held on May 6, 2011, has

17
18
19
20

21

already been prepared.
(b)

That the estimated fee for preparation of the clerk's record is not applicable

22

in this appeal as it is from the magistrate to District Court.
23
24

(c)

That the appellate filing fee has been paid.

25

26

NOTICE OF APPEAL

2

LAW OFFICES OF

CLARK

AND

FEENEY, LLP

LEWISTON, IDAHO 63501

1

2
3

(d)

That service has been made upon all parties required to be served pursuant

to LA.R., Rule 20.
DATED this

\~-\- day of November, 2011.

4

CL~ and?,FEENEY, r{LW

5

By

7

10
11

12
13
14
15
16

17
18
19
20

j

IliA

Charles M. Stroschein, a member of
the firm. Attorneys for Defendant.

8
9

/\V
u4 VL(. v z)fjJ~

(

6

I'

I hereby certify on the \9#
day of November, 2011, a true copy
of the foregoing instrument
Mailed
was: L
Faxed
Hand delivered
Overnight mail to:
Justin J. Co leman
Deputy Prosecutor
Nez Perce County Prosecutor's Office
P.O. Box 1267
Lewiston, ID 83501
Linda Carlton
Certified Court Reporter
425 Warner Avenue
Lewiston ID 83501

21
22

23
24

25
26

NOTICE OF APPEAL

3

LAW OFFICES OF

CLARK

AND

FEENEY, LLP

LEWISTON. IDAHO 83501

F'LED
lOll oro 2. PM 1 Z3

o

;,UTY

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUD CIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE
)
)
)
Plaintiff,
)
)
v.
)
)
GEORGE J. BESAW, JR.,
)
)
Defendant.
)
)
A transcript of the proceeding in the

STATE OF IDAHO,

CASE NO. CR 11-00419
ORDER SCHEDULING BRIEFS
AND ARGUMENT

Magistrates' Division has been filed with this

Court.
THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:
1) Appellant shall file their brief on or before January 9, 2012
2) Respondent shall file their brief on or before February 6, 2012.
3) Any Reply Brief shall be filed on or before February 28, 2012.
4) Appellate argument shall take place on March 8, 2012, commencing at the hour of
10:00 a.m.
DATED this

~ay o~pcfc:r'/118ci:) 201/

ORDER SCHEDULING BRIEFS
AND ARGUMENT

1

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that a true copy of the foregoing ORDER SCHEDULING BRIEFS AND
ARGUMENT was
/

hand delivered via court basket, or

_ _ mailed, postage prepaid, by the undersigned at Lewiston, Idaho, this
2011, to:
Charles Stroschein
PO Box 285
Lewiston,ID 83501
Justin Coleman
PO Box 1267
Lewiston, ID 83501

PATTY O. WEEKS, CLERK

By

~J!1iL
o~

ORDER SCHEDULING BRIEFS
AND ARGUMENT

2

L

day of December

FI LED

1

lDlZ JFfI 9 PM Z 5't

2
3
4

PATTy L>. ,.,

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND 1~~IB 'RfC1?tPF TJ1E
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE CO~' / \ . / M£;nJ
STATE OF IDAHO,

6

RespondentlPlaintiff,

7

8
9

vs.
GEORGE J. BESAW JR.,

10
11

AppellantlDefendant.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

II

DE LiTY
I}

5

Case No. CR 2011-0000419

12

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

13
14

Appeal from the Magistrate Court of the Second Judicial District of the State of
Idaho, in and for the County of Nez Perce.

15
16

THE HONORABLE JAY GASKILL

17

18
19
20
21

CHARLES M. STROSCHEIN
Clark and Feeney
1229 Main Street
P. O. Drawer 285
Lewiston, Idaho 83501
(208) 743-9516

ruSTIN COLEMAN
Deputy Prosecutor
Nez Perce County Prosecutor's
Office
P.O. Box 1267
Lewiston, Idaho 83501.
(208) 799-3073

Attorneys for Appellant

Attorney for Respondent

22
23

24
25

26

APPELLANT'S BRIEF
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III.

2

Statement of the Case

3

4
5

This is an appeal from the decision of the magistrate court regarding several pretrial motion issues.

6

IV.

7

Statement of Facts and Course of Proceeding
8

9
10
11

On January 16,2011, George Besaw, Jr., was driving in Nez Perce County with
a Class A Idaho driver's license. The arresting officer, ISP Trooper Jeffrey Talbott,
indicated that a white 1995 colored Ford F 150 failed to maintain it's line and failed to

12
13

signal southbound on 2pt Street at approximately 16th Avenue in Lewiston, Nez Perce

14

County, State of Idaho. The arresting officer recorded his contact with the vehicle and

15

the occupants. The Court can note the weather conditions from the video. Exhibit 7. It

16

was cold, rainy and wet.

17
18

The officer could smell the strong odor of an alcoholic beverage coming from the

19

vehicle and noticed the driver's eyes were bloodshot. The driver identified himself as

20

George J. Besaw, Jr. After running a record's check, the driver was requested to exit the

21

vehicle to perform the standard sobriety evaluations.
22
23
24

Trooper Talbott was first certified as a breath testing specialist and operator on the
Lifeloc device in October of2008. T. at p. 31. He was re-certified in August of2010.

25
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2

T. at p. 31, Exhibit 1. He testified at the time of the hearing that after his training in
August of 2010, new versions of SOPs were issued. The current version was issued in

3

4

November of 2010. He did not receive any training on the SOP that was issued in

5

November of 201 O. T. at pp. 34, 39. The trooper indicated he had no involvement in

6

writing the SOP or other manuals generated by the ISP Forensic Services. T. at p. 3S.

7

During the course of the hearing, the trooper was asked questions regarding the
8
9

conditions of the area where the field sobriety tests were conducted, the slope of the

10

parking lot where they were conducted, and the weather conditions. T. at pp. 26-28, lOS.

11

The trooper conducted the horizontal gaze nystagnus walk and tum and one leg

12
13

stand in adverse weather conditions. Exhibit 7. Mr. Besaw was arrested after the field

14

sobriety test were completed. He was placed in the back of the trooper's car, handcuffed

15

with his hands behind him with his feet in front of him. The trooper read to him the

16

Notice of Suspension. The trooper did not read the language that is in the bottom pOltion

17
18
19
20

of the middle section of the advisory, the language states as follows, "THIS
SUSPENSION FOR FAILURE OR REFUSAL OF THE EVIDENTIARY TESTeS) IS
SEPARATE FROM ANY OTHER SUSPENSION ORDERED BY THE COURT." T.

21

at p. 90.
22

23

The trooper read the advisory to Mr. Besaw but did not give him a copy of said

24

form at the scene. T. at pp. 89-90. The trooper did not video the back seat of the contact

25
26
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1

2

with Mr. Besaw until after the breath testing had been completed. T. at p. 86, Exhibit 7.
The trooper indicated he was positioned outside the vehicle standing and bent over some

3

4

of the time. T. at pp. 93-99. The trooper was asked questions about J\1r. Besaw and his

5

CDL license and what he had advised Mr. Besaw regarding the license suspension for a

6

Class A license. T. at p. 91.

7

The video shows that the trooper did not read all of the language that is contained
8

9

10
11

in the middle section of the advisory.
During the IS-minute observation period, while the trooper was standing outside
his vehicle with Mr. Besaw handcuffed with his hands behind him and feet forward, the

12
13

trooper had to deal with the window wipers going, the noise of21 st Street, the interruption

14

of Lewiston police officers on two different occasions and his discussion with those

15

police officers regarding the new advisory form and directing them to retrieve the new

16

advisory fonn from the front seat of his vehicle. Exhibit 7, T. at pp. 93-99. The trooper

17
18

had to deal with one of the passengers getting out ofthe vehicle and coming towards the

19

trooper's vehicle. T. at pp. 97-98. The trooper had to deal with the wife of the other

20

passenger coming forward to the vehicle after exiting her car which she drove to the

21

China Inn parking lot. Exhibit 7, T. at pp. 98-99. The trooper made eye contact with the
22
23

Lewiston police officers, and he could not guarantee that he was bent over the whole 15-

24

minute wait. T. at pp. 86-87, 93-94. The trooper indicated that he had to yell at the

25
26
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1

passenger to stay at the vehicle. Exhibit 7.

2

During the course of the observation period, the trooper would have been dealing
3
4

with the rain, the traffic noise, the window wiper sounds, the Lewiston police officers,

5

dispatch, his radio playing, the passenger approaching the vehicle, the wife of the

6

passenger approaching the vehicle, having eye contact with the individuals that

7

approached him, and speaking with them while Mr. Besaw was sitting in the back of the
8

9

10
11

trooper's vehicle without the interior video recorder recording the actions of the breath
test and advisory. The breath test result was a .219, insufficient, .20 l. Exhibit 5.
The printout also notes the following, "Last calibrated CAL standard .206 time

12
13
14
15

9:55 date 8/26/2009. Last check CAL standard .08 result .073 time 4:43 date 1/6/2011."
Exhibit 5.
The November, 2011, SOP requires a .20 performance verification for breath tests

16

over .20. Exhibit 3. SOP, section 5.l.3 states,
17
18

19
20
21

22

"A performance verification of the Alca sensor and Lifeloc FC20
instruments using a .08 or a .20 performance verification must be
performed within twenty four hours, before or after a evidentiary test to be
approved for evidentiary use. Multiple breath alcohol tests may be covered
by a single performance verification. Reference 5.1.4.1 for clarification on
the use of the .20 solution in this capacity."
Section 5.1.4 states,

23

24
25
26

"A .20 performance verification should be run and results logged
once every calendar month and replaced with the fresh solution
approximately every twenty five verification or until it reaches its
APPELLANT'S BRIEF
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2
3

4
5

6

expiration date, which ever comes first.
NOTE: The .20 performance verification was implemented for the
sole purpose of supporting the instrument results of a 18-8004 C
charge. Failure to timely perform a .20 performance verification
will not invalidate tests performed that yield results at other levels
or in charges other than 18-8004 C."

Section 5.1.4.1 states, "The .20 perfOlIDance verification satisfies the requirement

7

for perfonnance verification within twenty four hours, before or after an evidentiary test
8
9

at any level. The .20 performance verification solution should be not used routinely for

10

this purpose." The SOP does not have language that allows for a .08 solution to be run

11

at "any level" like the .20 solution.

12

13

The instrument log sheet for the unit used on Mr. Besaw notes that a performance

14

verification was done at 4:27 a.m. on January 16,2011, using the .08 solution with test

15

results of .073/.073, lot number 10802, bottle 0353. Exhibit 4.

16

Mr. Besaw was arrested and charged with a DUI.
17
18

19
20

E-mail exchanges regarding the changes in the SOP were admitted into evidence
and were attached to the closing argument with bate stamped numbers for ease of
reference. Those bate stamped numbers are referred to in this brief on appeal.

21
22
23
24

25
26
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1

2

Issues Presented on Appeal

3

4

l.

Whether the court abused its discretion by not suppressing the breath test.
lea).

5

6

There was a failure to comply with the standard operating procedure
requirement of a 0.20 solution performance verification within twenty four

7

(24) hours ofMr. Besaw's breath samples.
8

l(b).

9

10

2.

11

There was not a proper fifteen (15) minute observation period conducted.

Whether the court abused its discretion by not suppressing the field sobriety test
or limiting the use of field sobriety tests by the State.

12
13
14

3.

Whether the court abused its discretion in its failure to find a lack of standards in
breath testing as required by the Idaho Code § 18- 8004( 4)

15
16
17
18

19
20

21
22
23
24

25
26
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VI.

2

Argument

3
4
5

A.
THE TROOPER FAILED TO COMPLY WITH THE STANDARD
OPERA TING PROCEDURE REQUIREMENT OF A 0.20 SOLUTION
PERFORMANCE VERIFICATION

6
7

Mr. Besaw was arrested by Trooper Talbott on January 16, 2001. Mr. Besaw blew

8

a 0.219, insufficient and a 0.201 breath test. Exhibit 5. The performance verification

9

check was run with a O.S solution, lot number 10S02, bottle 0353. Exhibit 4. Idaho Code

10
11

(I. C.) § lS-S004(4) requires that breath testing be run pursuant to standards developed by

12

the ISP. The Court can also note the ID AP A rules that require standards be put into place.

13

IDAPA 11.03.01.014.03.

14

The Lifeloc reference manual specifically indicates that it is not a standard.
15
16

Exhibit 2 at p. 4 of 34. The only standards that are currently in place is the SOP. Exhibit

17

3. The Court can note that there are certain definitions found in the Lifeloc reference

18

manual. Calibration is defined as: "In the field this menu is used to run performance

19
20

verification checks, also known as wet checks or calibration checks. Actual re-calibration

21

of the instrument is done by the ISP labs and is password-protected". At p. 9 of 34 of

22

Exhibit 2. There is a definition of performance verification which states: "Your agency

23

may require that only BTS handle the performance verification checks. Don't
24
25

26

attempt performance verification checks unless you have been trained in the proper
APPELLANT'S BRlEF
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1
2

procedure." (emphasis added) At p. 24 of34 of Exhibit 2. The Court will find none of

this in the SOP.

3

4

5
6

The printout from Mr. Besaw's breath test has additional information. Exhibit 5.
After the breath test sequence, there is an indication oflast calibrated "cal standard" .206
and the date was August 26, 2009. R. at p. 3. The Lifeloc manual, has a similar printout

7

that states similar language regarding last calibrated and last check. At p. 27 of 34 of
8

9

10
11

Exhibit 2.
The Court can read the manual and note what the machine is supposed to register
regarding calibration and what was done in this particular circumstance. Exhibit 2. There

12
13
14
15

is no indication of another 0.20 solution check after August 26,2009.
Please review what is set out in the Lifeloc manual at page 31 of 34, Exhibit 2.
The printout (Exhibit 5) is inconsistent with the SOP (Exhibit 3). There is no verification

16

from the Lifeloc itself that there was ever a 0.20 solution check after August 26,2009.
17
18

However compare with the log sheet that notes a .20 solution check at the beginning of

19

the month. Exhibit 4. There is no explanation to why the Lifeloc did not register the .20

20

solution change noted on the log sheet.

21
22
23
24

Based on the definition of calibration found in the manual, page 9 of 34, the
monthly performance verification check is suspect. Exhibit 2.
The SOP is currently the only ISPFS standard. Exhibit 3. It does not have any

25
26
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1

2

definition of calibration other then noting that it is a word that used to define a
performance verification or simulator check. Exhibit 3, SOP, at p. 2 of21.

3
4

5

6

The Court can note there is a different procedure that is set out for minors in
possession or consumption. Exhibit 3, SOP page 19 of21. Paragraph 8.1 has a totally
different set-up and does not make a distinction between the breath instruments compared

7

to paragraph 6.2. Exhibit 3 at p. 15 of 21. The Court has to wonder why there is a
8
9

difference and why there is a distinction between the process that is found at 8.1 versus

10

the process that is found in section 6.2. The Court can look at paragraph 8.3 to confirm

11

the fact that there is a difference in the operation requirements 1. No explanation is given.

12
13

There is no explanation, there is no standard. There are many questions that are left

14

unanswered regarding this breath testing device, the breath test, calibrations, and

15

performance verification that took place.

16

17
18

19
20

21
22

23

Paragraph 8.3 of the SOP states: "Procedure: A complete breath alcohol test includes two (2) valid breath samples taken from
the subject and preceded by an air blank. The duplicate breath samples do not need to be consecutive samples. The individual
breath samples should be 2 minutes or more apart, to allow for the dissipation of potential mouth alcohol contamination. NOTE:
A deficient or insufficient sample does not automatically invalidate a test sample."

25

Paragraph 6.2 of the SOP states: "A complete breath alcohol test includes two (2) valid breath samples taken during the testing
sequence and preceded by air blanks. The duplicate breath samples should be approximately 2 minutes apart, or more, for the
ASIII's and the FC20's to allow for the dissipation of potential mouth alcohol contamination. NOTE: A deficient or insufficient
sample does not automatically invalidate a test sanlpJe." (emphasis original)

26
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1

2

There was not a 0.20 solution verification check within 24 hours of Mr. Besaw's
tese. Exhibit 4. The SOP that was in place at the time has a requirement that there be a

3
4

0.20 performance verification within 24 hours. Exhibit 3. 5.1A of the SOP (Exhibit 3)

5

specifically notes that the 0.20 performance verification was implemented for the sole

6

purpose of supporting the instruments results for an 18-8004C charge, in other words, a

7

blow over .20. Failure to timely perform a 0.20 performance verification will not
8
9

invalidate tests performed that yield results at other levels or in charges other then 18-

10

8004C. (emphasis added). Exhibit 3. There is no such rule for a 0.80 solution for an

11

excessive breath test.

It is clear that for a 0.20 blow, there has to be a 0.20

12
13
14
15

16
17
18
19
20

21
22
23
24

performance verification within 24 hours of the test. There was not and the SOP
2

Paragraph 5.1 and its subparts ofthe SOP states: "5. J Alco-Sensor and Lifeloc FC20-Portable Breath Testing Instrument
Performance Verification
5. 1.1 The Alco-Sensor and Lifeloc portable breath testing instrument performance verification is run using approximately 0.08
and/or 0.20 performance verification solutions provided by and/or approved by ISPFS.
5.1.2 The performance verification using the 0.08 and 0.20 performance verification solutions consist of two samples.
5.1.3 A performance verification ofthe Alco-Sensor and Lifeloc FC20 instruments using a 0.08 or 0.20 performance verification
solution must be performed within 24 hours, before or after an evidentiary test to be approved for evidentiary use. Multiple breath
alcohol tests may be covered by a single performance verification. Reference 5.1.4.1 for clarification on the use ofthe 0.20
solution in this capacity.
5.1.3.1 A 0.08 performance verification solution should be replaced with fresh solution approximately every 25 verification or
every calendar month, whichever comes first.
5.1.4 A 0.20 performance verification should be run and results logged once per calendar month and replaced with fresh solution
approximately every 25 verifications or until it reaches its expiration date, whichever comes first. NOTE: The 0.20 performance
verification was implemented for the sole purpose of supporting the instruments' results for an 18-8004C charge. Failure to
timely perform a 0.20 performance verification will not invalidate tests performed that yield results at other levels or in charges
otherthan 18-8004C.

25

5.1.4.1 The 0.20 performance verification satisfies the requirement for performance verification within 24 hours, before or after
an evidentiary test at any level. The 0.20 performance verification solution should not be used routinely for this
purpose. "( emphasis original excepting the word "approximately")

26
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1

2

was not complied with. As a result, there is not a valid breath test. SOP rule 5.1.4.1
states:

3

"The 0.20 perfonnance verification satisfies the requirement for
performance verification within 24 hours, before or after an
evidentiary test at any level."

4

5
6

Exhibit 3 at p. 10 of 21.

7

The court must apply the rule oflenity found in State v. Mills, 128 1d. 416, 913
8
9

10
11

P.2d. 1196 (Ct. App. 1996).

The whole reason for such testing is to determine the

accuracy of the instrument at a 0.40 breath test, a 0.80 breath test, and a 0.20 breath test,
which are all statutory limits developed by the legislature. State's Exhibit A. The rule

12
13
14

oflenity must be applied requiring a .20 performance verification within 24 hours. The
Mills court held in interpreting statutes, rules and regulations the following,

15

"Under the rule oflenity, criminal statutes must be strictly construed
in favor of the accused. (cites omitted) The same principle of
construction that apply to statutes apply to rules and regulations
promulgated by administrative agencies." (Cites omitted)

16
17
18

At. p. 429.

19

The breath tests results should have been stricken.

20

The Standard Operating

21

Procedure (SOP) for a Lifeloc FC20 Portable Breath Machine has a specific standard for

22

performance verification. The performance verification must be run within 24 hours of

23

a breath test, either before or after evidentiary breath testing to be approved for evidentiary
24

25

26

use.
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1
2

In this particular circumstance, pursuant to the log sheet, the arresting officer ran
a perfonnance verification on the Lifeloc using the .08 solution. Exhibit 4. Mr. Besaw's

3
4

5
6

breath test was noted as .219, insufficient and .201. Exhibit 5. Pursuant to the SOP a .20
solution verification solution must be performed within 24 hours.
The appelant had an excessive breath test result and so the failure ofthe operator

7

to comply with the standards set out by Idaho State Police Forensic Services and Idaho
8
9

10
11

Code § 18-8004(4) and Idaho Code § 18-8002A(7)(d) required the magistrate to strike
the breath test. He did not do so.
It should also be noted that § 5.1.4.1 of the SOP specifically allows the .20

12
13

solution to be run for verification for a..ny breath test result even though it is not

14

recommended. However, there is no indication that .08 performance verification can be

15

run for a 0.20 or above breath result. Use of the .08 solution in this case is in violation

16

of SOP for a .20 or above breath result. It is clear that arresting officer/operator/breath
17
18
19

testing specialist failed in the requirements of this breath test and performance
verification.

20

B.

21

WAS A 15 MINUTE OBSERVATION PERIOD PROPERLY CONDUCTED?

22

There has to be a 15 minute observation period prior to breath testing. See State

23

v. Stump. 146 Idaho 857 (Ct. App. 2009). The Stump case is interesting because it points
24
25

to the specific standard of observation required. See also Wheeler v. Idaho Transportation

26
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2

Department, supra.
In Stump, the driver was transported to the Teton County Sheriff s office to test

3

4

his breath alcohol using an Intoxilyzer 5000. The arresting officer was in the same room

5

with Mr.Stump. The Court noted that there was no evidence in the record of any

6

circumstances or conditions inside the room which might have interfered with or impaired

7

the arresting officer's senses. Officer Hurt also advised Mr. Stump to tell him ifhe had
8
9

10

11

belched or regurgitated during the 15 minute wait.
In appelant's case, the arresting officer did not tell Mr. Besaw that he needed to
advise the officer ifhe actually belched, burped, or the like. The Court can review a new

12
13

decision trom the Court of Appeals. Wilkinson v. lTD, WL 5582537 (Id. Appellate,

14

November 17, 2011). The Court in footnote 4 discussed the issue of being instructed not

15

to belch:

16

17
18
19
20

"Although the officer did not do so in this case, it would enhance
law enforcement procedures to simply ask the suspect if she
belched, burped, vomited, or did anything else during the waiting
period that might skew the test results. Previous cases have taken
note of whether or not the officer addressed such type of question
to a subject. See e.g. Stump, 146 Idaho at 861,203 P.3d at 1260;
Carson, 133 Idaho at 452,988 P.2d at 226."

21

Westlaw Opinion Number page 4.
22
23

In the Wilkinson case, the question of observation was before the Court of

24

Appeals. The Court of Appeals ruled against the driver. However, the Wilkinson test

25
26
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2

took place in a concrete room designed for breath testing. There were three video
cameras capturing the events as they occurred.

The hearing officer viewed these

3

4

recordings before making his decision. In addition, there was another female officer in

5

the room standing directly behind Wilkinson during the period of time Officer Davis had

6

his back turned to Wilkinson. Wilkinson under scores the problems that are found in Mr.

7

Besaw's case regarding the observation period. Trooper Talbott did not ask Mr. Besaw
8

9

ifhe burped, belched, or the like. The trooper did not videotape the events as was found

10

in the Wilkinson case. The court does not need a Homer Simpson burp on the audio to

11

question the observation period. The trooper could have video taped the testing sequence

12

13

but chose not to.

14

In Mr. Besaw's case, he was sitting in the back seat of the police car with the door

15

open and the officer standing outside. The Court noted in State v. DeFranco, 143 Idaho.

16

335,338, 144 P.3d. 40, 43 (Ct. App. 2006) that the 15 minute monitoring period is not

17
18
19
20

an odorous burden and will be met if the officer stays in close physical proximity to the
test subject so the officer's senses of sight, smell, and hearing can be employed.
In State v. Carson, 133 Idaho 451, (Ct. App. 1999), the Court was faced with a 15

21

minute wait that occurred in a law enforcement vehicle while the driver was being
22

23

transported to the Washington County Sheriffs Office to use the Intoxilyzer 5000. In that

24

case, Mr. Carson was asked ifhe had belched or vomited or burped, etc. during the drive.

25
26
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2

The arresting officer said he intermittently observed Mr. Carson in the rearview mirror
and listened for any indication ofbe1ching or regurgitation. The arresting officer testified

3
4

that because of the late hour he encountered no traffic on the road and his police radio

5

was quiet throughout the trip. The officer then acknowledged during cross examination

6

that is was raining and that the windshield wipers were operating. The Court found that

7

the arresting officer's attention was not devoted to Mr. Carlson and that evidence
8
9

presented at the motion hearing and common sense, tells us that an officer's ability to use

10

his hearing as a substitute for visual observation was impeded by noise with the

11

automobile engine, tires on the road, rain and windshield wipers.

12
13

In State v. DeFranco, supra, a similar situation to Mr. Besaw's case is presented.

14

The instrument used was the AlcoSensor III. In DeFranco, the officer left the patrol car's

15

rear door open and entered through the front passenger door, called dispatch momentarily

16

and removed his A1coSensor equipment that had been on the front seat. He then walked
17
18

19

20

to the rear of the vehicle, opened the trunk and looked through a file box to find a
advisory form. The Court found that the observation period was not possible based on
these circumstances.

21
22

The Court noted that, as in Carson, the officer was not always in a physical

23

position to either use his sight or alternatively his senses of smell or hearing to

24

accomplish the purpose of the monitoring period.

25
26
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Trooper Talbott's attention was distracted from Mr. Besaw. During the 15 minute
wait, Trooper Talbott's attention and senses were not on Mr. Besaw. 21st Street was

3
4
5

quite a busy road during the period of time Mr. Besaw sat in the back of the Trooper's
vehicle.

6

It is interesting to note the final comments by the Court of Appeals in DeFranco.

7

supra:
8

"If an officer deviates from that practice, without beginning the
fifteen minute period anew, which is always an alternative in cases
of uncertainty, the officer risks that the breath test results will be
rendered inadmissible. Such is the result here."

9

10
11

12
13

At p. 338.
The trooper did not have a valid 15 minute observation period. He was distracted

14

by outside influences. This is not a situation in which Mr. Besaw and the officer were
15
16

enclosed in a ten foot room. Mr. Besaw was sitting in the back of an ISP vehicle, in a

17

parking lot, next to one of the busiest streets in Lewiston.

18

The arresting law enforcement officer's senses were distracted by outside

19
20

influences. During the 15 minute wait, Trooper Talbott was distracted by Lewiston police

21

officers. There is a specific reference to him telling them to leave him alone for the next

22

four (4) minutes. Exhibit 7. Instead of them leaving him alone, they continued to talk to

23

him and he continued to talk to them. He directed them to get the advisory forms which
24

25
26

were in his vehicle. This is not a situation in which all of this is happening in an enclosed
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room like the Intoxilyzer 5000 EN at the Nez Perce County Jail. Mr. Besaw was sitting

2

in the vehicle, the door was open, Trooper Talbott was standing outside talking to at least
3
4

one Lewiston police officer regarding the advisory fonn.

5

During the observation period and breath testing sequence, one of the passengers

6

got out of the vehicle and approached the law enforcement vehicle. At that time, Trooper

7

Talbott's attention was directed to the passenger, due in part to officer safety since he was
8
9

10
11

there by himself. His attention was directed away from Mr. Besaw and towards the
passenger. His sight and hearing were directed towards someone other then Mr. Besaw.
N one of the case law cited herein requires that the Driver prove that he burped. The

12

13
14
15

Driver only has to prove that the 15 minute observation period was not followed. The
case law is very clear.
On top of all of these distractions, in the middle ofthe breath testing sequence, the

16

Trooper's attention was again directed away from Mr. Besaw and to the wife of one of
17
18
19
20

the other passengers who had arrived, exited her vehicle, and approached the police
vehicle.
There were three separate distracting incidents during the observation period

21
22

23
24

involving interference with other people. The appellate courts do not have much patience
with observation periods that are outside or in a vehicle.
In State v. Carson, supra, the observation period was in the vehicle and the Court

25
26
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2

found that the observation period was not valid.

In Carson, there were no other

distracting police officers, there were no distractions of passengers or passenger's wives.

3

4

Carson and officer were in an enclosed car with window wipers, engine noise and tires

5

on the road. In Mr. Besaw's case, there is the radio traffic from dispatch during the 15

6

minute wait. There is the noise of the window wipers. There is the noise of passing

7

traffic.
8

9

There is no evidence in this case, like in Carson, that some other senses replaced

10

the senses of sight or hearing. There is no indication that a person standing outside a

11

vehicle, with someone sitting inside a vehicle, could smell anything such as a burp or the

12
13

like. Again, note the weather and the likelihood of using the sense of smell. Obviously,

14

the senses of touch and taste do not apply. The three senses that were applicable in this

15

case were distracted or not realistically available during the observation period.

16

The Court has to wonder why with the Intoxilyzer 5000 EN, approximately 5 or

17
18

10 minutes away from the location of the stop, was not used. The Trooper used the

19

portable Lifeloc instead of the Intoxilyzer 5000 EN which is in an enclosed room at the

20

jail, with no distractions and the like.

21

The Court can look at a series of decisions from Latah County regarding judicial
22

23

reviews of the ALS hearings issued by Judge Stegner. In Campbell v. State lTD, Latah

24

County Case Number CV 10-401, the Court had to make a decision regarding a breath

25
26
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1

2

test in the field using the Lifeloc device. Attached and marked Exhibit "A" is the Court's
decision. The Court can also review Dennison v. State lTD, Latah County Case Number

3
4

CV 10-1363. The Dennison case also involves a breath test at the scene and is similar in

5

circumstance to Mr. Besaw's state. Attached and marked Exhibit "B" is the Court's

6

decision. In both cases, Judge Stegner found the 15 minute wait lacking.

7

The trooper describes the 15 minute wait as the period of time when !'vir. Besaw
8
9

was in his vehicle, not while he was outside the vehicle, not while he was performing field

10

sobriety tests or at any other time. T. at pp. 30-37. The State may argue that l'v1r. Besaw

11

simply wants the court to replace it's judgment for the judgment ofthe magistrate. One

12
13

would have to assume that is what the State argued in the other cases dealing with the 15

14

minutes wait such as: State v. Stump, 14 Id. 857 (Ct. App. 2009), State v. Carson, 133 Id.

15

451 (Ct. App. 1999), State v. DeFranco, 143 Id. 335, 144 P.3d 40 (Ct. App. 2006), and the

16

Latah County decisions attached to this brief.

17
18
19
20

The State may argue that the SOP has changed since the cases cited above were
decided.

However, has the equipment changed?

Have the manufacturers

recommendations changed? Has the science changed? Has Henry's law, the scientific

21

foundation for breath testing, changed? The only thing that has changed is ISP Forensic
22
23

Services' decision to make "standards" discretionary. The e-mails that are part of this

24

record show why there is a change. However, there can be no change regarding the

25
26
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2

mandatory 15 minute waiting period. "Proper testing procedure by certified operators is
necessary in order to provide accurate results." Exhibit 3, SOP.

3

4

The current SOP requests "at least 15 minutes of observation" Exhibit 3. The

5

Court has to wonder whether "should" really is discretionary when the SOP states as

6

follows: "Any material which absorbs/adsorbs or traps alcohol should be removed from

7

the month prior to the start of the 15 minute waiting period." (emphasis added) Exhibit 3.
8
9

If Mr. Besaw had an apple in his mouth or a chew soaked with alcohol or a lemon or 12

10

marbles, does the officer have discretion to allow that material to remain in the mouth

11

during the wait period and during the blow. What about the following:

12
13

"During the monitoring period the subject/individual should not be
allowed to smoke, drink, eat or belch/burp/vomitlregurgitate."

14

Exhibit 3, SOP.
15

16

Again, if :Mr. Besaw was smoking, drinking, eating, burping, vomiting and

17

regurgitating, could the breath samples be valid because the word "should" is used in the

18

SOP? Prior examples ofthe procedure of the 15 minute wait are as follows:

19
20

21
22
23
24

"Prior to evidential breath alcohol testing, the subject must be
monitored for fifteen (15) minutes. During this time the subj ect may
not smoke, drink, or chew gum, candy, food, or any tobacco product.
A material which absorbs/adsorbs or traps alcohol should be
removed from the mouth prior to the start of the fifteen minute
waiting period."
SOP 1112006 Paragraph 3.l. See Wheeler at p. 768.

25
26
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1

It is clear that this language including the "may not" and the "should" are all

2

mandatory requirements. Ifthey are not, then someone could smoke and drink during the
3

4

15 minute wait, and it would not have an effect on the breath test.

5

The State may argue that there was no indication of alcohol because of the .02

6

correlation. In Section 6.1 of the SOP, Exhibit 3, and it's subsections, there is no

7

indication of the significance of the 0.02 correlation regarding the 15 minute wait. The
8

9

10
11

State simply wants the Court to take its word on the application of the 0.02 correlation.
Mr. Besaw does not have to show anything other than the 15 minute observation
period was not followed.

12
13

In this case, there was a insufficient sample between the two breath samples given.

14

Exhibit 5. The Wilkinson. supra, court indicated, being in an enclosed room with mUltiple

15

cameras trained on the subject lends support to the position that there was not any burping,

16

belching or vomiting during this time. As the Court is aware, the ISP trooper in Besaw
17
18
19
20

--

decided not to record Mr. Besaw during the 15 minute wait. He could have, but he
decided not too. He decided to start recording after Mr. Besaw's breath testing sequence
was completed. His credibility is at issue like the officers noted in the following two

21

cases, In the Interests of Doe, 130 Id. 811, 815,948 P.2d 166,170 (Ct. App. 1997), State
22
23

24

v. Dominguez, 137 Id. 681, 52 P.3d 325, (Ct. App. 2002).
The two breath samples were quite a distance apart, .219/.20 l. The fact that the

25

26

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

21
LAW OFFICES OF

CLARK

AND

FEENEY, LLP

LEWISTON, IDAHO 83501

1

2

samples had such a wide variance supports mouth alcohol in Mr. Besaw's first breath
sample. The log sheet notes other breath samples which do not have the range found in

3
4

Mr. Besaw's case. Exhibit 4. (logsheet) The testing done on January 6,2011, .205/.202

5

and .072/.073, shows a separation of 0.003, 0.001, and no separation for the testing on

6

January 8, 2011, as both breath samples were 0.068. The testing of Boswell on January

7

. 16,2011, notes a 0.049 and a 0.046. One would have to believe that something like
8

9

mouth alcohol caused the wide margin between the .219 and the .201 samples. There is

10

a two minute wait after each breath sample so the next valid breath sample would have

11

been four minutes later. Exhibit 4.

12
13

The audio of the contact with Mr. Besaw speaks for itself. The trooper was

14

distracted from his observations of Mr. Besaw with the window wipers, with the rain, with

15

the traffic noise, with the other law enforcement officers, with the radio in his vehicle

16

playing, with the dispatch radio, with the passenger coming out of the car, and with the
17
18
19
20

wife ofthe other passenger coming and approaching his vehicle. Mr. Besaw was eating
a hamburger while he was driving. Exhibit 7. The Court can note the food that came
flying out of Mr. Besaw's mouth during the time he was in the parking lot. How many

21

22

fact patterns has the court seen in which someone was eating a hamburger just minutes

23

before the breath test, and that food was in the person's mouth just prior to the observation

24

period starting? In the cases cited above, there is no testimony from the drivers about

25
26
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2

burping, vomiting, regurgitating or the like and still the courts found a violation of the 15
minute observation period. Mr. Besaw does not have to provide testimony regarding

3

4

burping.

5

The magistrate's conclusion is not supported by the record 3 . The courts have

6

routinely reversed decisions regarding 15 minutes waits associated with vehicles. The

7

magistrate abused his discretion. The Court should remand with an instruction to suppress
8

9

the breath test.

10

II.
THE FIELD SOBRIETY TEST SHOULD HAVE BEEN SUPPRESSED

11

The court has the ability to review the video tape regarding the field sobriety test.

12

13

Exhibit 7. Attached as Exhibit "c" are pages from the NHTSA Manual 2006 which the

14

Court can take judicial notice of.

On the horizontal gaze nystagnus, the officer's

15

16

testimony was that Mr. Besaw's pupils did not appear to be the same size. T. at pp. 100-

17

101, 109.

18

The testimony indicated that the National Highway Traffic Safety

Administration Manual notes "If the eyes do not track together, or if the pupils are

19

20

noticeably unequal in size, the chance of medical disorder or injuries the nystagnus is

21

present". T. at pp. 132-133. In this case, the pupil size was obviously noticeable because

22

the arresting officer put that in his police report, which he testified to at the time of the

23
3

24
25

The magistrate stated: "In the instant matter, the officer was within two to three feet of Defendant Besaw, was facing him at all
times, putting him in a physical position that allowed him to utilize not only his sight but all his senses to accomplish the purpose
of the monitoring period, which is to determine if a defendant belches, burps or vomits." Opinion at p. 10.

26
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2

hearing. T. at p. 133. Therefore, allowing the horizontal gaze nystagnus in as evidence
would be improper. The scientific aura behind the testing would prejudice Mr Besaw.

3
4

Themagistrate stated, "A defendant may, therefore, challenge the weight of the evidence."

5

Opinion at p. 6. With regard to the "walk and tum" the court can note the slope that was

6

present. The surface was not reasonably dry, wasn't level and it was certainly slippery

7

based on the amount of water that was present. The same can be said for the "one-leg
8
9

stand". The officer had no prior experience with Mr. Besaw and would not know what

10

his ability was to perform these field tests in normal conditions. It was raining on that

11

January night in 2011. The court can also note the difference in what the trooper was

12
13

wearing and what Mr. Besaw was wearing.

14

The magistrate committed error by allowing the State to use the field sobriety tests

15

on the grounds of foundation, relevance, and that their probative value was substantially

16

outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. In one study, over 98% of roadside HGN

17
18
19
20

tests were determined to be not properly conducted. See "End-Position Nystagmus as
Indicator of Ethanol Intoxication", Science & Justice Journal 20014.
See United States vs. Hom, 185 F Supp 2d 530 (D.Md. 2002) and State vs. Lasworth 42

21

P.3d 844 (N.M. App., 2001). The appropriate test for measuring the reliability of
22
23
24

25
26

4 Please note the many attachments to the written closing argument regarding the field sobriety testings failures.
United States VS. HOITI, 185 F Supp 2d 530 (D.Md. 2002), Exhibit B of closing argument.
State VS. Lasworth 42 PJd 844 (N.M. App., 2001), Exhibit C of closing argument.
Schultz VS. State of Maryland, 665 A.2d 60, 77 (1995) and a study by Spurgeon Cole, Exhibit D of closing argument.
The Affidavit of Harold P. Brull in the case of United States VS. Horn, Exhibit E of closing argument.
The Affidavit of Joel P Wiesen, Ph.D., Exhibit F of closing argument.
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evidence is Rule 702 ofthe Idaho Rules of Evidence. See State vs. Gleason, 123 Idaho
62, 65, 844 P.2d 691 (1992). In that case, the Idaho Supreme Court questioned the

3
4

precedential value ofStatevs. Garrett, 119 Idaho 878, 811 P.2d488 (1991). The Gleason

5

Court affinned that at most the arresting officer could testifY that a nystagmus may only

6

be an indicator of intoxication, not that it is conclusive evidence. Moreover, such

7

evidence cannot be used "to establish or infer any particular correlative BAC level
8

9

because nystagmus does stem from other causes other than the ingestion of alcohol." See

10

Idaho Rules of Evidence, Rule 104. The Court of Appeals decision, State vs. Parkinson,

11

128 Idaho 29, 909 P.2d 647 (Ct. App.1996), cites Gleason to say that the admission of

12
13

expert testimony regarding scientific evidence is governed by Rule 702, but goes on to

14

"articulate the inquiry envisioned by Rule 702" discussing Daubert vs. Merrell Dow

15

Phannaceuticals. Inc., 502 U.S. 579, 113 S. Ct. 2786, 125 L. Ed.2d 469 (1993), for

16

guidance. 128 Idaho, at p. 34. Such inquiry requires,
17
18
19
20

a preliminary assessment of whether the reasoning or methodology
underlying the testimony is scientifically valid and of whether that
reasoning or methodology properly can be applied to the facts and
Issues.

21

(quoting Daubert) (emphasis added)

22

The Trial Court must make a preliminary assessment, factors to be evaluated include:

23
24

25
26

\Vhether the theory or technic in question can be tested, whether it has
been SUbjected to peer review and publication, its known or potential
error rate, the existence and maintenance of standards governing its use,
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2
3
4

and whether it has attracted widespread acceptance within a relevant
scientific community. (quoting Dauber)
128 Idaho, at p. 34.
The Court then synthesized, "other courts sand commentators" in listing these

5

additional factors:
6

7

8
9

10
11

1) The presence of safeguards and the technique,
2) Analogy to other scientific techniques whose results are admissible,
3) The nature and breath of inferences drawn,
4) The extent to which the basic data are verifiable by the court and jury,
5) Availability of other experts to test and evaluate the technique,
6) The probative significance ofthe evidence and the circumstances of the case.
(Cites omitted) Id.

12
13

However, the limitation in Parkinson, "just scientific expertise" has been done

14

away with the decision in U. S. Supreme Court case, Kumbo Tire vs. Carmichael, 119

15

S.Ct. 1169 (1999). In that case, the Supreme Court answered the question posed by Justice

16

Rehnquist's dissent in Daubert vs. Merrell regarding scientific evidence. Answering
17
18

19
20

affirmatively, in a fairly resounding decision, Justice Breyer authored the near unanimous
decision. The Court decided "how Daubeli applies to the testimony of engineers and other
experts who are not scientists." Id., at p. 1171. Answering this question, resolved a circuit

21
22

split, where several circuits, notably the Third, Fifth, and Eighth had indicated that

23

Daubert applied to all expert testimony while the Second, Ninth, Tenth and Eleventh

24

Circuits held that Daubert applies only to the admission of "scientific" expert testimony.

25
26
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2

The Court concluded that Daubert's strictures apply not just to "scientific" evidence, but
to all forms of proposed expert testimony. Kumbo 119 S.Ct., at 1171, 1175.

3

4
5

6
7

8
9

10
11

The Court, in stressing the importance of the gatekeeping function of a trial judge,
noted that its objective was to:
"ensure the reliability and relevancy of expert testimony, to make
certain that an expert, whether basing testimony upon professional
studies or personal experience, employs in the courtroom the same level
of intellectual rigor that characterizes the practice of an expert in the
relevant field."
Id., at p. 1176.
In order to ensure this level of reliability, Daubert's teaching and tests must be

12

13

applied to all expertise, whether it be scientific or "technical" or "other specialized"

14

knowledge. Kumbo, at p. 1174. These requirements must exist because all experts, not

15

just scientific ones, unlike ordinary witnesses are given this wide latitude to offer opinions

16

- including those not base upon firsthand observations or knowledge. Kumbo, at p. 1174.
17
18

19
20

While the Idaho Supreme Court has used a Rule 702 case-by-case test of reliability
for admission of expert testimony, the Court of Appeals has used Daubert, 509 U.S. 579
(1993) and similar factors, which include:

21
22
23

24
25

26

a) Whether the theory or technique in question can be tested;
b) Wnether it has been subjected to peer review and publication;
c) Its known or potential error rate;
d) The existence and maintenance of standards governing its use; and
e) Whether it has attracted widespread acceptance within a relevant
scientific community.
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2

The Idaho Court of Appeals uses the following criteria that a trial court might
consider when analyzing scientific evidence:

3

4
5

6
7
8

a) The presence of safeguards in the techniques;
b) Analogy to other scientific techniques whose results are admissible;
c) The nature and breadth of inference drawn;
d) The extent to which the basic data are verifiable by the court and jury;
e) Availability of other experts to test and evaluate the technique; and
f) The probative significance of the evidence in the circumstances of the case.
State vs. Konechny, 3 P.3d 535, 134 Idaho 410 (App. Ct. 2000); Kumbo Tire vs.

9

Carmichael, 119 S.Ct. 1169 (1999); State vs. Parkinson, 128 Idaho 29, 909 P.2d 647, (Ct.
10
11

12
13

App.1996).
The field sobriety tests administered in Mr. Besaw's case do not meet the
requirements of Daubert, Kumbo or Rule 702, nor can the arresting officer lay a sufficient

14

foundation to admit such evidence. Further, Mr. Besaw has no way to confront or
15
16

challenge the officer's observations ofthese presumed psychological or psychophysical

17

reaction of eyes, therefore, such evidence should not be allowed. Why not perfonn this

18

test with a video camera available?

19
20

In using the case law set out herein, the Court must detelmine that the field

21

sobriety tests result lack reliability and do not follow the requirements of the Rule 702

22

standards. The factors, as noted, cannot be met by the State in this case. The State called

23

no expert to provide a foundation pursuant to IRE 702. The Court can also note cases
24

25

from Kansas and Ohio. In State vs. \Vitte. 836 p.2d 110 (Kansas 1992), the Kansas Court

26
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1

2

criticized states like Idaho for accepting field sobriety tests based on State vs. Superior
Court 718 P. 2d 171 (Arizona). The Kansas Court noted:

3

"The Idaho Supreme Court also followed the Arizona opinion. The
Idaho Court noted that no evidence or publication had been presented
that refuted the Arizona opinion." State vs. Garrett, 119 Idaho 878,
881,811 P.2d 488 (1991).

4

5
6
7

8
9

At pp. 1118 and 1119.
The Kansas Supreme Court went on to criticize the Arizona Court by outlining
several contrary scientific studies that dealt with the horizontal gaze nystagmus test. The

10
11

Kansas Supreme Court concluded:
"If the Arizona Supreme Court had had the evide~ce before it, it may
not have held that the HGN evidence satisfies the Frye admissibility
requirements. The reliability of the HGN test is not currently a settled
position in the scientific community."

12
13
14
15

16

At p. 1121.
The Court may be better able to understand Mr. Besaw's position by looking at

17
18

Judge Lansing's dissenting opinion in State vs. Mazzuca, 132 Idaho 868, 979 P.2d 1226

19

(Ct.App. 1999). This case dealt with the Intoxilyzer 5000 and the foundation for the

20

evidence allowing the breath result in. Judge Lansing stated:

21

22
23
24
25

26

"To bolster its holding that this foundation suffices, the majority
opinion relies upon several cases from other jurisdictions where the
expert testimony was more complete. In my view, this reliance is
misplaced, for expert testimony given in other cases cannot substitute
for an evidentiary foundation properly presented before the
magistrate. "
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2

Atp.872.
Judge Lansing then went on to criticize the State vs. Garrett, supra, decision. She

3

4

stated:

5

"Since then, the Idaho Supreme Court has made it crystal clear that the
Frye test is not to be utilized as the standard for admission of scientific
or technical evidence. See State vs. Faught, 127 Idaho 873, 876,908
P .2d 556 (1995). Rather, the proper standard is stated in LR.E. 702."

6
7
8
9

10

Atp.872.
Judge Lansing concluded her dissenting opinion by stating:

11

"Thus, the admissibility of the Intoxilyzer 5000 test at issue here turns
upon the sufficiency of the foundational testimony presented to the
magistrate in this case, not information contained in decisions from
other courts. " (emphasis original)

12

13
14

At p. 872.
15
16

Moreover, the Court must note that nothing in Daubert, Kumbo, Parkinson, and

17

Rule 702 require the Court to admit opinion testimony that is connected to existing data

18

only by the ipse dixit of an expert. Kumbo, at 1179.

19
20

In State vs. Homan, 732 N.E.2d 952,89 Ohio St. 3d 421 (Ohio 2000), the Ohio

21

Supreme Court stated in discussing the field sobriety test: "The small margins of error

22

that characterized field sobriety tests make strict compliance critical." At p. 956. Judge

23

Gaskill ignored this point in his decision. The Court continued: "The HGN test is not
24

25
26

the only field sobriety test that required special care in its administration." At p. 956. The
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Court concluded its holding by stating: "In contrast we find that strict compliance \vith
standardized field sobriety testing procedures is neither unrealistic nor humanly

3

4
5

6

impossible in the great majority of vehicle stops in which the policy choose to administer
the test." At p. 957.
The Court can also look at State vs. Eytchison, 136 Idaho 210,30 P.3d 988 (Idaho

7

App.,2001). The Court of Appeals in commenting on the use of an expert indicated:
8

"The admissibility of expert testimony is governed by Idaho Rule of
Evidence 702."

9

10

11

At. p. 990.

12

The Trial Court in Mr. Besaw's case was required to conduct a Rule 702

13

Parkinson, Kumbo, hearing to determine whether or not in this particular case field

14

sobriety tests are settled science, as required in Rule 702 and Idaho Criminal Rule 12(b).
15
16

The magistrate filed to do so. The Court of Appeals in the Evtchison case commented on

17

the change of the Federal Rule 702 regarding expert testimony. See p. 990, footnotes 1

18

and 2. See also changes to Idaho Criminal Rule 16(b)(7).

19
20

State vs. Witte, 836 P.2d 110 (Kansas 1992) and State vs. Homan, 732 N.E.2d 952,

21

89 Ohio St.3d 421 (Ohio 2000), support Mr. Besaw's argument that cases like State vs.

22

Superior Court and the City of Fargo vs. McLaughlin, do not meet the requirements of

23

Rule 702 of the Idaho Rules of Evidence. The State will not refute the criticisms raised
24
25

26

by State vs. Witte, nor will the State refute the North Dakota Law Review article
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2

criticizing the North Dakota Supreme Court's decision regarding the horizontal gaze
nystagmus test.

3

In State vs. Garrett, (supra) the Court in a plurality opinion, determined the

4
5

scientific reliability of the horizontal gaze nystagmus. Chief Justice Bakes concurred in

6

the opinion while Justice McDevitt concurred in the results only. Justice Boyle filed a

7

special concurring opinion rejecting the use of the

.E.m standard and Justice Johnson

8
9

dissented. Justice Johnson advocated a standard of independent reliability. Justice

10

Johnson's dissent reflects what has been done by the Idaho and Federal Courts in recent

11

cases like Parkinson and Eytchison, Daubert and Kumbo. In State vs. Garrett, the Court

12
13

stated:
"Because the reliability of a test based on a scientifically tested
phenomenon should not vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, \ve
examine what other jurisdictions have done when HG test results are
offered as evidence in DUI cases."

14
15
16
17
18

At p. 880.
In Footnote 3, the Court states: "Such 'decisions' are persuasive only as they

19

20

contain analysis and reasoning which recommend itself to this Court." At p. 880. The

21

Garrett Court cited State vs. Superior Court:

"We have been furnished with no

22

publications or other authority which refutes the reasoned decision of the Arizona Court."

23

At p. 88l.
24

25
26

It is submitted that Mr. Garrett's counsel did not provide an adequate argument
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regarding filed sobriety tests. Mr. Besaw should not be held accountable for the failures
of Defendant counsel from a 1991 decision.

Justice Johnson, in his dissent, lists

3

4

succinctly the problems of the holding of the plurality when he stated:
"If this (the testimony of the arresting officer) establishes the reliability
for admissibility for expert opinion based on new scientific methods,
then we must be prepared to accept the admissibility of the results of
the polygraph examination based on the testimony of polygraph
operators, the admissibility of DNA tests based on the testimony of
laboratory technicians who conduct the tests, and the results of other
forms of 'scientific' testing based on the testimony of those who
conduct the tests. In my view, this is not the type of reliability that we
should require before allowing testimony of the results of tests
conducted based on new scientific methods. The foundation should be
laid by experts who have researched the tests and are available to
testify as to the scientific basis for the test." (emphasis added)

5

6
7
8
9

10
11

12
13

At p. 885.

14

The State ofIdaho has never provided said foundation with regard to field so briety
15
16

tests. There has never been a true Rule 702 hearing as envisioned by Daubert, Kumbo,

17

Parkinson, or Konechv. The Garrett and Gleason cases are bad law and should be

18

overturned.

19
20

The Idaho Supreme Court in Garrett accepted standards that, even in the best

21

circumstances, (in the laboratory), have a 23% failure rate (HGN), a 32% failure rate

22

(walk and tum) and a 35% failure rate (one leg stand). There is a well written article by

23

Phillip B. Price and Sturgeon Cole in the April 21, 2001 magazine, The Champion
24
25

26

published by the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers. See Idaho Rules
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of Evidence, Rule 104. The authors criticize the National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration field sobriety test validation. The author states:

3

"There has been no attempt to establish norms for the SF ST. We have
no idea how well a sober person can perform on the SFST. How does
ageor gender affect performance? How does fatigue or practice affect
performance? If an individual performs poorly at a .11 % BAC, how
does that compare with his or her performance with a BAC of .00%7
Before any individual's performance can be considered at 'test', that
particular individual's baseline with no alcohol must be known and
factored in. Without answers to these basic questions, the SFST
remains in the same category as tarot cards." (emphasis added)

4
5
6

7
8

9

10
11

At p. 42.
The authors then go on to discuss the number of false arrests:

12

"Ofthe sober individuals that were involved in the Colorado, Florida
and San Diego studies, the officers falsely arrested 24%, 18% and
29%, respectively. That is an average of23.6% false arrest rate. What
this means is that if the SFST are used as a decision of whether to
arrest an individual for an alcohol related offense, one out of every four
sober people will be falsely arrested." (emphasis added)

13
14
15
16

17
18

At p. 42.
In the State vs. Gleason, case, no real "expert" was called. As Justice Johnson

19
20

indicated in Garrett, the "expert" in question was the individual who conducted the test.

21

In Gleason, Justice Bistline in his concurrence in result states: "The majority's bare

22

statement that I.R.E. 702 is the appropriate test provides no guidance to the bench and bar

23

as to how to determine scientific reliability." Justice Bistline then questions the use of
24

25
26

Rule 702 by stating:
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"Questions that come to mind include: What level of scientific
reliability, if any, is required before evidence will assist the trier of
fact? Wnat constitutes scientific reliability? How reliable does
scientific evidence have to be before it is admissible? On whose scale
do we measure the amount of reliability? \Vhat unit of measurement
is being used?"

2

3
4
5

At p. 67.
6
7

There is in Gleason no Rule 702 analysis. The Rule 702 analysis, missing from

8

Gleason and Garrett, is found in cases like Daubert, Kumbo, and Parkinson. In Gehring.

9

supra, the Court allowed Officer Carrington to testifY about his assessment of a person's

10
11

sobriety, based on field sobriety tests, being 95% accurate.

Officer Carrington's

12

testimony is in stark contrast to the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration's

13

testing noted above and other current studies. (See Hom, supra.)

14

The State may argue that Mr. Besaw is trying to overturn prior precedent. The use
15
16

ofIdaho Rule of Evidence 702 is supported by Gleason. However, the use of a Rule 702

17

analysis is lacking, but can be expanded as required by federal case law and the Idaho

18

cases that have accepted the federal court reasoning. A Trial Court must do more under

19
20

its gatekeeping function before any field sobriety test should be allowed before a jury.

21

What scientific publications the Garrett Court refers to is unknown and not set out.

22

In fact, the State will not be able to support its position by pointing to any scientific

23

evidence that supports the use of the field sobriety tests let alone the horizontal gaze

24
25

26

nystagmus.
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In State vs. Ito, 978 P.2d 191 (Hawaii App. 1999) the Court determined that the
horizontal gaze nystagmus test had a 23% error rate in detecting individuals with a BAC

3

4

of.1 % or greater and a 35% error rate in detecting persons with a .08% BAC or greater.

5

At p. 203. The Hawaiian Court cited State vs. O'Key, 899 P.2d 687 (Oregon 1995). The

6

Oregon Court noted that part of the training the officers had to undergo required them to

7

ask before administering the HGN test, whether the person had a head injury, \-vas ill or
8
9

was taking medication. The officer in Hawaii had a whole series of questions that were

10

required to be asked before the HGN test could be required. See page 204. No such

11

questions were asked ofMr. Besaw. The Hawaiian Court noted as to whether the HGN

12
13

test is susceptible to abuse, one of the criticisms leveled at the test is that,
"It is wholly subjective - the police officer has no physical sample to
take to the laboratory. Thus, the suspect is not able to have his or her
expert examine the evidence .... [and] cannot contradict the officer's
testimony[.] (Cite omitted), in our view, however, this concern is
minimized as long as the HGN test results are limited solely. to
probable cause determinations." (emphasis added)

14
15
16

~

17
18

At p. 204.

19
20

In Mr. Besaw's case, the State does not want the field sobriety tests limited to a

21

probable cause determination, but used as evidence to prove intoxication beyond a

22

reasonable doubt. The Hawaiian Court in vacating the Trial Court's determination of

23

probable cause on the HGN test noted that officers are required to check themselves
24

25
26

"monthly with an (8x 15 square template or cardboard with a diagonal line drawn from
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one comer to another to demark 45 degrees] to be sure that your accuracy has been
sustained." Footnote 10 at p. 210. The Court also noted the wamings set out in the

3
4

National Highway Traffic Safety Administration manual:

"ONLY \¥HEN THE TESTS ARE ADMINISTERED IN THE
PRESCRIBED STANDARDIZED MANNER; AND ONLY\VHEN
THE STANDARDIZED CLUES ARE USED TO ASSESS THE
SUSPECT'S PERFORMANCE; AND, ONLY WHEN THE
STANDARDIZED CRITERIA ARE EMPLOYED TO INTERPRET
THAT PERFORMANCE. IF ANY ONE OF THE STANDARDIZED
FIELD SOBRIETY TEST ELEMENTS IS CHANGED, THE
VALIDITY IS COMPROMISED."

5

6
7

8
9

10
11

At p. 210.

12

In the trial court's opinion regarding the field sobriety test, the Court does not even

13

address the issue involving the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration standards

14

or any of the cases cited in the closing argument regarding the use of the National
15
16

Highway Traffic Safety Administration or the issues regarding failures to comply with the

17

standards set out in the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration manual. None

18

of the cases relied upon by the magistrate in it's decision addresses the National Highway

19
20

Traffic Safety Administration and the standards that are set out there in. In fact, the

21

magistrate used State v. Ferreira, 133 Id. 474, 988 P.2d 700 (Ct. App. 1999) to support

22

his decision regarding the issues found in Mr. Besaw's case. The Ferreira case is not on

23

point. The Ferreira case dealt with a constitutional challenge to the expectation of privacy
24
25

26

intruded upon by field sobriety tests and that probable cause was required before such
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tests were administered. The Ferreira case has nothing to do with the issues presented in
this case regarding a IRE Rule 702 challenge or a challenge regarding the standards

3

4

5
6

developed by the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration regarding field sobriety
testing.
In this case, the standards were not followed and the field sobriety test should be

7

suppressed. The trial court simply ignored the evidence regarding the National Highway
8
9

Traffic Safety Administration standards.

10

III.

11

ISPFS FAILED TO COMPLY WITH THE STANDARD REQUIREMENT OF
IDAHO CODE SECTION 18-8004(4)

12
13

The court would be wise to look at Wheeler v. Idaho Transportation Department,

14

148 Idaho 378, 223 P.3d, 761 (Ct. App. 2009). Administration regulations are subject to

15

the same principles of statutory construction as statutes. See Mason v. Donnelly Club,

16

135 Idaho 581, 586, 21 P.3d 903,908 (2001). The court indicated that when interpreting
17
18

19

20

a statute or a rule, it has to be construed as a whole to get the intent of the Legislature or
promulgating entity. The court has to use the literal words of the rule and the words
should be given their plain, obvious and rational meaning. In Wheeler the court

21
22

interpreted the use of the word "should". One would have to believe that with the e-mails

23

that are part of Mr. Besaw's record, the Court of Appeals would have determined that the

24

use of the word "should" was just a "weasel word" to get around any mandatory

25
26
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requirement.
The court would be well served by reading Judge Lansing's dissenting opinion.

3
4

She commented on the fact that ISP had not formally promulgated administrative rules

5

prescribing testing equipment or requirements for its maintenance and operation. She

6

noted that the ISP announced its approved breath methods through SOPs, and manuals.

7

Judge Lansing wrote that appellate courts have to treat such documents as "rules" for the
8

9
10

11

purpose ofjudicial review because they constitute the only materials by which the ISP has
acted upon the I.e. §§ 18-8002A and 18-8004(4) authorization for breath testing
standards. Judge Lansing noted: "But a "standard" that is merely a recommendation, and

12
13

hence optional, is no standard at all - it is merely something that the officers maintaining

14

and operating the Intoxilyzer 5000 may do if they wish or may disregard." At p. 388.

15

Judge Lansing indicated that if the rules weren't mandatory, then there could not be any

16

sort of standard: "This result, however, is obviously not what is intended by the ISP. The

17
18
19
20

ISP clearly did intend to promulgate standards, not just make optional, take or leave
suggestions for how an Intoxilyzer 5000 could be maintained and operated." At p. 389.
Boy was Judge Lansing wrong in this assessment of ISP. Judge Lansing also

21

notes, in footnote no. 7, the problem with the use of the term "approximately":
22

23
24

25
26

"There is no need here to go into an analysis of the propriety of using
the term "approximately" in a rule that is supposed to be setting defined
standards, but the problems caused by its use are as obvious as the
problems caused by the use of "should".
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At p. 390.
One would have to assume that the Court of Appeals wouldn't be very happy with

3
4

ISPFS if they had access to all ofthese e-mails and the fact that the people in charge of

5

the breath testing program in Idaho simply want to use "vagueness", "weasel words", and

6

"wiggle room". There are no breath testing standards. Judge Lansing's dissenting opinion

7

will become the majority opinion once the court has access to these e-mails and the real
8

9

thought behind the so called "standards" used by ISPFS. The Wheeler court reviewed the

10

mandatory provision of the SOP at the time of the Wheeler ALS. Those mandatory

11

provisions, like for the 15 minute wait, are now discretionary. Why!? See Exhibit 3,

12
13

Section 6.1 (should instead of must)

14

The court has to determine the credibility and competence of the arresting officer,

15

who was also the operator ofthe breath machine. In this particular instance, the arresting

16

office failed to properly advise Mr. Besaw ofthe requirement set out in I.C. § 18-8002A.

17
18

Trooper Talbott specifically indicated that he did not read the bold capitalized letters at

19

the bottom of the advisory section of the advisory form. He specifically failed to read the

20

following:

21
22
23
24

"THIS SUSPENSION FOR FAILURE OR REFUSAL OF THE
EVIDENTIARY TEST(S) IS SEPARATE FROM ANY OTHER
SUSPENSION ORDERED BY THE COURT."
Mr. Besaw asked about the consequences of his CDL Class A license, the officer

25
26
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indicated to Mr. Besaw that there wasn't any real difference or there wasn't a consequence
different then the advisory. On the witness stand, Trooper Talbott indicated that he

3
4

provided wrong information to Mr. Besaw and that there is a substantial difference in the

5

consequence for someone who has a Class A license. T. at p. 91. The court can note that

6

the consequence is a year's license suspension for a Class A license. Mr. Besaw had a

7

Class A License at the time of the arrest
8
9

State v. Bell, 115 Idaho 36,764 P.26 113 (Ct. App. 1988) interprets I.C. §18-

10

8004(4). The statute allows alcohol results, either blood, breath or urine, to be introduced

11

into evidence without an expert testifYing regarding the same. The Court of Appeals

12
13

14
15
16
17
18

19
20

21

22
23
24
25

26

stated:
"The admissibility of the result of a scientific test such as the bloodalcohol test in I.C. § 18-8004 turns normally on a foundation which
establishes the acceptability, validity, reliability and accuracy of the test
and test procedures. In the admission of a test result for alcohol
concentration the Legislature has concluded that certain foundational
elements need not be presented at trial unless such elements are
disputed. The Legislature has acknowledged that certain tests, due to
a history of reliability and accuracy, are presumed to be valid and
acceptable ... The Legislature has enacted a statutory scheme which
allows an expedient method for admitting a blood-alcohol test result
into evidence without the need for some expert testimony ... Inherent in
this statutory scheme, however, is an awareness by the Legislature of
the need for uniform test procedures. An "extremely reliable" test result
can only be the product of a test procedure which from previous use is
known to be capable of producing an accurate result. This benefit is
best provided by strict adherence to a uniform procedure. This was
recognized by the Legislature and is apparent first, from the statutory
language which provides for the test procedure to be determined by the
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Idaho Department of Health and Welfare, and second, by the "shall"
language mandating adherence to the standards set by that
Department. "

2
3

4

At p. 39

5

The e-mails that were produced, based on freedom of information requests,

6

regarding the changes to the Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) are replete with the use

7

of vague language, "wiggle room", and "weasel words s". ISP Forensic Services (ISPFS)

8
9

has detennined that it is more interested in getting past legal challenges then setting up

10

scientific standards that will follow the requirements of Bell and I. C. § 18-8004(4). Also,

11

it's clear that Skylar Anderson, who is currently under investigation by ISPFS was

12
13

instrumental in adapting the SOP and reference manuals that were in place at the time Mr.

14

Besaw was tested. The court can go through the e-mails and note that the people that are

15

making suggestions are not scientists. There is very little science discussed in these e-

16

mails that were generated regarding the changes to the SOPs.

17

The court can look at the e-mail found at page 002, where Matthew Garnette notes

18

19

that there area couple of changes he would like to make to the IDAPA rules. He states:

20

"They are fairly minor, but are causing all kinds of issues in court."

21

Vlhy is ISPFS worrying about court issues? They should be worried about
22
23
24

scientific standards and not what makes life easier for prosecutors, ALS hearing officers
S

25

Note E-mails are bate stamped for ease of reference a11d are attached to the '.vritten closing argument. The e-mails were made
part of the record at the hearing on May 13, 2011,

26
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and police officers.
On page 003, there is a discussion involving Skylar Anderson and the use of the

3
4

term "approximately". On page 005, there is a discussion regarding the MIP/MIC

5

procedure as simply being a best practices provision and not a standard. On page 006,

6

there is an e-mail from Eric Moody to Mr. Gamette, noting that he is one of the Idaho

7

TranspOliation Department (lTD) hearing officers. Renotes that two (2) attorneys during
8
9

10
11

oral argument noted problems with the SOP that was in effect for that particular set of
DUIs. The issue involved the 1:\\'0 (2) minutes standard between breath samples.
ALS hearing officers have no business making these sorts of comments or

12
13
14
15
16

participating in scientific standards being developed for Idaho. ISPFS laboratory officials
are not above hiding and cheating as noted in the Brady material that is at page 104.
On page 009 ofthe e-mails, there is a discussion about the two (2) minute window
between breath samples. The standards should be developed based on science, not on

17
18
19
20

what helps prosecute drivers who have been stopped for DUls.
On page 013, there is a specific e-mail from Darren Jewkes to several employees
of the ISPFS. Mr. Jewkes states:

21
22
23

"I am not sure ifI dare ask, but are there any other parts ofthe SOP that
you feel needs immediate attention, such as changing "will" to "may"
or "approximately" or doing away with "monthly" etc. (Jeremy here
is your chance:)."

24

25
26

It is interesting to note that in this e-mail, Darren Jewkes actually uses the ":)"
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symbol. Is this the way scientists should be acting, is this the way standards are
developed?

3

On page 015, Jeremy Johnson uses the words: " .... I am just suggesting putting in

4

5

some wiggle room language ... " and "cases are being tossed"( emphasis added). Where

6

is the science in using "wiggle room" language. The ISP concern seems to be that cases

7

are being tossed. Whether cases get tossed really isn't relevant to a discussion as to the
8
9

scientific standards for breath testing.

10
11

There are also discussions regarding the use ofthe 0.2 solution and the need for
linearity. The only one who seems to be concerned about standards is David Laycock. On

12
13

14

page 016, he notes: "I just don't think this is the time to cut back on quality standards."
He goes into a discussion about compliance with SOP. In fact, Jeremy Johnson notes:

15

"It is good scientific practice to check linearity because that lends
credence to accuracy ofthe numbers that the instrument generates."

16
17

At p. 018.

18

Of course, then the e-mails note the ability to just put all sorts oflanguage in that

19
20

21

22

protects the operators by having someone come in and testify around any problems. At
p.019.
There is also a discussion by Jeremy Johnston noting that a mandatory word like

23

"must" would be replaced with a discretionary word like "should". Again, where is the
24

25
26

science? \\That would Judge Lansing say about this?
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On page 020 of the e-mails, Jeremy Johnston uses the term "wiggle room"
regarding the 0.20 language. On page 021 the term "wiggle room" is used again

3

4

regarding the simulator.

5

Jared Olson, who is the Traffic Safety Resource Prosecutor for the Idaho

6

Prosecuting Attorneys Association, seems to be instrumental in making changes. Why a

7

non-scientist prosecutor is involved in any process involving generating standards must
8

9

10
11

be considered suspect.
Anne Nord indicates that the SOP is "an operator SOP". At p. 036.
There is also a discussion involving Skylar Anderson and the use of the word

12
13

"approximately". He notes that he thinks the word "approximately" creates ambiguity in

14

the method and creates room for debate regarding when a perfonnance verification is

15

valid. He notes:

16

"In this forensic lab, we all have strict deadlines regarding when we can
use a solution and I thinkBTSs are responsible enough to be held to a
strict standard."

17
18
19
20

Atp.036.
This language seems pretty laughable considering the investigation that Mr.

21

Anderson is under, but the words that he uses are to the point, "wiggle room" words are
22
23

24

used to create ambiguity in the method and creates debate.
On page 040, Anne Nord, states:

25

26
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"I want to thank both of you for all the work you have put in on these.
I hope we start seeing the payoff soon and some of these issues we
have been having with court interpretations will go away."

2
3

4

Why is ISPFS worrying about court decisions instead of simply making scientific

5

standards? It is obvious that ISPFS is not interested in science. ISPFS is interested in

6

convicting DUI drivers.

7

Christine Starr, who is a prosecutor, has also had input into the development of the
8
9

10

standards. Her scientific background is not known. Most likely, she has none since she
is prosecutor. Jeremy Johnston notes:

11

"I think we should limit it to police officers and attorneys. Defense
might try to use something in the e-mail to their advantage if they find
about it before the officers and prosecutors."

12

13
14
15

16

Atp.051.
At page 054, there is a discussion with Jeremy Johnston noting that he doesn't
want the guidelines to read as mandatory because he knows some BTSs use the nuclear

17
18

19
20

approach and change solutions ifthey get an initial failed series oftests. So again, how
can the current SOP be mandatory. Standards are not guidelines. The holding in State v.
Bell, eCt. App. 1988), supra, does not support the current SOP as a standard. The current

21

SOP is written so that nothing is mandatory.
22
23

On page 055, Jared Olson, asks questions about the term "calendar month" and the

24

use of the word "should" and noted that the procedure is a suggestion. Jeremy Johnston

25
26
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decides that he can manipulate the requirements regarding the two samples requirement
being approximately two (2) minutes apart. See page 063. On August 24,2010, Jesse

3

4

Avery asks a question:
"According to 5.1.2 of the Sop's there should be an air blank between
the 2 verification checks on a lifeloc. The lifeloc does not perform an
air blank when doing a wet check. Is there something else we need to
be doing?"

5

6

7
8
9

At p. 064.
Matthew Garnette notes on August 24, 2010:

10

"I just talked to Jared and he is going to have a few more prosecutors
read the SOP over and he may have a few more comments."

11

12
13

14
15

At p. 066.
Again, why is ISPFS asking prosecutors for input regarding scientific standards.
On August 25 th 2010, Jared Olsen says:

16

"As a disclaimer; I recognize that there is absolutely no way the SOPs
can be constructed in a way that will not result in attacks in court."

17
18

At p. 068.

19

20

With regard to the August 25 th e-mail, Jeremy Johnson responds from page 068

21

through page' 072. The court can note the discussion regarding the 0.8 solution, the 0.2

22

solution, the tenn "calendar month" and Jeremy Johnson's concern about Clark & Feeney

23

coming up with a "legit argument" for the term "routinely". Jeremy Johnston also notes

24
25

26

on page 070: "I removed the "open door suggestions" and just left if[ sic] vague." Jeremy
APPELLANT'S BRlEF

47
LAW OFFICES OF

CLARK

AND

FEENEY, LLP

LEWISTON, IDAHO 83501

1

2

Johnson decides that he is going to explain the scientific standards he has developed as
follows:

3

"I thought that I had added enough weasel words to allow for different
jurisdictions to use their own policies and beliefs to decide." (emphasis
added).

4

5
6

At p. 071.

7

On page 072 there is a discussion about that word "should" in that it is not being
8
9

10
11

mandatory; it simply allows for best practices as opposed to an actual standard.
1SP "scientist" Jeremy Johnson in an e-mail dated August 26, 2010, states: "Do
these pants make my butt look fat?" At. page 075. The scientific scholarship that is

12
13

14
15

found in these e-mails is simply mind-numbing. The level of childish comments is
inappropriate.
Jared Olsen writes about the real science behind the changes to SOPs:

16

"It would be good to get comments from some of the BTS's,
prosecutors in different jurisdictions and probably most importantly
your own AGs who could forward it on to the appellate division who
could offer some excellent insight. I recognize this is not a requirement
of ISPFS and I just want to reaftlrm my appreciation that you would
allow me to comment at all. I see only benefits by us working together.
So thanks again, and please let me know if you have questions or if I
can be of further assistance."

17
18
19
20
21
22

At p. 079.

23

Again, why involve prosecutors, attorney generals, and the appellate division of
24

25
26

the attorney generals' office in the development of legal standards. 1SPFS has not
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1

developed any scientific standards, it's simply developing "weasel words".

2

The court should make a determination that the "standards" in place on January 16,
3
4

2011, do not meet the requirements ofI.C. § 18-8004(4) and the holding in State v. Bell

5

(supra). The court has a challenge in front of it. Is the court going to comply with the

6

statutory requirements set out in I.C. § 18-8004(4) or is it simply going to follow the party

7

line.
8
9

The breath testing specialist and operator in this particular case indicated that he

10

had not been trained or certified on the SOP that was put into effect on November 1,

11

2010. Therefore, he could not meet the standards set out in Masterson v. Department of

12

13

Transportation, 150 Idaho 126,244 P.3d 625 (Ct. App. 2010).
CONCLUSION

14
15

The trial court failed to apply the case law regarding the need for standards in

16

breath testing pursuant to I.e. § 18-8004(4). The trial court failed to act as a gatekeeper
17
18

regarding the field sobriety tests. Not every problem goes to the weight, therefore, the

19

filed sobriety test should have been suppressed. Finally, the breath test should have been

20

suppressed because of the failure to have a proper observation period and because of the

21
22

failure to use the correct solution for prefonnation verification.

23
24

25

26
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2

DATED this

2L day of January, 2012.

3

4
5

6

. Stro chein, a member of
the firm. Attorneys for Defendant.

7

8
9

10
11

12
13

14
15
16
17
18
19
20

9--

I hereby certify on the
day of January, 2012, a true copy
of the foregoing instrument
Mailed
was:
Faxed
Hand delivered
Overnight mail to:

L

Justin J. Coleman
Deputy Prosecutor
Nez Perce County Prosecutor's Office
P.O. Box 1267
Lewiston, ID 83501

CLARK and FEENEY,

L~
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIA~ DISTRICT OF'
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LATAH

DEREK RUSSELL CAMPBELL,
Petitioner,
VS.

)
)
)
)

Case No. CV-l0-401
MEMORANDUM OPINION

)

)
STATE OF IDAHO"
)
TRANSPORTATION DEPARTMENT, )
)
Respondent.
),

--------~----------~--~)
Derek Russell Campbell ("Campbell") has petitioned this Court for judicial
review of the administrative suspension of his driver's license. which was imposed by
the Idaho Transportation Department r'the DepartmentU ) .

BACKGROUND
On March 17,2010, at 3:12 a.m., Idaho State Police Corporal Oint BaJ.dwin

("Baldwin") stopped the pickup Campbell,was driving for speeding; straddJ.iD.g a l~e
diVider, and weaving on Jacks<;Jn Street in Moscow, Idaho. The stop was recorded
visually via arecorder located in the front of Baldwin's patrol car and audibly via a
1
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microphone located on Baldwin's perso:i:t. Another officer (whose name does not
appear in the record) arrived to assist Baldwin. 'Noting Campbell's slurred speech, the
smell of alcohol, and his admission to having consumed some alcohol that night,
i

Baldwin had Campbell exit his pickup to verform some field sobriety tests (Fsts ').
(Video at 5:30.)

Balp.~then checked Camphell's mouth.

(Video at 5:45.)

After administering the FSTs Baldwin walked Campbell to the passenger side
,

'

of the patrol car. Baldwinleft Campbell at the passenger side ~f the car, turned., and
went around the fr6nt of the car to the opposite side to retrieve a testing device frOn:L
inside. It took him approximately eleven seconds, during which time he slammed the
car's door and another vehicle pass7d. (Video from 11:44 to 11:55.)- Later, after
. Baldwin read Campbell the refusal paperwork, Campbell asked Baldwin a question, to
which Campbell re$ponded "fD;l sorry, I could:i:t't hear you;" apparently due t~ the
noise of a passing vehicle. (Video q,t 17:14.)

, Later, while still next to ~pbelL Baldwin got the Ufeloc FC20 (a :breath
alcohol testing device) ready, dUring which a long series of loud beeps were heard. '
(Video from 18:42 to 20:59.) eru:npbell's first attempt'to submit a sample .f,ailed
because he apparently did not blow hard enough. (Video at 22:35.) The second
.
.
sample registered .158. (Video at 24:57,) The third sample registered .145. (Video at
,

27:26.) Carripbell was arrested for driving under the influence df alcohol in violation
of IDAHO CODE A.NN. § 18-8004 (2004).

2

-\~
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:'JU"

The Department suspended Campbell; s driver's license. Campbell sought

r'

, review' of that suspension. At his administrative license suspension AlS") hearing,
.

.

'

.

his attorney argued that the fifteen-m:inute monitoring period had not been observed~ .
Hearing Officer Mark Richrriond thereafter issued findings of tact and conclusions of
law and order, sustaiIring Campbell's license suspension. In his firidings, the Hearing
,Officer indicated that, based on Baldwin's affidavit, the breath test complied with
.
.
Idaho law arid Idaho State Police Standard Operating Procedures. Find~gs of Fact
.

'

and Conclusions of Law and Order ("FFCLO

Tf
)

at 5. On appeal, Campbell argues that

the fifteen-minute monitoring period was not observed and that there were
insufficient breath samples to suspend hiS license.
STANDARD OF REVIEW

AccordIDgto IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-8002A(8) (2010), "[a] party aggrieved by
the decision of the hearing officer may seekjuclicia1 review of the decision in,the
manner proVided for judicial review of final agency action provided in chapter 52, title
67'.~daho Code." A co:ru;t must affirm the action under review unless the agency's

findings, iDferences, conclusions, or ciecisions (a) violate statutory or constitutional
prOVisions; (b) excee<:i- the.agency's statutory authority; (c) are made upon unlawful
_ procedure; (d) are not supported by-substantial evidence in the record as a wholei or
(e) are arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 67-5279(3)
,

.

(2004)" To succeed on review, a party challenging an ageIicy decision must
demonstrate that the agency erred i;n a manner specified in IDAHO CODE ANN. § 67-

3..
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5279(3) (~004). See IDAHO CODE ANN. § 67-5279(4) (2004); Price v. Payette County Bd. of

County eomm'rs'r 131 Id$o 426, 429,958 P.2d 583,586 (1998). The court's review
"must be c~nfined to the agency record. IDAHO CoDE ANN ..§ 67-5277 (2004). IDAHO
lt

.
.
CoDE ANN. § 67-5279(1)
1/

(2004) sta~ that when reviewing an agency decision, a court

shall not substitute its judgment for that of the agency as to the weight of tl}.e

evidence on qu~stions of fact." An agenCy' s f~ctua1 determinations are binding on a
reviewing court, even where there is conflicting evidence before the agency, so lon~ as
the determinations are supported by substantial evidence on the record. Marshall v.

state Dep't ofTransp., 137 Idilio 337,340,48 P.3d 666, 669 (Ct. App. 2002) (citations
orriitted).
ANALYSIS

J..

Baldwin failed. to sufficiently monitor Campbell: for the required fifteen minutes.

Breath alcohol tests must be administered accorrung to Idaho State Police
Stand~d Operating Procedures: Breath Alcohol Testing (IfISP SOPs") in order for their

results to enjoy a presumption of reliability. Schroeder, 147 Idaho at 478, 210 P 3d at
586. At the time of the administrative hearing in this case, the applicable ISP SOP had
been revised in July of 2009.

If the necessary procedures are not strictly followed, test results will be
. inadinissible unless the State can e;;tablish, through expert testimony I the resultsl
reliability notwithstanding the procedural deviation.

Ia..

(relying on State v. ·Chtiran,

132 Idaho 341,342-44/ 971 P.2d 1165,1166-68 (Ct. App.1999)). Accordingly,
4
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II

(nloncompliance with:these procedures is. one of the .grounds for vacating an

a~trative license suspension under L C. § 18-8002A(7)(d)." Mahurin v.

State,

Dep't afTrans. (In re Suspension of the Driver's Licens~ of Mahurin), 140 Idaho 656, 658:-59,
99 P.3d 125,127-28 (Ct App. 2004). As noted·in Wheelerv. ldalw Tra.nsportation

Department, 148 Idaho 378,_ 1 223 P.3d 761,768 (Ct. App. 2009), the mandatory
nature of these rules is established through use of the word "must." The Department
is given no leeway where a mandatory procedural requirement is con~erned.
One such required procedure is the fifteen-~ute pre-test waiting period
during which "the [test] subject must be monitored ... [and1 the subject should notbe
allowed to smoke, drii-ik, eat or belch/burp:' ISP SOP § 3.1. Such events could
introduce alcohol mto the subject's mouth. Carsan, 133 Idaho at 453,' 988 P.2d at 227. If

any of those events occur, the operator must wrut another fifteen minutes, before
testing, to allow re-absorption to occUr. State v: DeFranco, 143 Idaho 335, 337, 144: P.3d
40,42 (et. App. 2006). During the fifteen-minute monitoring period, lithe operator
must b~ alert for any event that might influence the accuracy of tlle breath test." ISP
SOP § 3.1.5.

The mandated monitoring period is "not an onerous burden" unfairly foisted
upon law enforcement officials. Defranco, 143 Idaho at 338, 144 P.3d at 43.· The
operator is not required to stare fixedly" at the subject for fifteen ti:rlnutes. Bennett v;

.

fr

.

State, bep't of Transp., 147 Idaho 141, 144,206 P.3d 505/508 (Ct. App. 2009) (citation
omitted). However, the ~onitoring must "be such as could reasonably be expected to

5
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. accomplish the purpose of the. requirement." Carson, 133 Idaho at 453, 988 P.2d at 227.

This requirement is ordmarily met if the operatq~ stays in cl~ physical proximity to ..
If

the test subject so that the officerl s senses of sight, smell and hearing can.
.

be

.

employed" DeFran~o, 143 Idaho at 338, 144 P.3d at 43. Use of sight alone, however, is
not enough. Bennett, 147 Idahq at 144, 206 P.3d at 508.
Idaho CoUlj:s have found noncompliance "With the fifteen-minute monitoring
period in several instances.
In Bennett, the court found noncompliance because the.
.

offi~er left the room twice during the monitonng perind. 147 Idaho at 145, 206 P.3d at

509. In De~artCof the court found noncompliance where ~e officer
left the patrol car's rear door ajar and then entered through the front passenger
. door, called dispatch momentarily, and removed his breathalyzer equipment '" .
[from the] front seat .... [and] walked around to the rear of the vehicle,
opened the trunk and looked through a file box in the trunk ...
143 Idaho at 336, 144 P.3d at 41. The court found nonCompliance even though the
officer testified he could see DeFranco through the gap between the trunk and the
vehicle and that he would have heard a bu.Tp. Id. In Carson the court found
noncompliance where the officer wa~hed the ~bject intermittently through the
mirror while driving hfm to the ~ti.on, the officer had a hearing aid, it was raining,
and the wmdshield wipers were on. Carson,.133 Idaho at 453, 988 P.2d at 227..
"

In this case, Baldwin left Campbell on the passenger side of his patrol car and .
. went arouild the front of the car to its opposite side to retrieve

the testing device. This

is similar to the officer's' actions in DeFranco. This activity took Baldwin
6
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approximately eleven seconds, dui:ing \'\Thich time he closed his door· and another
. '
.

. vehicie paSsed. (Video from 11:44 to 11:55.) While Baldwin's affidavit indica~s that

he observed the mandatory fifteen-minute waiting period, an affidavit alone is
/I

insufficient to support a finding that proper procedures were followed." Bennett, 147
Idaho at 145,. 206 P.3d at 509. This is especially true where the video contradicts the
affidavit
Even if Baldwin could see Campbell throughout his eleven-second trip to the
driver's side of the patrol car (which is not evident from the video),it is d~ Baldwin
could not properly employ his senses of hearing and smell while he was away. There
is a record of passing cars making it difficult to hear. (Video at 17:1.) At the time
Baldwin went to the other side of his car not only did anothe~ vehicle pass, but he
. closed his car's door, which would have dro~ed ouf a belch. Requiring the operator
to remain ~ close proximity to the suspect :in order for him to utilize his senses of
. sight, smell, and hearing is a reasonable reqUirement. It minimizes the chance of error.
Since the use of sight aione is not enough to properly monitor a suspect, ;e,e Bennett,
147 Idahci at 144,206 P.3d at 508, the Hearing Officer's conclusion that Baldwin
properly monitored Campbell is not supported by substantial evidence. .
2. The result of the last breath sample is ~uffident to support a license
suspension.

The facts here. show that Baldwin attempted to take breath tE!St samples at 22:35"
24:57, and 27:26 into the stop: .As noted above, however, Baldwin left Campbell at the

7
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passenger side of the patrol car and went around to the opposite side to rebieve a
testing device from inside, returning to Campbell at 1~:55 into the stop. If Bal~lwin
" had, as required, re-started the fifteen-minute monitoring :period at that timer he could

have started testing 26:55 .into the stop. The first two tests, administered at 22:35 and
24:57, were not administered after a fifteen-minute monitoring period. Consequently,
they are not valid tests. That leaves only" one test sampie, the one 'done at 27:26~
having been done after the fifteen-!ffinute monitoring period expired. Having only
one valid test (absent facts not present here) is insuH;icient to suspend a driver's
license.
The Department argues that even if the first two testS were conducted in
.

violation of the monitoring requirements, the last one

.

was not and therefore

constitutes a sufficiEmt basis to suspend CampbeU's driver's license. While the
Department does not.have any appellate authority for this contention; it does cite a
decision from another District Judge for this proposition. See, In the Matter. of the

Drimng Privileges of Jeffrey D. Simler, No. CV07-01649 (ID Dist Ct,Nov. 21r 2007). In
Simler, Judge Brudie concluded that" while the first breath test was adrninister~d after

only fourteen minutes of observation and was ,therefore :inadrrrissible, the second
breath te:5t was administered one ininute later .and thus, provided sufficient evidence
/I

in the record for Hearing Officer Moody to find the evidentiary breath test was

properly adririnistered." Id. at 5. Suffice it to say, this

Cou:t disagrees with Judge

Brodie's analysis. .
8
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.,

I"

,3

provided during a m;eath testing seguence.1( ISP SOP § 3.2 states that a breath test'

. .

.

consist? of two breath samples. It reads "ra] breath alcohol test includes two (2) valid
breath samples taken during the testing sequence and separated by air blanks." ISP
.

.

secon~ or third adeqUl?-te sample as requested by the operator, the single test result

may be considered valid.." The ISP SOP does not provide an):' other way by which a
. single sampIe can be considered v?lid..
The ISP SOP language unambiguo-pBly states that a breath test consists of two
.'

valid'samples and that one sample is not sufficient unless the lone test.is the fault of .
the subject There is :1).0 suggestion that the lone valid test was the result of anything
Campbell did. As a result; the Hearing Officer's conclusion that the evidentiary test
.
.
was performed in compliance with Idaho -law and lSP standard operating procedUre"
U

is not supported by substantial evidence.

CONCLUSION.
The HearingOfficer's findings are not supported by substantial evidence in the
record as a whole. Consequently, the Hearing Officer's. decision is vacated and the case
. is remanded to the Hearing Officer.

T?ated ~

X

S'

'.

'.

day of October 2010.

r'\~.

J~ R Stegner.
District Judge

9
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LATAH

DOUGLASS.DENNESON,

)
Case No. CV-2010-1363

)

Petitioner,

)

MEMORANDUM OPINION

)

vs.

)
)

STATE OF IDAHO
)
TRANSPORTATION DEPARTMENT, )
)

Respondent.

)

Douglas S. Denneson ("Denneson") has petitioned this Court for judicial
review of the administrative suspension of his driver's license which was im.posed
by the Idaho Transportation Department ("the Department").

BACKGROUND
On Septem.ber 26, 2010, at approximately 10:48 a.m., Idaho State Police
Trooper Jacob Schwecke ("Schwecke") stopped the pickup Denneson was driving
for speeding on U.s. Highway 95. The stop occurred near milepost 358 in Latah
County, north of Moscow. The stop was recorded visually via a recorder located in the front of Schwecke's patrol car and audibly via a microphone located on
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1

Schwecke's person. Schwecke approached Denneson and stated he could smell
alcohol coming from the vehicle. After Denneson admitted to having consumed
alcohol the night before, Schwecke asked him to exit the truck to perform some
field sobriety tests by the side of the road on Highway 95. After conducting the
horiiontal gaze nystagmus test, Schwecke told Denneson he was going to start the
fifteen-minute mandatory waiting period. Schwecke then checked Denneson's
mouth.
Schwecke next walked Denneson back to the passenger side of hiS patrol
car, proceeding slightly ahead of Denneson and to his right. Schwecke continued
to converse with Denneson. Schwecke then retrieved some items from inside his
patrol car. The two then walked back to Denneson's vehicle with Denneson
proceeding slightly ahead of Schwecke and to Schwecke's right.
Schwecke next explained the walk and turn test to Denneson,
demonstrating part ofit for him. Duringthe demonstration, Schwecke looked
down at his feet and turned his back to Denneson for a total of 13 seconds. (Video
from 12;01;18 to 12:01:31.) Schwecke was positioned a short distance away from
Denneson during the demonstration.
, The two walked back to the patrol car again and S chwe eke ope~ed the car
door, retrieved the breath testing equipment, and closed the door. (Video ,at
12:04:48.) Numerous vehicles passed throughout the fifteen-minute observation
. period. Schwecke administered the first breath sample more than fifteen minutes
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2

after he initially checked Denneson's mouth. Denneson's BAC on the first test was
.035. On the second test 'his BAC measured .032. Because Denneson was under
twenty-one years old at the time, he was arrested for driving under the influence
of alcohol in violation ofLC. § 18-8004.
The Department suspended Denneson's driver's license. Denneson sought
review of his suspension through the administrative procedure available to him.
At the administrative license suspension ("ALS") hearing held on December 8,
2010, Denneson's attorney argued that the fifteen-minute monitoring period had
not been properly observed. Following the hearing, Hearing Officer Dustin Jansen
issued findings of fact and conchlsions oflaw, sustaining Denneson's license
suspension. In his findings, the Hearing Officer noted that "Officer Schwecke's
affidavit states the evidentiary test was performed in compliance with Idaho Law
and ISP Standard Operating Procedures." Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law and Order at 4. Additionally, the Hearing Officer stated that "[a]fter review
of the audio/video, it cannot be concluded that the observation period was not
properly administered." Id. On appeal, Denneson argues the fifteen-minute
monitoring period was not properly observed.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
According to I.e. § 18-8002A(8), "[a] party aggrieved by the decision ofthe
I

hearing officer may seek judicial re~ew of the decision in the manner provided for
judicial review of final agency action provided in chapter 52, title 67, Idaho Code."

3
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A court must affirm the action under review unless the agency's findings,
inferences, conclusions, or decisions (a) violate statutory or constitutional
provisions; (b) exceed the agency's statutory authority; (c) are made upon unlawful
procedure; (d) are not supported by substantial evidence in the record as a whole;
or (e) are arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion. I.C. § 67-5279(3). To
succeed on review, a party challenging an agency decision must demonstrate that
. the agency erred in a manner specified in I.C. § 67-5279(3). See LC. § 67-5279(4);

Price v. Payette County Ed. of County Comm'rs., 131 Idaho 426, 429,958 P.2d 583,
586 (1998). The court's review "must be confined to the agency record." I.C. § 675277. Idaho Code § 67-5279(1) states that when reviewing an agency decision, a
court "shall not substitute its judgment for that of the agency as to the weight of
the evidence on questions of fact." An agency's factual determinations are binding
on a reviewing court, even where there is conflicting evidence before the agency,so
long as the determinations are supported by substantial evidence on the record.

IMarshall v. State Dep't of Transp., 137 Idaho 337,340,48 P.3d 666,669 (Ct. App.
2002) (citations omitted).
Resolution of this issue turns on the identification and construction of the
regulations governing the administration of the breath test. This is a question of
law over which this Court exercises free review. State v.Remsburg, 126 Idaho
.338, 339, 882 P.2d 993, 994 (Idaho Ct. App. 1994); see also In re Schroeder, 147
Idaho 476, 479,210 P.3d584, 587 (Idaho Ct. App. 2009) (stating that the
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interpretation and application of statutory law and administrative rules or
regulations presents purely legal issues over which appellate courts have free
review).

ANALYSIS
1. Schwecke failed to sufficiently monitor Denneson for the required

fifteen minutes.
Breath alcohol tests must be administered according to Idaho State Police
Standard Operating Procedures: Breath Alcohol Testing ("ISP SOPs") in order for
their results to enjoy a presumption of reliability. In re Schroeder, 147 Idaho 476,
478,210 P.3d 584, 586; see also ISP SOP §6. The purpose behind the mandatory
monitoring period is to make sure the operator observes the subject for any event
that might make the results of the test inaccurate through the introduction of
mouth alcohol. State v. Carson, 133 Idaho 451,453,988 P,2d 225, 227 (Ct. App.
1999).
If the necessary procedures are not strictly followed, test results will be

inadmissible unless the State can establish, through expert testimony, the
reliability of the results notwithstanding the procedural deviation. Id. (relying on
State v. Charan, 132 Idaho 341, 343, 971 P.2d 1165, 1167 (Ct. App. 1999».
Accordingly, "[n]oncompliance with these procedures is one of the grounds for
vacating an administrative license suspension under 1. C. § 18-8002A(7) (d)." In re
lvlahurin, 140 Idaho 656, 658--59, 99 P.3d 125, 127-28 (Ct. App. 2004). As notedin
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fVheeler v. Idaho Transportation Department, 148 Idaho 378,386,223 P.3d 761,
768 (Ct. App. 2009), the mandatory nature ofthese rules is established through
use of the word "must." The Department is given no leeway where a mandatory
procedural requirement is concerned.
One such required procedure is the fifteen-minute pre-test waiting period
during which "the [test] subject must be monitored ... [and) the subject Shollld not
be allowed to smoke, drink, eat, or belchfburp." ISP SOP § 6.1. Such events could
introduce alcohol into the subject's mouth. Carson, 133 Idaho at 453, 988 P .2d at
227. If any of those events occur, the operator must wait another fifteen mmutes,
before testing, to allow re-absorption to occur. State v. DeFranco, 143 Idaho 335,
337, 144 P.3d 40,42 (Ct. App. 2006). Further, the ISP SOP provide that, "[d]uring ,
the monitoring period, the Operator must be alert for any event that might
influence the accuracy of the breath test." ISP SOP§ 6.1.4.
The mandated monitoring period is "not an onerous burden" unfairly foisted
upon law enforcement officials. DeFranco, 143 Idaho at 338, 144 P.3d at

43~

The

operator is not required to "stare fixedly" at the subject for fifteen minutes.
Bennett v. State,' Dep't of Transp., 147 Idaho 141, 144, 206 P .3d 505, 508 (Ct. App.
2009) (citB:tion omitted). However, the monitoring must "be such as could
reasonably be expected to accomplish the purpose of the requirement." Carson,
133 Idaho at 453,988 P.2d at 227. This requirement is ordinarily met lithe
operator "stays in close physical proximity to the test subject so that the officer's
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senses of sight, smell and hearing can be emplo.yed."

DeFranco~

143 Idaho at 338,

144 P.3d at 43. Use of sight alone, however, is not enough. Bennett, 147 Idaho at
144, 206 P.3d at 508. When an

offic~r's

sense of sight,is impaired, he must be able

to use his senses of hearing and smell to properly observe the subject. DeFranco,

143 Idaho at 338, 144 P.3d at 43.
Idaho courts have found noncompliance with the fifteen-minute monitoring
period in several instances. In Bennett, the court found noncompliance because
the officer left the room twice during the monitoring period, 147 Idaho at 145,206
P.3d at 509. In DeFranco, the court found noncompliance where the officer
left the patrol car's rear door ajar and then entered through the front
passenger door, called dispatch momentarily, and removed his breathalyzer
equipment ... [from the] front seat .... [and] walked around to the rear of
the vehicle, opened the trunk and looked through a file box in the trunk ...
143 Idaho at 336, 144 P.3d at 41. There, the court found noncompliance even
though the officer testified he could see DeFranco through the gap between the
trunk and the vehicle and that he would have heard a burp. Id. In Carson, the
court found noncompliance where the officer watched the subject intermittently
through the mirror while driving him to the station. Also in Carson, the officer
had a hearing aid, it was raining, and the windshield wipers were on. 133 Idaho
at 453, 988 P .2d at 227:
In contrast to Bennett, DeFranco; and Carson is State v. Remsburg, 126
Idaho 338, 339,882 P.2d 993,994 (Ct. App. 1994). In Remsburg, the court found
compliance where the officer sat next to the subject and progTammed the testing
:MEMORANTIUM OPINION
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device, waited for it to warm up, and read the required advisory to her. In
Remsburg, although the officer failed to maintain visual contact, he appeared to
have full use of his other senses.
In this case, Schwecke was not always in a physical position to watch
Denneson, or alternatively to use his sense of smell and hearing to accomplish the
purpose of the

~onitoring

period. While Schwecke's affidavit indicates he properly

observed the mandatory fifteen-minute waiting period, "an affidavit alone is
insufficient to support a finding that proper procedures were followed." Bennett v.
State, Dep't of Transp., 147 Idaho at 145, 206P.3d at 509. The Court must look at
the record as a whole.
From the time the fifteen-minute waiting period began, to the time the
initial breath sample was taken, over seventy vehicles passed by on U.S. Highway
95, which is a busy two-lane road. (Video from 11:59:00 to 12:15:54.) Schwecke's
attention was occasionally diverted from Denneson, and circumstances indicate
Schwecke's senses of hearing and smell were also inhibited. Schwecke and
Denneson were outside of their. cars during the entire fifteen minutes, and similar
to the officer's actions in DeFranco, on two different occasions Schwecke leaned in
to retrieve items out of his patrol car. (Video at 11:59:46 and 12:05:52.) Although
Schwecke was not far from Denneson at this time, his attention. was diverted and
his senses were impaired when reaching into the car.
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Further, while demonstrating the walk and turn, Schwecke had his eyes to
the ground or his back turned to Denneson for thirteen seconds. (Video from
12:01: 17 to 12:01:30.) During the time Schwecke's vision was directed awayfrom
Denneson, passing traffic and the outdoor setting ,further inhibited his senses of
hearing and smell.

~4Jso,

during the demonstration Schwecke was worried about

avoiding passing traffic, further distracting him froni monitoring Denneson.
Finally, it is difficult to conclude that Schwecke was alert to any burps during the
administration of the Field Sobriety Tests ("FSTs") during the waiting period. To
properly administer the FSTs, Schwecke should have been focused on Denneson's
feet during the walk and turn and one leg stand tests. However, to properly
administer the waiting period, Schwecke needed to observe Denneson for any
burps or regurgitation. By trying to do two things at once, Schwecke was not
doing what is required by the SOPs. The large source of noise and inability to
smell any burps substantially impaired Schwecke's ability to supplement any
visual observations with his other senses to ensure nothing occurred that would
affect the accuracy of the test.
The standard set forth in the ISP .sop regarding the monitoring period is
the officer must be alert for anything that might affect the accuracy of the test. See
ISP SOP 6.1.4. (Emphasis added.) As Carson demonstrates,

an officer can be in

close proximity to the individual, but conditions may still exist that render the
monitoring period inadequate. It is clear that at several points during the
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monitoring pe<riod, Sc)1wecke could not properly employ his senses of hearing, sight
and smell. The Hearing Officer's conclusion that Schwecke properly monitored
Denneson is therefore not supported by substantial evidence.

CONCLUSION
The Heari~g Officer's findings are not supported by substantial evidence in
the record as a whole. Consequently, the ffearing Officer's decision is VACATED
and the case is REMANDED.

~V

Dated this _,_ day of July 2011.

YJ"V\. C)~
Job]{ R. Stegner
District Judge
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The results of this study provide a clear evidence of the validity of the 3-test
battery. To support arrest decisions at above or below 0.08, it strongly
suggests that the SFSTs also accurately discriminate BACs at 0.04 and
above.
OVERVIEW OF NrSTAGMUS

Nystagmus
Nystagmus is defined as an involuntary jerking of the eyes. Alcohol and certain
other drugs cause Horizontal Gaze Nytagmus.
Categories of Nystagmus
There are three general categories of nystagmus:
1.

Vestibular Nystagmus is caused by movement or action to the vestibular
system.
A

2.

Types of vestibular nystagmus:
o

Rotational Nystagmus occurs when the person is spun around or rotated
rapidly, causing the fluid in the inner ear to be disturbed. If it were
possible to observe the eyes of a rotating person, they would be seen to
jerk noticeably.

o

Post Rotational Nystagmus is closely related to rotational nystagmus:
when the person stops spinning, the fluid in the inner ear remains
disturbed for a period of time, and the eyes continue to jerk.

o

Caloric Nystagmus occurs when fluid motion in,the canals of the
vestibular system is stimulated by temperature as by putting warm
water in one ear and cold in the other.

o

Positional Alcohol Nystagmus (PAN) occurs when a foreign fluid, such
as alcohol, that alters the specific gravity of the blood is in unequal
concentrations in the blood and the vestibular system.

Nystagmus can also result directly from neural activity:
o

Optokinetic Nystagmus occurs when the eyes fixate on an object that
suddenly moves out of sight, or when the eyes watch sharply contrasting
moving images.
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Examples of optokinetic nystagmus include watching strobe lights, rotating
lights, or rapidly moving traffic in close proximity. The Horizontal Gaze
Nystagmus test will not be influenced by optokinetic nystagmus when
administered properly.
o

o

Phvsiological Nystagmus is a natural nystagmus that keeps the sensory
cells of the eye from tiring. It is the most common type of nystagmus. It
happens to all of us, all the time. This type of nystagmus produces
extremely minor tremors or jerks of the eyes. These tremors are generally
too small to be seen with the naked eye. Physiological nystagmus will have
no impact on our Standardized Field Sobriety Tests, because its tremors are
generally invisible.
Gaze Nystagmus occurs as the eyes move from the center position. Gaze
nystagmus is separated into three types:
(1) Horizontal Gaze Nystagmus occurs as the eyes move to the side. It is
the observation of the eyes for Horizontal Gaze Nystagmus that
provides the first and most accurate test in the Standardized Field
Sobriety Test battery. Although this type of nystagmus is most accurate
for determining alcohol impairment, its presence may also indicate use
of certain other drugs.
(2) Vertical Gaze Nystagmus is an involuntary jerking of the eyes (up and
down) which occurs when the eyes gaze upward at maximum elevation.
The presence of this type of nystagmus is associated with high doses of
alcohol for that individual and certain other drugs. The drugs that cause
Vertical Gaze Nystagmus are the same ones that cause Horizontal Gaze
Nystagmus.

••
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Note: There is no drug that will cause Vertical Gaze Nystagmus that
does not cause Horizontal Gaze Nystagmus. If Vertical Gaze
Nystagmus is present and Horizontal Gaze Nystagmus is not, it could
be a medical condition.
(3) Resting Nystagmus is referred to as a jerking of the eyes as they look
straight ahead. Its presence usually indicates a pathology or high doses
of a Dissociative Anesthetic drug such as PCP. If detected, take
precautions. (OFFICER SAFETY.)
3.

Nystagmus may also be caused by certain pathological disorders. They include
brain tumors and other brain damage or some diseases of the inner ear. These
pathological disorders occur in very few people and in even fewer drivers.
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1\1edical Impairment
The examinations that you can conduct to assess possible medical impairment
include:
o
o
o

Pupil size
Resting Nystagmus
Tracking ability
PROCEDURES

Procedures to Assess Possible Medical Impairment
Prior to administration of HGN, the eyes are checked for equal pupil size, resting
nystagmus, and equal tracking (can they follow an object together). If the eyes do
not track together, or if the pupils are noticeably unequal in size, the chance of
medical disorders or injuries causing the nystagmus is pr~sent.
Procedures of Horizontal Gaze Nystagmus Testing: The Three Clues
The test you will use at roadside is "Horizontal Gaze Nystagmus" -- an involuntary
jerking of the eyes occurring as the eyes gaze toward the side. Some jerking will be
seen if the eyes are moved far enough to the side.
1.

The Lack of Smooth Pursuit (Clue Number One) - The eyes can be observed to
jerk or "bounce" as they follow a smoothly moving stimulus, such as a pencil or
penlight. The eyes of an unimpaired person will follow smoothly, i.e., a marble
rolling across a smooth pane of glass, or windshield wipers moving across a wet
windshield.

2.

Distinct and Sustained Nystagmus At Maximum Deviat~on (Clue Number Two)
- Distinct and sustained nystagmus will be evident when the eye is held at
maximum deviation for a minimum of four seconds. People exhibit slight
jerking of the eye at maximum deviation, even when unimpaired, but this will
not be evident or sustained for more than a few seconds. When impaired by
alcohol, the jerking will be larger, more pronounced, sustained for more than
four seconds, and easily observable.

3.

Onset of Nvstagmus Prior To 45 Degrees (Clue Number Three) - The point at
which the eye is first seen jerking. If the jerking begins prior to 45 degrees it is
evident that the person has a BAC above 0.08, as shown by recent research.
The higher the degree of impairment, the sooner the nystagmus will be
observable.

APPELLANT'S BRIEF
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Estimating a 45-Degl'ee Angle

It is important to know how to estimate a 45-degree angle. How far you position the
stimulus from the suspect's nose is a critical factor in estimating a 45-degree angle.
(i.e., If the stimulus is held 12" in front of the suspect's nose, it should be moved 12H
to the side to reach 45 degrees. Likewise, if the stimulus is held 15" in front of the
suspect's nose, it should be moved 15" to the side to reach 45 degrees.)
For practice, a 45-degree template can be prepared by
making a 15 H-square cardboard and connecting its
opposite corners with a diagonal line.
To use this device, hold it up so that the person's nose is
above the diagonal line. Be certain that one edge of the
template is centered on the nose and perpendicular to
(or, at right angles to) the face. Have the person you are
examining follow a penlight or some other object until
suspect is looking down the 45-degree diagonal. Note
the position of the eye. With practice, you should be able
to recognize this angle without using the template.

/

/

Specific Procedures

If the suspect is wearing eyeglasses, have them removed.
Give the suspect the following instructions from a safe position. (FOR OFFICER
SAFETY KEEP YOUR "WEAPON AWAY FROM THE SUSPECT):
o
o
o

"I am going to check your eyes."
"Keep your head still and follow this stimulus with your eyes only."
"Keep following the stimulus with your eyes until I tell you to stop."

Position the stimulus approximately 12-15 inches from the suspect's nose and
slightly above eye level. Check to see that both pupils are equal in size. If they are
not, this may indicate a head injury. You may observe Resting Nystagmus at this
time, then check the suspect's eyes for the ability to track together. Move the
stimuluS smoothly across the suspect's entire field of vision. Check to see if the eyes
track the stimulus together or one lags behind the other. If the eyes don't track
together it could indicate a possible medical disorder, injury, or blindness.

APPELLANT'S BRIEF
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Check the suspect's left eye by mO\Ting the stimulus to your
right. Move the stimulus smoothly, at a speed that
requires approximately two seconds to bring the suspect's
eye as far to the side as it can go. While moving the
stimulus, look at the suspect's eye and determine whether
it is able to pursue smoothlv. Now, move the stimulus all
the way to the left, back across suspect's face checking if
the right eye pursues smoothly. Movement of the stimulus
should take approximately two seconds out and two
seconds back for each eye. Repeat the procedure.
After you have checked both eyes for lack of smooth pursuit, check the eyes for
distinct and sustained nystagmus at maximum deviation beginning with the
suspect's left eye. Simply move the object to the suspect's left side until the eye has
gone as far to the side as possible. Usually, no white will be showing in the corner
of the eye at maximum deviation. Hold the eye at that position for a minimum of
four seconds, and observe the eye for distinct and sustained nystagmus. Move the
stimulus all the way across the suspect's face to check the right eye holding that
position for a minimum of four seconds. Repeat the procedure.
Note : Fatigue Nystagmus. This type of nystagmus may begin if a subject's eyes are
held at maximum deviation for more than 30 seconds.
Next, check for onset of nystagmus prior to 45 degrees. Start moving the stimulus
towards the right (suspect's left eye) at a speed that would take approximately four
seconds for the stimulus to reach the edge of the suspect's shoulder. Watch the eye
carefully for any sign of jerking. When you see it, stop and verify that the jerking
continues. Now, move the stimulus to the left (suspect's right eye) at a speed that
would take approximately four seconds for the stimulus to reach the edge of the
suspect's shoulder. Watch the eye carefully for any sign of jerking. When you see
it, stop and verify that the jerking continues. Repeat the P12ocedure. NOTE: It is
important to use the full four seconds when checking for onset of nystagmus. If you
move the stimulus too fast, you may go past the point of onset or miss it altogether.
If the suspect's eyes start jerking
before they reach 45 degrees,
check to see that some white of
the eye is still showing on the side

ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES

l. CHECK FOR EYEGLASSES
2. VERBAL INSTRUCTIONS
. 3. POSITION STIMULUS (12-15 INCHES)
4. EQUAL PUPIL SIZE AND RESTING NYSTAGMUS
closest to the ear. If no white of
5. TRACKING
the eye is showing, you either
6. LACK OF SMOOTH PURSUIT
have taken the eye too far to the
7. DIST. & SUSTAIl\TED NYSTAGMUS @ MAX. DEV.
side (that is more than 45
8. ONSET OF NYSTAGMUS PRIOR TO 45°
9. TOTAL THE CLUES
degrees) or the person has
10. CHECK FOR VERTICAL GAZE NYSTAGMUS
unusual eyes that will not deviate I!::::===================:d

very far t o the. side.
APPELLANT'S BRIEF
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NOTE: Nystagmus may be due to causes other than alcohol. These other causes
include seizure medications and some other drugs. A large disparity between the
performance of the right and left eye may indicate a medical condition.
Test Interpretation
You should look for three clues of nystagmus in each eye.
1.
2.

3.

The eye cannot follow a moving object smoothly.
Nystagmus is distinct and sustained when the eye is held at maximum
deviation for a minimum of four seconds.
The angle of onset of nystagmus is prior to 45 degrees.

Based on the original research, if you observe four or more clues it is likely that the
suspect's BAC is above 0.10. Using this criterion you will be able to classify about
77% of your suspects accurately. This was determined during laboratory and field
testing and helps you weigh the various field sobriety tests in this battery as you
make your arrest decision.
Vertical Gaze Nvstagmus
The Vertical Gaze Nystagmus test is simple to administer. During the Vertical
Gaze Nystagmus test, look for jerking as the eyes move up and are held for
approximately four seconds at maximum elevation.
1.

Position the stimulus horizontallv, about 12-15 inches in front of the suspect's
nose.

2.

Instruct the suspect to hold the head still, and follow the object with the eyes
only.

3.

Raise the object until the suspect's eyes are elevated as far as possible.

4.

Hold for approximately four seconds.

5.

W?-tch closely for evidence of jerking.

Horizontal and Vertical Gaze Nystagmus can be observed directly and does not
require special equipment. You will need a contrasting stimulus for the suspect to
follow with their eyes. This can be the tip of your index finger, penlight, or pen.
The stimulus used should be held slightly above eye level, so that the eyes are wide
open when they look directly at it. It should be held approximately 12-15 inches in
front of the nose. Remain aware of your position in relation to the suspect at all
times.
APPELLANT'S BRIEF
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OFFICER SAFETY IS THE NUMBER ONE PRIORITY ON M'Y TRAFFIC
STOP.
Procedures for Walk-and-Turn Testing
1.

Instructions Stage: Initial Positioning and Verbal Instructions
For standardization in the performance of this test, have the suspect assume
the heel-to-toe stance by giving the following verbal instructions, accompanied
by demonstrations:

2.

o

"Place your left foot on the line" (real or imaginary). Demonstrate.

o

"Place your right foot on the line ahead of the left foot, with heel of right foot
against toe of left foot." Demonstrate.

o

"Place your arms down at your sides." Demonstrate.

o

"Maintain this position until I have completed the instructions. Do not start
to walkuntil told to do so."

o

"Do you understand the instructions so far?" (Make sure suspect indicates
understanding. )

Demonstrations and Instructions for the \\Talking Stage
Explain the test requirements, using the following verbal instructions,
accompanied by demonstrations:
o

"When I tell you to start, take nine heel-to-toe steps, turn, and take nine
heel-to-toe steps back." (Demonstrate 3 heel-to-toe steps.)

o

"When you turn, keep the front foot on the line, and turn by taking a series
of small steps with the other foot, like this." (Demonstrate).

o

"While you are walking, keep your arms at your sides, watch your feet at all
'times, and count your steps out loud."

o

"Once you start walking, don't stop until you have completed the test."

o

"Do you understand the instructions?" (Make sure suspect understands.)

o

"Begin, and count your first step from the heel-to-toe position as 'One.'"

APPELLANT'S BRlEF
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3.

Test Interpretation
You may observe a number of different behaviors when a suspect performs this
test. Original research demonstrated that the behaviors listed below are likely
to be observed in someone with a BAC above 0.10. Look for the following clues
each time this test is given:
A. Cannot keep balance while listening to the instructions. Two tasks are
required at the beginning of this test. The suspect must balance heel-to-toe
on the line, and at the same time, listen carefully to the instructions.
Typically, the person who is impaired can do only one of these things. The
suspect may listen to the instructions, but not keep balance. Record this
clue if the suspect does not maintain the heel-to-toe position throughout the
instructions. (Feet must actually break apart.) Do not record this clue if
the suspect sways or uses the arms to balance but maintains the heel-to-toe
position.

B. Starts before the instructions are finished. The impaired person may also
keep balance, but not listen to the instructions. Since you specifically
instructed the suspect not to start walking "until I tell you to begin," record
this clue if the suspect does not wait.
C. Stops while walking. The suspect pauses for several seconds. Do not record
this clue if the suspect is merely walking slowly.
D. Does not touch heel-to-toe. The suspect leaves a space of more than one-half
inch between the heel and toe on any step.

E. Steps off the line. The suspect steps so that one foot is entirely off the line.
APPELLANT'S BRIEF
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F. Uses arms to balance. The suspect raises one or both arms more than 6
inches from the sides in order to maintain balance.
G. Improper turn. The suspect removes the front foot from the line while
turning. Also record this clue if the suspect has not followed directions as
demonstrated, i.e., spins or pivots around.
H. Incorrect number of steps. Record this clue if the suspect takes more or
fewer than nine steps in either direction.
Note: If suspect can't do the test, record observed clues and document the
reason for not completing the test, e.g. suspect's safety.

If the suspect has difficulty with the test (for example, steps off the line),
continue from that point, not from the beginning. This test may lose its
sensitivity if it is repeated several times.
Observe the suspect from a safe distance and limit your movement which may
distract the suspect during the test. Always consider officer safety.
Based on original research, if the suspect exhibits two or more clues on this test
or fails to complete it, classify the suspect's BAC as above 0.10. Using this
criterion, you will be able to accurately classify 68% of your suspects.
4.

Test Conditions
Walk-and-Turn test requires a designated straight line, and should be
conducted on a reasonably dry, hard, level, nonslippery surface. There should
be sufficient room for suspects to complete nine heel-to-toe steps. Note: Recent
field validation studies have indicated that varying environmental conditions
have not affected a suspect's ability to perform this test."
The original research indicated that individuals over 65 years of age , back, leg
or inner ear problems had difficulty performing this test. Individuals wearing
heels more than 2 inches high should be given the opportunity to remove their
shoes.

5.

Combined Interpretation of Horizontal Gaze Nystagmus and Walk-and-Turn
Tests
Based on the original research, combining four or more clues of HGN and two or
more clues of the Walk-and-Turn, suspects can be classified as above 0.10 BAC
80% of the time.
,"- . ' ,.......
:)jb-
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Procedures for One-Leg Stand Testing
1.

Instructions Stage: Initial Positioning and Verbal Instructions
Initiate the test by giving the following verbal instructions, accompanied by
demonstrations.
o

"Please stand with your feet together and your arms down at the sides, like
this." (Demonstrate)

o

"Do not start to perform the test until I tell you to do so."

o

"Do you understand the instructions so far?" (M:ake sure suspect indicates
understanding. )
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2.

Demonstrations and Instructions for the Balance and Counting Stage
Explain the test requirements, using the following verbal instructions,
accompanied by demonstrations:
o

"When I tell you to start, raise one leg, either leg, with the foot
approximately six inches off the ground, keeping your raised foot parallel to
the ground." (Demonstrate one leg stance.)

o

"You must keep both legs straight, arms at your side."

o

"While holding that position, count out loud in the following manner: "one
thousand and one, one thousand and two, one thousand and three, until told
to stop." (Demonstrate a count, as follows: "one thousand and one, one
thousand and two, one thousand and three, etc." Officer should not look at
his foot when conducting the demonstration - OFFICER SAFETY.)
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o

"Keep your arms at your sides at all times and keep watching the raised
foot."

fit
f'

o

"Do you understand?" (M:ake sure suspect indicates understanding.)

f'

o

"Go ahead and perform the test." (Officer should always time the 30
seconds. Test should be discontinued after 30 seconds.)

Observe the suspect from a safe distance. If the suspect puts the foot down, give
instructions to pick the foot up again and continue counting from the point at
which the foot touched the ground. If the suspect counts very slowly, terminate
the test after 30 seconds.

f'
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3.

Test Interpretation
You may observe a number of different behaviors when a suspect performs this
test. The original research found the behaviors listed below are the most likely
to be observed in someone with a BAC above 0.10. Look for the following clues
each time the One-Leg Stand test is administered.

A. The suspect sways while balancing. This refers to side-to-side or back-andforth motion while the suspect maintains the one-leg stand position.
B. Uses arms for balance. Suspect moves arms 6 or more inches from the side
of the body in order to keep balance.
C. Hopping. Suspect is able to keep one foot off the ground, but resorts to
hopping in order to maintain balance.
D. Puts foot down. The suspect is not able to maintain the one-leg stand
position, putting the foot down one or more times during the 30-second
count.
Note: If suspect can't do the test, record observed clues and document the
reason for not completing the test, e.g. suspect's safety.
Remember that time is critical in this test. The original research has shown a
person with a BAC above 0.10 can maintain balance for up to 25 seconds, but
seldom as long as 30.
Based on original research, if an individual shows two or more clues or fails to
complete the One-Leg Stand, there is a good chance the BAC is above 0.10.
Using that criterion, you will accurately classify 65% of the people you test as to
whether their BAC's are above 0.10.
Observe the suspect from a safe distance and remain as motionless as possible
during the test so as not to interfere. If the suspect puts the foot down, give
instructions to pick the foot up again and continue counting from the point at
which the foot touched the ground. If the suspect counts very slowly, terminate
the "test after 30 seconds.
4.

Test Conditions
One-Leg Stand requires a reasonably dry, hard, level, and non-slippery surface.
Suspect's safety should be considered at all times.
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The original resea.l'ch indicated that certain individuals over 65 years of age,
back, leg or inner ear problems, or people who are overweight by 50 or more
pounds had difficulty performing this test. Individuals wearing heels more than
2 inches high should be given the opportunity to remove their shoes.
5.

Taking Field Notes on Suspects' Performance of Field Sobriety Tests
For purposes of the arrest report and courtroom testimony, it is not enough to
record the total number of clues on the three tests. The number of clues is
important to the police officer in the field because it helps determine whether
there is probable cause to arrest. But to secure a conviction, more descriptive
evidence is needed.
The officer must be able to describe how the suspect performed on the tests, and
exactly what the suspect did.
The standard note taking guide pro\rided in this Manual is designed to help you
develop a clear description of the suspect's performance on the tests.

6.

Taking Field Notes on The Eve Procedures
First, have subject remove glasses.
The section for Medical Assessment
appears at the bottom of the guide's
front page.

Equal Pupils
0 Yes 0 No
Equal Tracking
0 Yes 0 No
Vertical Nystagmus
0 Yes 0 No
Other (i.e., Resting Nystagmus) _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

,..

...
fill'

o
o

Check "Yes" or "No" box for equal pupil size.
Check "Yes" or "No" box for equal tracking.
r-----------------------------------~

In the section labeled "other", record
any facts, crrcumstances, conditions,
or observations that may be relevant
to this procedures (i.e., Resting
Nystagmus).

HORIZONTAL.GAZE NYSTAGMUS
LEFT

o

LACK OF SMOOTH PURSUIT

o

The section on the Horizontal Gaze
Nystagmus test appears on the
bottom of the guide's front side.

DISTINCT AND SUSTAINED
NYSTAGMUS AT MAXIMUM
DEVIATION

o

ONSET OF NYSTAGMUS
PRIOR TO 45 DEGREES

Complete the entire test for both
eyes, writing "yes" or "no" for each
nystagmus clue.

RIGHT

.....
fill

..
fill
fill
fill
fill
fill

....
fill
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HS 178 RS/06

.
fI

APPELLANT'S BRIEF
VIII-14

fIJI
t

o
o

Write "yes" if the clue is present;
Write "no" if the clue is not present.

In the section labeled "other," record any facts, circumstances, conditions or
observations that may be relevant to this test.
o

Examples of additional evidence of impairment emerging during nystagmus
test:
suspect unable to keep head still;
suspect swaying noticeably;
suspect utters incriminating statements.

o

Examples of conditions that may interfere with suspect's performance of the
Horizontal Gaze Nystagmus test:
wind, dust, etc. irritating suspect's eyes;
visual or other distractions impeding the test (always face suspect away
from rotating lights, strobe lights and traffic passing in close proximity).

7.

Taking Field Notes on Walk-and-Turn Testing
The section on the Walk-and-Turn test appears at the top of the guide's back
side.
WALK AND TURN

....

- . - ..

CANNOT KEEP BALANCE ,-----,

--

_

-

STARTS TOO SOON

FIRST NINE STEPS

.

"',
..

SECOND NINE STEPS

STOPS WALKING
MISSES HEEL -TO- TOE
STEPS OFF LINE
RAISES ARMS
ACTUAL STEPS TAKEN

IMPROPER TURN (Describe)
CANNOT DO TEST (EXPLAIN)

I~O_T~:~:p~RE~:L~L~A~N~T~'S~B~ru~E~F------------------------------------~~40
HS 178 R8/06

VIII-15

The first two clues, "cannot keep balance" and "starts too soon" apply only
during the instructions stage of the test. Record the number of times each of
those clues appear.
For example, if the suspect's feet "break apart" from the heel-to-toe stance twice
during the instructions stage, write "2" in the box alongside the "cannot keep
balance" clue. Similarly, if the suspect never "starts too soon," write "0" in that
box. Note: Actual steps taken is for scoring purposes only. Wrong number of
steps is the validated clue.
Don't leave boxes blank. If a particular clue never shows up , write "0" in the
corresponding box.
Record the next five clues separately for the walk down the line, and then up
the line.
A. If a suspect stops walking, record it by drawing a vertical line across the toe
of the step at which the stop occurred. Do this for the first as well as the
second nine steps. Place the letter "S" at bottom of the vertical line to
indicate stops walking.
WALK AND TURN
,*

-

-,"

,"" ' .

-

-

-'

~

,

CANNOT KEEP BALANCE 1'---_--'
STARTS TOO SOON

FIRST NINE STEPS

SECOND NINE STEPS

STOPS WALKING

......
.......

~I

MISSES HEEL -TO- TOE
STEPS OFF LINE
RAISES ARMS
ACTUAL STEPS TAKEN

IMPROPER TURN (Describe)
CANNOT DO TEST (EXPLAIN)
OTHER:

APPELLANT'S BRIEF
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....
......
..•..
...

B. If suspect fails to touch heel-to-toe, record how many times this happens.
Draw a vertical line across the toe of the step at which the miss occurred.
Place the letter "M" at the top of the vertical line to indicate missed heel to
toe.
C. If suspect steps off the line while walking, record it by drawing a line from
the appropriate foot print at an angle in the direction in which the foot
stepped. Do it for each nine steps.
D. If suspect uses arms to balance, give some indication of how often or how
long this happens.
o

Example: suspect raised arms from sides three times; place a check for
each occurrence in appropriate box.

o

Example: suspect held arms away from sides during 3 through 7; place
a check for each occurrence in appropriate box.

o

Example: suspect "flapped" arms continuously; make a note.

E. Record the actual number of steps taken by suspect in each direction.
For the next point, "improper turn," record a description of the turn.
If you note that the suspect "cannot perform test." indicate explicitly why
you did so.
o
o
o

,
•
•t

•

Example: "off line three times;"
Example: "staggered six steps to right, nearly fell;"
Example: "fear of injury."

At end of the test, examine each factor and determine how many clues have
been recorded. Remember. each clue may appear several times. but still
only constitutes one clue.
In the section labeled "other," record any facts, circumstances, conditions or
. observations that may be relevant to this test.
o

Examples of additional evidence of impairment during Walk-and-Turn
test:
suspect verbally miscounts steps;
suspect utters incriminating statements.

APPELLANT'S BRIEF
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o

Examples of conditions that may interfere with suspect's performance of
the \Valk-and-Turn test:
wind/weather conditions;
suspect's age , weight;
suspect's footwear.

8.

Taking Field Notes on the Combined Interpretation of Nystagmus and Walkand-Turn
By combining four or more clues ofRGN with two or more clues of the ';VAT
test, suspects can be correctly classified as above 0.10 BAC 80% of the time.

9.

Taking Field Notes on One-Leg Stand Testing

ONE LEG STAND

The section on the One-Leg Stand test appears
midway down the page.
By recording when things happen as well as what
happens , you will be able to prepare a more
descriptive arrest report.

\Hi I (i)
\_ /

\.......-;

".
".

L

R
Sways while balancing.

You will place check marks in or near the small
Uses arms to balance.
boxes to indicate how many times you observed
Hopping .
each of the clues. You will do this separately for
the test on the left leg (L) or on the right leg (R).
Puts foot down.
, - - - - - - - - - - - - - - , In addition, if the
suspect puts the foo-t
down during the test,
you will record when
T_y_p."...:_of_F_oo_tw_e_a_r_ _ _ _ _-'
it happened (write the ' - - - -_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _--1
count on new note guide). For example, when
standing on the left leg the suspect lowered the right
L R
o 0 Sways while balancing. foot at a count of "one thousand and thirteen" , and
o 0 Uses arms to balance. again at "one thousand and twenty". Your diagram
o · 0 Hopping.
should look like the sketch to the left. You must also
# 0 Puts foot down.
pay attention to the suspect's general appearance
Type of Footwear
and behavior while the test is being performed.

I'-

I

At end of the test, examine each factor and
determine how many distinct clues have appeared.
L--_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _-J

--

fII'
.fIJ!'

..
....,.
...

".
".
".
fill

..
fIJ
fA

.,
•
~
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\ lIn-lS

,"

.
IT IS ~r:ECESSARY TO EMPHASIZE THIS VALIDATION APPLIES
ONLY WlIEN:
o

THE TESTS ARE ADMINISTERED IN THE PRESCRIBED,
STANDARDIZED MANNER

o

THE STANDARDIZED CLUES ARE USED TO ASSESS THE
SUSPECT'S PERFORMANCE

o

THE STANDARDIZED CRITERIA ARE EMPLOYED TO
INTERPRET THAT PERFORMANCE.

IF ANY ONE OF THE STANDARDIZED FIELD SOBRIETY TEST
ELEMENTS IS CHANGED, THE VALIDITY IS COMPROMISED.
At end of the test, examine each factor and determine how many clues have been
recorded. Remember, each clue may appear several times , but still only constitutes
one clue.

Ii
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7
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,II
I

1

2

CO MES NOW, the Appellant, by and through his undersigned attorney of record,
and responds to the State's brief.

3

I.
FACTS

4
5

The State does not cite to the record to support its statement of facts.
6

II.
ARGUMENT

7

8
9

10
11

The Court should disregard the State's argument based upon LA.R., Rule 3 5(b)(6).
The maj ority of the brief is made upon of mere conclusions that are not supported by the
record, case law, statute, rule or the like. The State's first issue is noted as follows: "The

12

trial court properly found that a performance verification check was done on the Lifeloc
13
14

FC20 unit as required by the standard operating procedures." Respondent's Brief at p.

15

2 J. In this section of the State's brief, the State does not cite to the record except as to

16

Defense Exhibit 5. The State does not cite to a statute or a rule, but simply tries to

17

18

interpret a section of the SOP. Exhibit 3. The case law is clear that a party waives an

19

issue if either authority or argument is lacking. The case law that is found in Idaho

20

usually is applied to an Appellant, but the application of said case law can be applied to

21

the State's brief. See State v. Hansen, 130 rd. 845,949 P.2d 583 (Ct. App. 1997). The
22

23
24

25
26

came up with his

Respondent's Brief was not numbered so Counsel simply counted the pages of the brief and
page number.
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1

2

courts have routinely found that unless there is compliance with the Idaho Appellant
Rules, then the arguments are deemed to be waived. See Dawson v. Chevovich Family

3

4

5
6

Trust, 149 Id. 375,234 PJd 699 (2010).
In State v. Amerson, 129 Id. 395, 325 P.2d 399 (Ct. App. 1996), the Court of
Appeals indicated:

7

8
9

"It is a well settled axiom of appellant practice that issues posed
without citation to authority or without presentation of argument
supported by authority, demonstrating the soundness of the principle
argued, will not be considered."

10
11

At. pp 409-410.

12

The State's argument in Section II ignores the above noted rule and case law. The

13

court should disregard the argument made by the State regarding the 0.20 performance

14

verification. There is no case law cited. There is no rule cited. There is no scientific
15

16
17
18

authority cited.
In addition, the State fails to address the rule oflenity found in State v. Mills, 128
Id. 416, 913 P.2d 1196 (Ct. App. 1996) and its application to the SOP. Exhibit 3. The

19
20

Court may want to ask the State why there is any use of a 0.20 performance verification

21

solution at all in section 5 of the SOP if there is no need for a 0.20 performance

22

verification.

23

The 0.20 performance verification is specifically used for supporting results for

24

25
26
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1

2

an I.C. § 18-8004C charge. See SOP § 5.1.4 Note2 • Exhibit 3. Clearly Mr. Besaw's
breath test falls within the excessive range. Exhibit 4. He was convicted of an excessive

3

4

charge. The 0.20 performance verification satisfies the requirements for performance

5

verifications within twenty-four (24) hours before or after "at any level." The SOP does

6

not say that the 0.08 can be used within twenty-four (24) hours at any level. The plain

7

reading of the "standard" for an excessive breath test is that a 0.20 performance
8

9

verification had to be run within twenty-four (24) hours of Mr. Besaw's test. There was

10

no 0.20 performance verification run within twenty-four hours. Exhibit 4 (the log sheet).

11

The Court can also look at the e-mails that are part of this record that show that

12
13

linearity is required for excessive breath tests. Closing argument attachments, pp 016-

14

018,068-072. Clearly, SOP Section 5.1.4.1 regarding the 0.20 performance verification

15

not being routinely used for "this purpose", has to apply to breath tests below a 0.20.

16

What else could it possibly mean? The Court also has to question exactly what SOP,

17
18

19
20

21
22

section 5.1.1 means. It states as follows:
"The Alco-Sensor and Lifeloc FC20 portable breath testing instrument
performance verification is run using approximately 0.08 and/or 0.20
performance verification solutions provided by and/or approved by
ISPFS." (emphasis added)
SOPp.10of21. (Exhibit3)

23
24

25
26

2 SOP 5.1.4 NOTE: The 0.20 performance verification was implemented for the sole purpose of
supporting the instruments' results for an 18-8004C charge. Failure to timely perfOlm a 0.20 performance
verification will not invalidated tests performed that yield results at other levels or in charges other than 188004C.
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1

2

What does the use ofthe word "approximately" mean in the context of this provision?
The State can not argue against the rule of lenity or common sense in the

3

4

application of the science of linearity in breath testing. Cases from other parts of the

5

country also examine the need for linearity in breath testing at different intoxication

6

levels. See State v. Holland, 27 A.3d 1212 (App. Division N.J. 2011).

7

With regard to the State's section three argument, it is convoluted as to what the
8
9

10
11

section actually addresses. I.e. § 18-8004(4) requires "standards". It is hard to argue that
the current SOP is any sort of standard considering all of the "should"s and
"approximately"s that are set out in this current SOP. Exhibit 3. There is no science

12

13

behind any of the SOP changes. Attached and marked as Exhibit "A" are ~he prior SOPs

14

from August 20 t\ 27t\ 2010. Why have there been years of mandatory requirements

15

regarding the 15 minute observation period and now all of a sudden, Idaho has

16

discretionary provisions regarding the 15 minute observation period.

17
18
19
20

The State's rendition of the facts is not consistent with the record. The fact that
the State does not cite to any part of the video or any part ofthe transcript is telling. The
trooper did not bother to video tape Mr. Besaw until after his breath testing was

21

completed, but this fact is not commented on by the State. See In the Interests of Doe,
22
23

130 Id. 811, 815,948 P.2d 166,170 (Ct. App. 1997), State v. Dominguez, 137 Id. 681,

24

52 P.3d 325 (Ct. App. 2002). (Credibility of officers that fail to record)

25
26
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1

In addition, the last sentence in this section of the State's Brief makes no sense:

2

"As demonstrate above, none of these factors were present in the current case
and Trooper Talbott was ideally positioned to ensure that the defendant did
not burp, belch or vomit."

3

4

5
6

Respondent's Brief at p. 73 •
Based on the video, Mr. Besaw was eating a hamburger in his vehicle. Exhibit 7.

7

While he was standing outside, a large chunk of food came out of his mouth onto the
8

9

10
11

parking lot surface. The "ideally positioned" trooper could not have prevented Mr.
Besaw from burping, belching or vomiting. Also, there is no burden on Mr. Besaw to
show a Homer Simpson style of burp. The burden regarding the observation period is on

12
13

the State. State v. DeFranco, 143 Id. 335, 144 P.3d 40, eCt. App. 2006). The trooper's

14

senses were distracted from Mr. Besaw. The sense of smell is not helpful in this case.

15

What would a burp smell like, alcohol? Did not the trooper say Mr. Besaw smelled of

16

alcohol? T. at pp. 105-106.

17
18

With regard to the brief s final section regarding the field sobriety tests, the State,

19

like the trial court, misses the point of the argument. First of all, Idaho has never had a

20

LR.E., Rule 702 hearing on field sobriety tests. The Idaho case law regarding the HGN

21

field sobriety test is suspect, but that is only part of the argument on this appeal. The
22
23
24

Trial Court ignored the argument dealing with the requirements for proper field sobriety
3

25

Respondent's Brief was not numbered so Counsel simply counted the pages of the brief and
came up with his own page number.

26
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1

2

testing. Was there compliance with the requirements of the National Highway Traffic
Safety Administration manual in Besaw? The Trial Court should have suppressed the use

3
4

ofthe field sobriety test because oflack of compliance with the National standard. State

5

v. Bish, 947 N.E.2d 257 (Ct. App. Ohio, 2010) and State v. Ito, 978 P.2d 191 (Hawaii

6

App. 1999) Again, it is telling that the State does not address any ofthe specific issues

7

about how the field sobriety tests were conducted on that rainy, cold January night. The
8
9

10
11

State does not note the conditions at all in the facts or in the body of it' s brief. The State
argues that the trooper testified that the FSTs were done within the established
procedures. The trooper did not say this, he testified that he did the tests by following his

12

13
14
15

16

training. T. at pp. 108-109. The State did not provide proof of those established
procedures.
The State argues that the Idaho Supreme Court has not held that there is an
absolute need for compliance with the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration

17
18

manual. Brief at p. 9. The NHTSA manual itself says there has to be an absolute

19

compliance. See page VIII - 19 ofthe manual. Other cases throughout the country have

20

found there has to be compliance. U.S. v. Horn, 185 F. Supp.2d 530 (D. Md. 2002) It

21

would seem unlikely that the Idaho Supreme Court would veer away from the majority
22
23

of decisions of other states on the issue of validation. In fact, the Court can review the

24

closing argument filed by Mr. Besaw which cited additional cases dealing with issues of

25
26
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II

1

2

field sobriety testing. For the Court's convenience, copies ofthose pages ofthe closing
argument are attached as Exhibit "B".

3

CONCLUSION

4

5

The trial court failed to apply the case law regarding the need for standards in

6

breath testing pursuant to I.C. § 18-8004(4). The trial court failed to act as a gatekeeper

7

regarding the field sobriety tests. Not every problem goes to the weight, therefore, the

8

9

filed sobriety test should have been suppressed. Finally, the breath test should have been

10

suppressed because of the failure to have a proper observation period and because ofthe

11

failure to use the correct solution for preformation verification. This court should reserve

12

the trial court and suppress the breath test and field sobriety tests.
13
14

DATED thisal day of February, 2012.

15

CLARK and FEENEY, LLP

16
17
18

19
20

21
22
23
24

25
26
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2
3
4

5

6
7

8
9

10

I hereby certifY on thedl day
of February, 2012, a true copy
of the foregoing instrument
was: ~ Mailed
Faxed
Hand delivered to:
Justin J. Coleman
Deputy Prosecutor
Nez Perce County Prosecutor's Office
P.O. Box 1267
Lewiston, ill 83501
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12
13

14
15
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Idaho State Police
FOl~nsicSerVices

Idaho Breath Alcohol Standard Operating ProCedure
Issuing Authority~ISPFS Quality Manager

Revision 0 Effective 812012010
Pagel of 17

REPLYBREIF

Glossary
Approved Vendor: A source/provider/manufacturer of an approved premixed alcohol simulator solution shall be explicitly
approved as a vendor of premixed alcohol simulator solutions for distribution within Idaho.
Breath Alcohol Test: A series of separate breath samples provided during a breafu testing sequence.
Breath Alcohol Testing Sequenc:-.e: A sequence of events as determined by the Idaho State Police Forensic Services, which
m.a:y- be. rure.cted by either the instrument or the operator, but not both, and may consist of air blanks, perfo~ce
verificau.on,. mtemal standard checks, and breath samples.
,"
Breath Testing Specialist (BTS): An operator who has. completed an advanced tralning class taught by an ~e of the
Idaho State Police Forensic Services. BTS certification is valid for 26 calendar months and expires onA~&Y of the

~~

~

Certificate of Analysis: A certificate stating that the. premixed ethyl alcohol solutions used for
been tested and approved for use by the ISPFS.

Perf~e verification have
'f.....

~
0'"

Certificate of Approval: A certificate stating that an individual breath alcohol testing
has been evaluated by the
ISPFS and found to be suitable for forensic alcohol testing. The ce~~~ th,,~ture of an Idaho State Police
Forensic Services Lab Manager, and the effective date of the instrument afG,'Xv ....
ChangeQver Class: A training class for currently certified· persoun
. #they are taught theory, operation, and
.proper testing procedure for a new make or model of instrument
adop
their agency. Breath Testing Specialists
attend BTS training that qualifies them to perfomi BTS duties
to ~trmnent.

~videntiary

b~ath

a.Stibj~U:U~tential

~egal

Test: .A
tes: perfOI1lled on
evideuti.ary or
purposes. A distinction
IS made between eVldenuary testing and commumty ~ or ~ests perfoIIIled wlth the mstrument.

ldah
.• smt. P."'" F.,• ...,

.

s_~ ~E1""j~V~
0., <heofBoreau ofF""""",, S_~'. <he ISPFS ~ -""""

to providing forensic science services to the . .
breath alcohol testing program per IDAP~ ..01.

MlPIMIC An """",,",Don.-l '" do:..

J.

# po"'~""n ~

Idaho.

ISPFS is the administrative body for the

~

mioo<;' _ " = o f okohoI.

Operator Certification: The condition ~~g Satisfied the training requirements for administering breath alcohol tests as
established by the ISPFS. Operator c~tion is vali<i for 26 calendar months and expires on the last day of the 26th

=""'An

;'<IM"""

-"&0.;: ~
If§PFS

qwiliiiol by .........._

""""' >1001>01_

An~9pproved. tra.ining ciass for prospective or uncertified breath alcohol operators. Currently

.Operator Class:
certified Breath Tes .
.

laIists may teach opera.tor classes.

.

A verification of the accuracy of the breath testing instrument utilizing a simnlator and a
ation solution. Performance verification should he reported to three decimal places. While ISPFS uSes
pI(,j[fQil)dance verification, manufacturers and others may use ateIIU such as "cal1bration check" or "simulator check."
VI!,I'H~·tion:

Perfo
.ce Verification Solution: A premixed ethyl alcohol solution used for field performance verifications. The
solUtion is provided by and/or approved byISPFS.
. Recertification Class: A training class for cnn-ently certified personnel, completion of which results in unintenupted
continuation oftheiI' Operator or BTS statns for an additional 26 months.
Waiting P~riodlMonitoling Period/DeprivlttionPeriodlObsen'Rtion Period: 15-urinute period prior to administering a
. breath alcOhol test, in which an officer monitors the test subjectfmdividual.
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Breath Alcohol Standard Operating Procedure
List of Revisions
Date ofRe,1sion

Topic

soP Section
2

Delete reference to ALS

June 1, 1995

2

0.02/0.20 solutions

June 1, 19~

3.2.1

Valid breath tests

OC~~'1995

2.1

Aleo-Sensor calibration checks

#-.

Q}~Yl' 1996

Intoxilyzer 5000 Calibration Checks

2.2

1996

EjiectiveJune,1996

~

2.12

0.003 agreement

2.1.2

Operators may run cahbration ~

*0
0

~

0~

$

2.1.2

Re_'SOIntionWithin~

2.1

All 3 solutions run wi~ 24-~1>eriod

June 1,1996
July 1,1996
September 6, 1996
September 6, 1996

2

AH3_''f!J~~r=iod

September 6, 1996

2.1.2

Re-rnnnm~~SO

September 26, 1996

2.1

A1!*ns.~a 48-hourperiod

September 26, 1996

..~~ htfief
vY

~ce..~(lj.ee"removed

All 3

2

Oct 8,1996

~srun within a 48~hour period

~~than three calibration solntions

2

&CiioluJXm VlIlnes

2

L1-0G

2:1

~_

~(;

2.2

~

~

JlQ

September 26, 1996
October 8, 1996

10jlge< called in ill BPS

April 1, 1997

AUgust 1, 1998

Alco-Sensor and IntOxilyzer 5000
calibration check
·Calibration checks for the Intoxilyzer 5000·

February 11, 1999

Name change, all refetencesniade to the
Bureau offorensicServices were changed
Idaho State Police Forensic Services,

August 1999

to

1.6

ReCord Mariagement

August 1, 1999

2

Dd~sectioIlS on relocating. repairing. recalibrating,
arid loaning of.instruments from previous revision.

August 1, 1999
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1.2,2.1,2.2
3

Ako-Sensor and Intoxilyzer 5000 calibration checks
Deleted sections on blood and urine samples
for alcohol determination

August 1. 1999
AUgust 1, 1999

1.6

Operator certification record management

January 29. 2001

1,2, and 3
2.1,2.2

Reformat numbering
Requirement for running 0.20 simulator solution

Angust18,2006

22.1.1.2.2

Changed 3-sample to "two print cards".

}lOV~~,2006

2.2.1.1.2-2
2.1.2.1 and 2.2.4

Deleted "simulator port" and "two print cards".
Simulator temperature changed from "should"
to "Diust".

2.2.1.1.2.2

Clarification of 0.20 calibration checks.

1.2

Added the Lifeloc FC20

1.5

Deleted requirement that the new
utilize the same technology if~ _is~",ntly
certified
~

.

~

~2007

~~YI4'2007

~<0

0

~

~:'I{~"
V

September 18, 2007
February 13, 2008

Febmary 13, 2008

accep~9for s~ator

2

Modified the
solutions to
+/- 10%, elimina~~++II'(} ®trovision. Added
"Established ~~0llue
e different
from those ~ o~e ttle label"

Added~ F~brationchecks

2.2

In~ 500~bration is now section 2.3

~~.~cally allow use of the 0.20

2.

Febmary 13, 2008
February 13, 2008

February 13,2008

~~'_Ject testing

Sections I, 2, 3

~ral reformat for clarification. Combined
'-~osensor and Lifeloc sections. Specifically,
~hanged calibration requirement using the 0.20
r$ference solution: from fom:: (4) checks to two (2).

December 1,2008

o

efJ

2.1.4, 2-23,
And 2.2.10

2;2.4'1~d.arification: a "calibration check" consists of a
' -~
pair of sampleS in sequen~e and.both samples
':S:>'
must be within the acceptable range before

~..::s
,

2.1.3,2.1.4:1,2.1.9

January 14,2609

proceeding with subject testing. A 0.20 solution
sllould be replaced every 20-25 samples. Clarified
the correct procedure for perfooog a calibration check.
Clarification: Added "before and after" to the 0.080 and
July 7,2009
0.200. Calibrati6n checks; wifuin 24 hours ofa subject test
·Theofficialtime and date of the cah"bration check is the
.tithe 'and date recorded on the printout or the time and date
,recorded in the log, whichevercon-esponds to the calibration
check referenced in section 2:z.3 2.1.4.1.
.,

or
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History Page
Revision #

Effective date

illstory

o

8/2012010

The entire SOP was rewritten to incorporate language changes regarding
perfonnance verifications, and to clear-up ambiguities associated with
the 0.20 verification and the relevance to cases not involving an l~
&004c. charge. Scope and safety sections were added. Troubl~ting,
MIPIMIC sections added.
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Quantitative Analysis for Alcohol in Breath by Approved Breath Testing
Instruments

Contents:

P.g~,'"
~(f7

Section2: Scope
Section 3: Safety

C{}~age7

Section 4: Instrument and Operator Certification
Section 5: Performance Verification of A

roved Breath Testin

page 10

Section 6: Evidentiary Testing Procedure

page 13

Section 7: Tronbleshooting

page 15

Section 8: MIPIMIC Procedure

page 16
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Quantitative Analysis for Alcohol in Breath by Approved
. Breath Testing Instruments.

1

~"

Scope

2

~
Forensic~
S~ (ISPFS)

This method describes the Idaho State Police
procedure, for use by agencies external to ISPFS, for the. analysis
i).~ath for the
ent This
presence of volatile compounds using an approved breath tes~~
. '()
method provides for the quantitative analysis of ethanol.
. .Follo~g all the recommendati~ns of this e~l pr~~: .will establish the
sCIentific validity and set the unquestlone. d founda:.tl~Oal. sSlbility of the breath
. this procedure does not
alcohol test Failure to meet all of the recomi!mtions
~e stioning of the breath alcohol
disqualify the breath alcohol test, but does all
tests as it pertains to its foundation o~.
.
.ty .
urt That foundation can be set,
through testimony. by a breath testing s e
. t. e
or ISPFS expert in breath testing
as to the potential ramifications of th
ati~om the procedure as stated

Q~~
~~~

~

3

&-0 «/V'

Safety

~1!::V'~reath

.
Within the
alcohol testing, the general biohazard safety
precaustiohs sho~e fo~. This is due to the potential infectious materials that
may be. ejected from th~uth during the sampling of the breath. Caution should be
taken so .as the e~ breath is not directed towards the officer or other unrelated
bystander.
~

oC:J

&

4 .

~nt and Operator Certification
To

~u
ensure that minimum standards are met, individual breath testing instruments,
. ... ~erators, and ?reath tes~g sp~ialists (BTS) nmst beapp~oVed BD:d certified. by .the
Idaho State Police ForeIlSlc ServIces (ISPFS). The ISPFS will establish and mamtain a
."<otist of approved instruments by manufacturer brand or model designation for use in the
A

b..:s

state.

.
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4.1

Approval of Breath Testing Instruments. In order to be approved and certified
each instrument must meet the following critelia:
4.1.1 The instrument shall analyze a reference sample or analytical test standard,
the results of which must agree within +1- 10% of the target value or such
limits set by ISPFS.
4.1.2 The certification procedures shall be adequate and appropriate ~<Jl ~e
analyses of breath specimens for the determination of ~coo.ol
concentration for law enforcement
~

adeq1lti~\1?aluate the

4.1.3 Any other tests deemed necessary to correctly and
instrument to give accurate results in routine breath alifilsting .
4.2

The ISPFS may, for cause, remove a specific instnlD1~$-~ serial nnrober from
evidential testing and suspend or withdraw certificati~eof

4.3

Operators become certified
certified Breath Testing Specialist
and expires the last day of the 26
perfOlID all :functions required .

by~mpi~~.0 class taught by an ISPFS
. Q.

tion is for 26 calendar months
cation will allow the operator to
tam a""Valid breath alcohol test. It is the
responsi~ility of~e indi~())perat~·~~n ~eircun'ent c~fication; the
ISPFS Will not notify op~ ~~rr cemficationlS about to exprre.
th.,C~

4.3.1 RecertifiCa'4...@<Z:P-JJ;6-mor:.th.periOdiSachievedbycompletingan
ISPFS ~re~d ~~r class pnor to the end of the 26th month.
4.3.2

If/b>\~~ to satisfactorily complete. !he dass (including !he
wrltt-eh

he/she

4.3.3

.

.

cheal tests), or alloWs therr certification status to exprre,
take the operator class in order to become re-certified.

J.[~ Operator certification is voided, the individual is not certified to

.(0i evidentiary breath alcohol tests on the instrument in question until the

CJO""operator class is completed.

· A..eJ

. U' -

4.3.3.1 There are no grace periods or provisions for extension of operator
certification.

~~~. .
~ ~4

Breath Testing Specialists (BTS) are Operators who have completed an
advanced training class and are ISPFS-certified to perform instrument
~·m.aintenance, and provide both initial and.recerlification training forinstrurnent
operators.

n

V

4.4.1

To obtain initial BTS certification, an individnal must be currently
certiiied as an Operator of that particular. mstrilment BTS certification is
then obtained by coropletinganapproved BTStraining class.

·4.4.2 Certification is valid for 26 calendar months.
Idaho .Breath Alcohol Standard Operating Procedure
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4.4.3

IfBTS certification is allowed to expire, the individual reverts to certified
Operator status for 12 calendar months for that instrument He/she may
no longer perfonn any BTS specific duties relating to that particular
instrument

4.4.4 BTS certification is renewable by attending an approved BTS training
class.

4.4.5

4.5

'"

The Idaho State Police Forensic Services may revoke BTS ce~~n for
cause. Examples may include falsification of records, failwfly'-perform
required pelfonnance verification, failure to successfull¥~"'a BTS recertification class and failure to meet standards in ctit&kicting operator
training.
(Q\

~

Adoption of a new instrument by an agency will reliI1~pdatingany BTS and
Operators in that agency in the use Ofthe~ ~- -.
4.5.1

A currently certified BTS A'b~.~ a certified BTS for a new
instrument by completing ~PF~ved BTS Instrumentation class.

ce~@gera~y

certify on a new instrument by
4.5.2 A currently
completing an IS~ ap~~ Operator Instrumentation Class for the
new instrume~<o ~
4.5.3

Indi~~~~ ~~y

certified as Operators must complete an

Ope~.1ass ~"'aach approved instnnnent

4.6

~feJ~tndm.

Record
anagement.
It is the responsibility of each
individual ~~ , store· perfonnance verification records, subject records,
maintenan
ords, instrument logs, or any other records as pertaining to the
tM.·d:~~~~e o~ breath testing instruments and to maintain a current record of
oper~UllCation.

~€JO It is the responsibility of ilie agency to see that the said records are stored

. ~.

.. 0 " .~

. «.~

and maintained a minimum of (3) years in accordance with IDAPA
11.03.0l.

4.6.1.1 Records may besribject: to periodic review by the Idaho State
Police Forensic Selvices.
4.6.2

The Idaho State Poliee Forensic Services will not be respoUSlble forilie
. storage of such recOrds not generated by ISPFS.
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5.

Performance Verification of Breath Testing Instruments
Performance verifications aid the Breath Testing Specialist (BIS) and the Idaho State
Police Forensic Services (ISPFS) in determining if a breath testing instrument is
functioning correctly. Performance verifications are performed using a wet bath
simulator performance verification solution. The solution is provided by and/or approved
by ISPFS. The ISPFS analysis establishes the target value and acceptable range Rf the
SOlUtions. used for the verification and includes the acceptable values on the c~'
;~ of
Analysis for each solution. Note: The ISP established target values may
'erent
from those shown on the bottle label
.
~.

Alco-Sensor and Lifeloc FC20 - Portable Breath u~&g Instrument
Performance Verification
'f....

5.1

f.d

5.1.1

5.1.2

The Aleo-Sensor and Lifeloc FC20 portabl~ath testing instrument
performance verification is run ~g ap~ately 0.08 andlor 0.20
performance verification SOluti~~V~Y and/or approved by ISPFS.

Th: pex:rormanc~ verifi5e\~ ~~e
venficanon solutions

5.1.3

o V
~caf\~f

O.OS and 0.2? performance
separated by arr blanks.

A performance
the Aloo-Sensor and Lifeloc FC20
instruments ~ a ~~ performance verification solution must be
performed ~ ~~, before or after an evidentiary test to be
approved ~ ev1lle'Ll6ry
.• ·
use.' Multiple breath alcohol tests may be
COVf~Cfsi a s~'Performance verification.
5.

5.1.4

co~ oftw~ samples

Q~.
~M

performance verifieati.on solution should be replaced with
solution approximately every 25 verifications or every
"'" calendar month, whichever comes first.
.

A~o performance verification ~hould be run ,and results. logged once per

r9~endar mOilth and replaced WIth fresh solution approxunately every 25

((jV verifications.

~

~CJ

.§>

.~

NOTE: The 0.020 performance verification was implemented for the sole
puIpose ofsupporting the instruments results for an lS-8004c charge. In
the absence of an 18-S004c· charge, the 0.20 verifications, or lack thereot:
shall have no relevance to the results or the evidentiary value of the
evidentiary test.
5.1.4.1

The 0.20 perfon:n.arlce verification satisfies the fequirement for
performance verification Within 24 hours, before or after an
evidentiary test. The 0.20 penormance verification solution should
not be used routinely for this pmpose.
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5.1.5

Acceptable results for a 0.080 or 0.20 performance verification is a pair of
samples in seqnence that are both within +/- 10% of the performance
verification solution target value. Target values and ranges of acceptable
results are included in a certificate of analysis for each solution lot series,
prepared by, and available from, the ISPFS.
NOTE: Due to external factors associated with changing a
performance verification solution (examples include: amb~t air
in the sample chamber, temperature fluctuation) the resuii\.~)~the
initial performance verification may not be withj~n
the i((eptable
range. therefore the performance verification may be . ed until
a pair of satisfactory results are ob~ed. ~owev '. esults after
a total of tbreeruns for any solution (eqU1Va)..~~ SIX tests) are
still unsatisfactory, contact the appropriate IS~Laboratory. The
instrument should not be used for evi~ary testing until the
problem is corrected and perfonn~L~rification results are
within the acceptable r~. Th0bggested troubleshooting
procedure should be~.oll
t\.~~-l~al performance verification
does not meet the a
ce
.

'\'

5.1.6

Temperatur.e of the s~~ must ~etween 33.5°C and 34.SoC in order
for the performance x..t@Pfatio~Ults to be valid.

N.OTE:

Th~e'.Q
. tOr m~d to.
~~"'i'also

insure that ..
alcohol vi!f
5.1.7

5.1.8

5.

clJ·
" -

« .

Y. ~ producing low results.

g ~cation
-~
Pe~ce
solutions should only be used prior to the
e~o~~ oil the label.

An~!li, may run additional performance verification solution levels at
~~:etion.

Lb~e official time and. dale of the perfurmance verification is the time and

G·

"U
. ",,~.2
. .;;;,.v

Walm for approximately 15 minutes to
warm. If the lid is cold, condensation of

date recorded on the printout, or the time and date recorded in the log,
whi~hever corresponds to the perfonnance verification referenced in
section 5.13 or 5.1.4.1.

Intoxilyzer 5000lEN Performance Verification

..

Intoxilyzer 50001EN instruments must have a performance verification willi each
evidentiary test If the performance verification is within the acceptable range for
llie lot of solution being used, then the instrument will be approved and the
resulting breath samples will l;>e deemed valid for evidentiary 'use.
.
5.2.1

IntoXilyzer 5000IEN performance verification is run using 0.08 and/or
O.20perfonnance verificarlonsolutions provided by and/or approved by
ISPFS.
Idaho Breath Alcohol Standard Opei:ating Procedure
Issuing Au1hority-ISWS QiIality Mlmager
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{

5.2.2 During each evidentiary breath alcohol test using the Intoxilyzer SOOOIEN,
a performance verification will be performed as directed by the instrument
testing sequence and recorded as SIM CHK on the printout If the S1M
CHI( is not within the acceptable range for the solution lot being used, the
testing sequence will abort and no breath samples will be obtained.
5.2.3

A two sample performance verification using a 0.08 perforlllance
verification ,solution should be ron and results logged ea~h
tfihe a
solution is replaced with fresh solution. A 0.08 performance
. ation
solution should be replaced v,rith fre~h solution approximat\!yv ery 100
samples or every calendar month, whichever comes first ~-...\

,

"J
a~o

5.2.4 A two sample performance verification using
performance
verification S.'OIUtiOn should be ron and resul~S
I ~ ed once per calendar
month and replaced with fresh solution appr'
ely every 25 samples.
several months.
The saine bottle of 0.20 solution m,::,.be used

~

~

NOTE: The 0.02~P.~cation was implemented for
, the sole purpose 0
po$n'g.."fue instruments results for a 188004c charge. {n~ e abse~ of an 18-8004c charge, the 0.20
verificatio~"'Ck th~ shall have no relevance to the results
or the evid~ ~ftheevidentiary test

5.2.5

Acceptab~e.:f...#!~ ~o or 0.20 performance verification is a pair of

samples ~~'
~at are both within +/- 10% of the performance
v~ so
get value. Target values and ranges of acceptable
' ~ ~ ution lot series are included in a certificate of analysis,
re ",
pr
d ~d available from, the ISPFS.
tar,

~tE: Due to external factors associated With changing a
~'0 performance verification solution (examples include: ambient air

U

in the sample chamber, temperature fluctuation) the results of the
initial perfOIinance verification may' not ~e within the acceptabl.e
C;
range, therefure the performance verificauon may be repeated unul
a pair of satisfactory results are obtained however, if results after a
""~
total of three runs for any solution (equivalent to six tests) are still
~0
unsatisfactory, contaCt the appropriate ISPFS Laboratory. The
~'
instrumen~ should not be used for eviden~ t:sting until the
<')"V"
problem IS corrected and performance verificatIon results are
" " - w i t h i n tlie acceptable range. Follow the suggested troubleshooting
procedure if the initial performance verification does not meet the
acceptance Criteria.

ct

.t'l......0

"

L,

""

5.2.6 ,The official time anddaie of the performance verificatiOn is the time and
date recorded on the printout, or 1he time and date recorded inihelog.
Idaho BreafuAlcohol Standard Operating Procedure
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5G8

S.2~7

Performance verification solntions should only be used prior to the
expiration date as marked on the label.

5.2.8

Temperature of the simulator must be between 33.SoC and 34.SoC in order
for the performance verification results to be valid.

5.2.9

An agency may run additional performance verification solution levels at
their discretion.
"-

5.2.10 The BTS must set the correct acceptable range limits and ~~~ance
verification solution lot number in the instrument before pr~~g with
{''"'\
evidentiary testing.

.

,J

0'-cJ.

6. Evidentiary Testing Procedure

i~~cess~rder to provide accurate

Proper testing proce.dure by certified operators
results that will be admissible in court rn~~ us
breath, not the blood, and report results as ~ of ~

daho measure alcohol in the
in 210 liters of breath.

Prior to evidential breath al<mM tes~ the subject'individnal should be
monitored for at least ~?\.~ min~~ Any material which absorbs/adsorbs
or traps alcohol should .~0VR.~om the mouth prior to the start of the 15
minute waiting peri~~.
~~.~~:l'bnitoring period the subject'individual should
not be allowed to ~ ~t, or belchlburp/vomit'regurgitate.

6.1

~o o~material is left in the mouth during the entirety of the

NOTE:
15 mUm

~izj?l;od; any potential external alcohol contrunination will
. . . . with the subject/individual's body water andlor dissipate so
.as notlo interf~
the results of the subsequent breath alcohol test
comeint~

6.1.1

~~ath alcohol test must be administered by an operator currently

~0'fl1ied in the use of the instrument used.

fJ..uOFalse teeth, partial plates, or bridges installed or prescribed by a dentist or

~

~U

.§>

«

6.1.3

physician do not need to be removed t.a obtain a valid test
The operator may elect a blood test in place of the breath alcohol test if
there is a failure to complete the fifteen minUte monitoring period
sucCessfully.

. 6.1.4 During the monitoring period, the operator must be alert for any event that
might influence the accuracy of the breath alcohol test.
6~1.4.1 The operator must

be aware of the possible presence of mouth
alcohol as indicated by the testing instrument. If mouth alcohol is
suspeCted or indicated, the operator shoUld begin another lSminute waiting period before repeating the testing sequep.ce.
Idaho Breath Alcohol standard Operating ProCedure
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Page 13 of17

REPLYBREIF

'::) I~ ()
~ ...
U ,)

6.1.4.2 If, during the 15-minute waiting period, the subjectfmdividual
vomits or regurgitates material from the stomach into th.e
subject/individual's breath pathway, the I5-minute waiting period
must begin again.
6.1.4.3 If there is doubt as to the events occurring during the 15 minute
monitoring period, the officer should look at results
the
duplicate breath samples for evidence of potential ~c6hol
contiunination. For clarification see section 6.2.2.2.
R)

<R

0~

A ~mplete b~eath alcohol test includes two. (2) valid ~~~~les taken
dunng the testing sequence and preceded by arr blanks. ~ duplicate breath
samples should be approximately 2 minutes apart to allQl(.for the dissipation of
potential mouth alcohol contamination.
~(l) ~

6.2

~t flfiP~

NOTE: A deficient or
invalidate a test sample.
~f()" •~
6.2.1

does not automatically

If. the subject/indivi~ or ~es to provide a second or third
adequate sample ~sted ~e operator, the single test result may be
•....:(',.
considered valid.

...

6.2.1.1

0

~v-

~~~

repeat the testing _ c e as required by

6.~e~r should use a new mouthpiece for each series of tests.
6 . 2.2 A third ~ sample is required if the first two results differ by more than

o.o~

mouth alcoh~l is indi~~ed or ~uspected, i~ is not .necessary
o~~.l
.. Unless
to repeat the 15-n:unute WaIting penod to obtam a third breath

..

rL0.·C;

sample.

"" -6.2.22 The results for a duplicate breath samples should correlate within
0.02 to indicate the absence of alcohol contamination in the
subject/individual's breath pathway, show consistent sample
delivery, and indicates the absence of RFI as a contributing factor
to the breath results.

~V

~ ~.
/)"V"

"'<..

6.2.3 The operator should log test results and retain printouts for possible use in
coUrt The log of the results or the instrUment printouts can be used as the
offlciallegal record for coUrt purposeS.
6.2.4 If a subject/individual fails or refuses to provide a second or third sample
as requested by the operator, ilie results obtained ate still considered valid
.. Idaho· Breath Alcohol Standard Operating Procedure
Issuing Authority-rSPFS Quality Manager
.
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by the ISPFS, provided the failure to supply the requested samples was
the fault of the subject/individual and not the operator.
6.2.5

If the second or third samples are lacking due to instrument fuilure, the
operator should attempt to utilize another instrument or have blood drawn.

7. Troubleshooting Procedure

'"

~rovi~urate

Proper testing procedure by certified operators is. necessary in or.de.r to
results that will be admissible in court. Instruments used in Idaho measure
breath, not the blood, and report results as grams of alcohol in 210 liters
7.i

p~~

01 in the

atb..

Performance verification:
If, when performing the
performance
verification, the instrument falls outside the limits .OJ.(..the verification, the
troubleshooting guide should be used.

*fO"

f~~ub~ting

NOTE: This is a guide
failed performance
nded to streamline and isolate
verifications and the proced~<G i-~
the. pote~tial cause of the. R1IQblemv ct adherence to the guidelines is
~~
notrequured.

OV

7.1.1

The three source/;)

v·

ernt~en

performing the .periodic performance
setup and operator technique, 1he
~~cation solution, and the instrument calibration

v.ro;canoos#,~~r
~imulator ~

Itself.

00 ~c}

7.1.2 If ~t 0Tormance verification fails, the simulator setup and
tecQre~qu-;e~e operator performing the verification should be evaluated.
The s·
should be evaluated to ensure that 1.·t is hooked up properly,
use
hoses, is properly warmed, is within temperature, the operator
~JeJf. ftecbnique is not too hard or soft, and that the operator does not stop
~&.~g until after the sample is taken.
.

yO 7.1.2.1 The performance verification should be run a second time

I'>

. «-'<.I

.~ V
... ~
rJ
. . . :.:::>
,

7.1.22 If the performance verification passes on the second try, the
instrument passes the performance verification.

.

7:1.3

If the second performance verification fails, then the perforrruince
verification solution should be evaluated.
7.1.3.1 The performance verification solution shOuld be changed to a fresh
solution.
7.1.3.2 'The solution should be wanned for app!()x.Unately 15 minutes, or
-until the tempeiature is within range, and the simulator lid is as
as the simulator jar.

warm
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7.1.3.3 The performance verification may then be repeated..
7.1.4 If the third performance verification fails, then the only remaining source
of error lies with the instrument itself At this point the instrument must
be taken out of service and sent to ISPFS or an approved service provider.
7.1.5

7.2

Upon return from service, the instrument should be evaluated by ~FS
before being put back into service.
"

~
If a bubble forms in the thermometer, the operator or·.....).,~an place the

Thermometers:

7.2.1
thermometer in a freezer to draw the mercury (or
thermometer. This should disperse the bubble.

8. MIPIMIC Procedure

equiva1e~~""';e bulb of the

<l;-

~ '5::-eJ2

~~.e).~minor posses~ionlminor

Since the. testing tbr:sho!d (presence or
in
in
consumption charge IS different from ~~.:s~e and the numenc thresholds,
!here is a· different proce.dru;e associ~with ~ese speci.al circt~tance~.. In many
mstances, ail underage drinking ~y OOQgist of multiple subJectsrmdiVlduals that
need to be tested and the sheern~ero~viduals does not lend itself to observing a
15 minute waiting period f01i(.~h p(~C.'~~' The potential for "mouth alcohol" is still a
factor and should be addr(!y."i§m ~~g sequence.
8.1

15 minU~Otion ~d: At the officer's discretion, or as the circumstances
~ :\.0tx-~cedure (Section 6) may be followed in order to obtain
dictate,
a breath s
Ie ~ thesubjectiindividual. Otherwise, a shOltened procedure
can be fOllO~~

MIP~cqyocedure:

~
.. O~e breath alcoh?l test must be administered by an operator currently
ed ill the use of the mstruInent used.

..

«
..

. V~.:u .False teeth. partial plates, or bridge•.inst:ill~or prescribed by • dentist or

~phYSICtan do

~

8.3

not need to be removed to obtam a valid test.

. A complete breath alcohol test includes two (2) valid breath samples taken
during the testing sequence and· preceded by ait blanks. The duplicate breath
samples should be approximately 2 minUtes apart to .allow for the dissipation of
potential mouth alcohol conumunation.
NOTE:. A deficient or insufficient sample does not automatically
invalidate a test sample.
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8.3.1 If the subjectfmdividual fails or refuses to provide a second or third
adequate sample as requested by the operator, 'the single test result may be
considered valid.
8.3.1.1 The operator may repeat the testing sequence as required by
circumstances.
8.3.1.2 The operator should Use a new mouthpiece for each series o~sts.
8.3.2 A third breath sample is required if the first two results differ ~~ than
0.02.
V~

$.

S~Jare

83.2.1 The results for a.dnplicare breath samples
wifuin
0.02 to indicate the absence of alcohol
. tion in the
subject/individnals breath pathway, _ ~ consistent sample
delivery, and indicates the absence of ~s a contributing factor
to the breath results.
~
f:::-0
8.3.3 The opera.tor should log test Ii
~~~iri printouts for possible use in
court. The log of the resul
tb.e~~-;;rt printouts can be used as the
official legal record for
purpose-!.

a

y"

83.4 Ifa SUbjectfmdiviQfails~fuses to provide a second or third sample
as requested ~'l~ op~~, the results obtained are still considered valid
by the IS~t~O?!.
old:
4>fu.ee failure to supply the requested samples was
the faul~ s~~dividual. and not the operator.
8.3.5 If

Jilt\'Q~~\.~·r~a;ird. . Samples are lacking due to instrument failure, the

op~or s~ attempt to utilize another instrument or have blood drawn.

~0
'Of::>

<§

roG

·v~

#
.«'5 .
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Glossary
Approved Vendor: A source/provider/manufacturer of an approved premixed alcohol simulator solution shall be explicitly
approved as a vendor of premixed alcohol simulator solutions for distribution within Idaho.
Breath Alcohol Test: A series of separate breath samples provided dnring a breath testing sequence.
Breath Alcohol Testing Seqnence: A sequence of events as detem:rined by fue Idaho State Police Forensic Serv-ices, which
may be directed by either the instrument or the Operator, but not both:, and may consist of air blanks, perfolJIllUlce
verification, internal standard checks, and breath samples.
,
Breath Testing Specialist (BTS): An Operator who has completed an advanced training class taught by an ~ of the
· Idaho State Police Forensic Services. BTS certification is valid for 26 calendar months and expires on the
y of the

~~

~

~erification have

Certificate of Analysis: A certificate stating that the premixed ethyl alcohol solutions used for perfo+
been tested and approved fur use by the ISPFS.

«:)\

. Certificate of Approval: A certificate stating thilt an individual breafh alcohol testing ~ been evaluated by the
ISPFS and found to be suitable for forensic alcohol testing. The certificate bears the ~~ of an Idaho State Police
Forensic Services Lab Manager, and the effective date of the instrument app~

0

perso~el
~<:;:w~agency.
are taught theory. operation, and
Breath Testing Specialists

Changeover Class: A. training class for curreirtly certified
proper testing procedure for a new make or model of instrument be·
attend BTS training that qua.li:J:ies theni to perform Bis duties rela

. (J

ted'~eir

the ;n!lt.,,~ent.

~'V'

· ~"identiary Test: .A br~ath t~ Perli.ormed.. on .a.subjec~~ for p¥al evidenti~ or ~egal pmposes. A distinction
lS made between eVIdentiary testIng and commumty s~~ts perfurmed WIth the mstrument.

F~k:nO~~e

State Police Foreus.ic Services (lSPFS):
Bureau of Forensic Services, the ISPFS is.dedicated
to providing forensic science services to the ~ ~9" ~tem of Idaho. ISPFS is the administrative body for the
breath alcohol testing program per IDAPA 1l.Olf'lol'. - ~ V

ldah. 0

..~,,-'
An abbreviation used to ~ min{Y0~ssession or minor in cousumption of alcohoL
P:J~

MIPIMIC:

ha~fied

Operator Certification: The condition of
the training requirements for administering breafh alcohol tests as
eStablished by the ISPFS. Operator ~~~ is valid fur 26 calendar months and expires on the last day of the 26th
month.
_~
· Operator: An individual

Certi1ied~ISPFS as qualified by training to administer breath alcohol tests.

Operator Class: An ISPF~ed 1raining class for prospective or uncertified breafh alcohol Operators. Currently
certified Breafh Testing ~ts may teach Operator classes.

.Perlorm_"'T- A

performance v
. . the term perf1
..

d

verification of ... """"'.cy of the breath testing instrument ntilizing a simulator an. a
l;Olution. Peifonnance verification should be reported to 1hree decimal places. While ISPFS uses
verifi~on, lIIlW.ufact:urerS and others may use a term such as "cahbration check" or "simulator check."

PerfO~~eIificatiOn

Solution: Apremixed ethyl alcohol solution used for field performance verifications. The
'. solution ~rovided by and/or approved by ISPFS.
Recertification Class: A training cla:ss for aJiTentlycertUied personnel, completion of which results in uninterrupted
Continuation of their Operator or BTS status for aD. additioua126 months.
.

.

.
_.

.

..

Waiting Period/Moilitoring Period/Depri,'ation Period/Observation Period: IS-minute period prior to administering a
breath alcohol test, in which an officer nionitorS
test subj~trmdivid.ual.

the
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Breath Alcohol Standard Operating Procedure
List of Revisions
SOP Section

Date of Revision

Topic

2

Delete reference to ALS

June 1,1995

2

0.0210.20 solutions

June 1,1995

3.2.1

Valid breath tests

OctobA~995

2.1

Aka-Sensor cahbration checks

$\)996

2.2

Intoxilyzer 5000 Calibration Checks
Effective Jurie, 1996

2.1.2

0.003 agreement

2.1.2

chec~

0'

.~
Re-run a ",lution withln 24 h~~. ~0
<:::'
Operators may run calibration

2.1.2

riY"~

1, 1996

June 1, 1996
July I, 1996

Sept<mber 6, 1996

2.1.2

~~"1.our~Od
AIl 3 solutions ~ a..~~period
R~running~'?dtutiO'f#

~1

All

~~ tO~~OVed

September 26, 1996
Oct 8,1996

2

~SOl~ run within a 48-hour period

September 26, 1996

2

M~ three calibration solutions

October 8, 1996

2.1

All 3 solutions run

2

~~utionvalues
. no longer called in to BFS

2

~o-~.

00·· Alco-Sensorand Into~yzer 5000

2.1

~eJ.

2.2

SOl~~'~; a 48-hour period

r.

September 6, 1996
September 6, 1996
September 26, 1996

Aprill,1997

August 1. 1998

calihrationcheck
Calibration checks for the Intoxilyzer 5000

Febrllary 11, 1999

Name change, all references made to the
Buteau of Forensic Services were changed to
Idaho State Police Forensic Services.

August 1999

1.6

Record Management

August 1, 1999

2

Deletedsec1ions. on relocating, repairing, recahbrating,
and 10anfug of instruments frOm previous revision.

August 1, 1999

~v

«,~
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3

Alea-Sensor and Intoxilyzer 5000 calibration checks
Deleted sections on blood and urine samples
for alcohol dete:rmination

August 1, 1999
August 1, 1999

1.6

Operator certification record management

January 29,2001

1,2, and 3
2.1,2.2

Reformat numbering
Requirement for running 0.20 simulator solution

Angust 18, 2006

2.2.1.1.2.2

Changed 3-sample to "two print cards".

NovembeF{7' 2006

2.2.1.1.2.2
2.L2.1 and 2.2.4

Deleted "simulator port" and "two print cards".
Simulator temperature changed from "should"
to "musf'.

1.2, 2.1, 2.2

2.2.1.L2.2

Clarification of 0.20 cahbration checks.

1.2

Added the Lifeloc FC20

~~~7
. 14,2007

~"":'september 18, 2007
*0<'"

Deleted requirement that the new~'~~~~0

1.5

utilize the same technology if the

certified

~

c~

.{$

February 13, 2008
February l3, 2008

~ simnl~solutions to

Modified the accepted ran-

2

+1-I0~, elimin.·ating~~.Ol ~ion. Added

"Established target ~s ~ different
from those sh~n ~~e label"

February 13, 2008

2.2

A.d~ Lif~C20~ration checks

February 13, 2008

2.

M~.ttO...~callY allow use of the 0.20

February 13, 2008

Gen~fori:nat for clarification.

December 1, 2008

IntoifO~~1:ion is now section 2.3
during s~testing

Sections 1, 2, 3

Combined

~ensor aild Lifeloc sections. Specifically,

.( ~ged calibration requirement using the 0.20

CJ0,"reference.solution from four (4) checks to two (2).

2.1.4, 2.2.3, 2.2.4,2~0 .... Clarification: a "calibration check" consists of a
And 2.2.10
."\; ~
pair of samples in sequence and both samples
~V
must be within the acceptable range before
.::§
proceeding with subject testing. A 0.20 solution
shouid berepI.aced every 20-25 samples. Clarified
the correct procedure for performing a calibration check.

January 14,2009

.

«.§J

2.1.3, 2.1.4.i, 2.1.9

July 7,2009
Clarification: Added "before and after" to the O.ORand
0.20 cal1bration checks, within 24 hours of a subject test.
The official time and date of the cahbratioil check is the
tiineand date recorded. on the printout, or the time and date
recorded in the log, whichever cOlTesponds to the calibration
.
ch¢k referenced in section 2.1.3 or2.1.4.1.
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History Page
Revision #

Effective date

IDstory

o

8120/2010

The entire SOP was rewritten to incorporate language changes regarding
performance verifications, and to. dear-up ambiguities associated with
the 0.20 verification and the relevance to cases not involving an 188004C charge. Scope and safety sections were added. Troubleshooting,
~
MIP/MIC sections added.

1

8/27!iOl0

"

Deletions andlor additions to sections 2. 4.3.3, 4.4.1. 4.4.3, ~.6.1.l,
5.1.2,5.1.4,5.1.4.1,5.1.5,5.2.4,5.25,6,6.2.1, 6.2.3, 6;'~V~1, 7.1.1,
~
7.1.2, 7.1.2.2, 7.1.3, 7.1.4, 7.1.5, 8.

~

~

e:'

~

~0

,.(\0 .~0
~' V-

OG ,,.

Q.~~
)..,~....

~0

~0

thO

O'Q

/,u

~V
roC:J

~

«;-0
-o.C:J

CJ·O~ .

«;-0
~u
... ~

.«'V

.
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Quantitative Analysis for Alcohol in Breath by Approved
Breath Testing Instruments.

1

2

Scope
This method describes the Idaho State Police Forensic Services lJ~S)
p.rocedure, for use by agencies external to ISPFS, for the analysis of~e: tbr the
presence of volatile compounds using an approved breath testing ins
. This
. method provides for the quantitative analysis of ethanol.
(~
~.)

.

....
Following all the recommendations (}f this external procedt;
~ establish the
scientific validity of the breath alcohol test Failure to meet all ~the recommendations
within this procedure does not disqualify the breath alcoh~l~~ut does allow for the
questioning of the breath alcohol tests. as it pert:ai,e.s to its ~on of admissibility in
court.. That foundation can be set, through te~'), h~...~ath testing specialist expert
or ISPFS expert in breath testing as to the ~.lia}-~cations of the deviation from
the procedure as stated.
~~...

0-"-

3

CO ',,/

Q~.~

Safety

Within the disciplI·~...or bre .. cohol testing, the general biohazard safety
.
due to the potential infectious materials that may
precautions should be fouU'",""",,urinJ§...~ sampling of the breath. Cantion should be taken so
be ejected from the m
as the expired bre
t ~~d towards the officer or other unrelated bystander.

.;s.

4

Instrument

2n~~rator Certification

TO~
en ~t minimum standards are·met, individnal breath testing instruments,
Operators,
reath testing specialists (BTS) must be approved and certified by the
I~ S~' ce Forensic Services (ISPFS). The ISPFS will establish and maintain a
list ~~ved instruments by manufacturer brand or model designation for use in the
s~

...• .§>~

« .

.

Approval of Breath TeSting Instruments. In order to be approved and certified
each instrument must meet the following criteria:
4.1.1

The instrument shall analyze a reference sample or analytical test
standard, the results of which must agree within +/- 10% of the target
value or such limits set by ISPFS.
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4.1.2 The certification procedures shall be adequate and appropriate for the
analysis of breath specimens for the determination of alcohol
concentration for law enforcement.

4.1.3 Any other tests deemed necessary to correctly and adequately evaluate the
instrument to give accurate results in routine breath alcohol testing.
4.2

The ISPFS may, for cause, remove a specific instrument by serial number from
evidential testing and suspend or withdraw certification thereof.

4.3

Operators become certified by completing a training class taUght~y PFS
onths
certified Breath Testing Specialist (BTS). Certification is for 26 cal
and expires the last day of the 26th month. Certification will a?~ ~Operator
to perf01ID all functions required to obtain a valid breathi:~-test It is the
responsibility of the individual Operator to maintain their c
certification; the
ISPFS will not notify Operators that their certification is ~u
expire.

~,

~ved

4.3.1

Recertification for another 26-month period
by completing an
ISPFS approved Operator class P~ the~~fthe 26th month.

4.3.2

If the individual fails to
the class (including the
written and practical tes~r a11~eir certification status to expire,
he/she must retake the~a~$s in order to become recertified..

4.3.3

If current
run evidenti~0ath'
Operator c~~ c~

sa~~ori~~~plete

Operato~,"
~ is expired, the individual is not certified to

I tests on the instrument in question until the

d..

4.3.~~ ~~ grace periods or provisions for extension of Operator
O~tQitn.

Breath Tes~~ecialists (BTS) are Operators who have completed an
advanced ~g ,class and are ISPFS-certified to perform instrument
~' and provide both inllial ."d recertifu:arion 1nUning for instrument

4.4

4.tP To obtain initial BTS certification, an individual must be currently

/1.....0
'" -

~U

«.s>

certified as an Operator of that particular instrument BTS certification is
then obtained by completing an approved BTS training class.
NOTE: The prior Operator status "on that particular instrument"
requirement is waived for new instrumentation.

4.4.2 BTS Certification is valid for 26 calendar months.
4.4.3

IfBTs certification is allowed to expire, the individual reverts to certified
Operator status for 12 calendar months for that instrument. He/she may
no longer perform any BTs specific duties relating to that particular
instrument.
Idaho Brea1h Alcohol Standard Operating Procedure
Issuing Authority-ISPFS Quality Manager
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4.4.4 BTS certification is renewable by attending an approved BTS training
class.
4.4.5

4.5

The Idaho State Police Forensic Services may revoke BTS certification for
cause. Examples of what may constitute grounds for revocation may
include falsification of records, failure to perform required performance
verificatioll; failure to successfully pass a BTS recertification class and
failure to meet standards in conducting Operator training.

Adoption of a new instrument by an agency will require updating any :ij~d
Operators in that agency in the use of the new instrument.
R)'"
4.5.1

~'l6r

A currently certified BTS may become a certified
a new
instrument by completing an ISPFS approved BTS Ins~~tion class.

o~.f

4.5.2 A currently certified Operator may certify
'Ow instrument by
completing an ISPFS approved Operator Ins~tation Class for the
~
~
new instrument.
4.5.3

Individuals not currently ~ .~ ~rators must complete an
Operator Class for each ap~~~nt

m~e¥len~

4.6

Record maintenance and
It is the responsibility of each
individual agency to sto~o~~ verification records, subject records,
maintenance recordS, ~~eriritt
~: or any other records as pertaining to the
ents and to maintain a current record of
evidentiary use ofbr~€M:es'
Operator certifica~EJ

0

4.6.1

!~.
~ of the agency to see that the said records are stored
:tai:q.0a minimum of (3) years in accordance with IDAPA
11.

4.6.

.01.&

~ords may be subject to periodic audit by the Idaho State Police

"-C::1

Forensic Services.

4;6.&~e Idaho State Police Forensic .Services will not be responsible for the

G

«;-0

storage of such records not generated by ISPFS.

~V

«'5
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5.

Performance Verification of Breath Testing Instruments
Performan~ verifications aid the Breath Testing Specialist (BTS) and the Idaho
State Police Forensic Services (ISPFS) in detennining if a breath testing instrument is
functioning correctly. Performance verifications are performed using a wet bath
simulator performance verification solution. The solution is provided by and/or approved
by ISPFS. The ISPFS analysis establishes the target value and acceptable range of tl1e
solutions used for the verification and includes the acceptable values on the Certificate of
Analysis for each solution. Note: The ISPFS established target values may be di"ent
from those shown on the bottle label.
~

5.1

Alco-SensQr and Lifeloc FC20-Portable Breath
Performance Verification

Testinj

\<il>s~ment

V)\

brea~~

5.1.1

The Aleo-Sensor and Lifeloc FC20 portable
instrument
performance verification is ron using appro~ly 0.08 and/or 0.20
performance verification solutions provided b;:#ir approved by ISPFS.

5.1.2

The performance verification
verification sohrtions cons~Y~

5.1.3

A performance verificati~ of ~ Alco-Sensor and. Lifeloc FC20
instruments using a A~-PeQ:o~ce verification solution must be
performed within~~~..betore or after an evidentiary test to be
approved for .;~)(ti..
Multiple breath alcohol tests may be
covered by a~J~
ce verification.

l~ th~~8

and 0.20 performance

.

~

5.1.3.1_~~8 p~

..

·ce. verification solution should be replaced with
~.h ~on app~oximately every 25 verifications or every
bale~1ith, whichever comes :first.

O

5.1.4 A

O-}ii~rmance verification should be run and results logged once per

cal~ month

and replaced with fresh solution approximately every 25
OGj:jications or until it reaches its expiration date, whichever comes first

rp<':
<0'"

~ ..

.. U

~

. ~'J.

NOTE: The 0.20 performance verification was implemented for
the sole purpose of supporting the instruments' results for an 188004Ccharge. Failure to timely perform a 0.20 performance
verification ~ not invalidate tests performed that yield results at
other levels or m charges other than 18-8004C.

5.1.401 The 0.20 performance verification satisfies the requirement for
performance verification wifuin 24 hours, before or after an
evidentiary test at any level. The 0.20 performance verification
solution should not be used routinely for this pmpose.
5.1.5

Acceptable results fot a 0.08 or 0.20 performance verification is a pair of
samples in sequence that arebotl1 within +1- 10% of the performance
Idaho Breath Alcohol Standard Opera1ing Procedure
Issuing AJIthority-ISPFS Quality Manager
Revision 1 Effective 8127/2010
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verification solution target value. Target values and ranges of acceptable
results are included in a certificate of analysis for each solution lot series,
prepared by, and available from, the ISPFS.
NOTE: Due to external factors associated with changing a performance
verification solution the results of the initial performance velification may
not be within the acceptable range, therefore the performance verification
may be repeated until a pair of satisfactory results are obtained. However,
if results after a total of three test series for any solution (equivalent to six
tests) are still unsatisfactory, contact the appropriate ISPFS Lal\Q~ry.
The instmment should not be used for evidentiary t~Stin
tin'til the
problem is corrected and performance verification results . . , the
acceptable range. The suggested troubleshooting proc
should be
followed if the initial performance verification d.ct~ ot meet the
acceptance criteria.

<0\

betwee~~<C and 34.5°C in order

5.1.6 Temperature of the simulator must be
for the performance verification re~ts to be ~

n~

~r

. NOTE: The simulator may
wJi!J approximately 15 minutes
to ensure that. the metal lid [~ w~'ff the lid is cold, condensation of
alcohol vapor may OCC~~U~g~ results.
5.1. 7 Performance v~Q:
expiration dat~~tih(la~...

.SQbJMn:

should only be used prior to the

agenc~ ~J_~Onal performance verification solution levels at
dis~ ~u

5.1.8 An
their

~.cial~ ~ and date of the performance verification is the time and
date reco~on the printout, or the time and date recorded in the log,
whisPi"@j corresponds to the performance verification referenced in
. sec~.1.3 or 5.1.4.1.

5.1.9

rnto:!.fo:.'?SOOOIEN Performance Verification

5.2

T.£;Qyzer 50001EN instruments must have a performance verification with each

.tl.-~tiary test. If the performance verification is within the acceptable range for

"'" the lot of solution being used, then the instrument will be approved and the
Iesulting breath samples will be deemed valid for evidentiary use.

~V

~~

.

rJV
~

.

5.2;1

Into:rilyzer 5000lEN performance verification is run using 0.08 andlor
0.2Qperfonnance. verification solutions provided by and/or approved by
ISPFS...

5,2.2 During each evidentiary breath alcohol test using the IntoxilyZe! 50001EN,
aperforman~ verification will be performed ;:is directed by the instroment
testing sequence and recorded as SIM CHK on the printout If the SIM
Idaho Brea1h Alcohol Standard Operating Procedure
Issuing Au1hority-ISPFSQualitr Manager
Revision 1 Effective 8127/2010
Page 11 ofI8
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CHK is not within the acceptable range for the solution lot being used, the
testing sequence will abort and no breath samples will be obtailled.
5.2.3

A two sample performance verification using a 0.08 performance
verification solution should be run and results logged each time a
solution is replaced with fresh solution. A 0.08 performance verification
solution should be replaced with fresh solution approximately every 100
samples or every calendar month, whichever comes first

5.2.4

A 0.20 perfonnance verification should be run and results logged ~~er
calendar month and replaced with fresh solution approximate~Very 25
verifications or until it reaches its expiration date, whichever ~V first

imple~

NOTE: The 0.20 performance verification was
for the sole
pmpose of supporting the instruments' results for(lh\8-8004C charge.
Failure to timely perform a 0.20 perfonnance<.vlrlfication will not
invalidate tests performed that yield results a,.t ~llevels or in charges
other than 18-8004C.
~

eJ"-

5.2.5

D~ce

Ac.ceptable results for a 0.08 o-gJ:;:iJ"
verification is a pair of
samples in sequence that~oth ~
10% of the perfonnance
verification solution targ..~ue. ~et values and ranges of acceptable
results for each s~~CO\ldt s~s...are included in a certificate of analysis,
prepared by, and ~.Le ..~~"'rfle ISPFS.

-:1-

NOTE: Due

~~.J:Wo.~·'~tors associated with changing a perfonnance

Verificati?~tioJ('j;BP;clts of the initial performance verifica~on ~y

-wffi

th~~le range, therefore the performance verificat:J.on
ma~!'fep~~Ul a pair of satisfactory results are obtained. However,

not be

if s
ota! of three test series for any solution (equivalent to six
testS are
unsatisfactory, contact the appropriate ISPFS Laboratory.
The ~ent should not be used for evidentiary testing until the
prolh$i is cou'ected and performance verification results are within the
~table range. Follow the suggested troubleshooting procedure if the
~~ perfonnance verification does not meet the acceptance criteria.

~,,? The official time and date of the performance verification is the time and
r:z:rv

~..

date recorqed on the printout, or the time and date recorded in the log.

~U .5:2:7 Per.f~ce

..§5

«

verification solutions should only be used prior to the
expItation date as marked on the label.

5.2.8Tempe~

of the simulator must be between 33.S0C and 34.SoC in order
for the penoimailce verification results to be valid.

5 ;i:9 Au agency may run additional perfonnance verification solution levels at
their discretion.

Idaho Breath Alcohol Standard Operating :?rocedure
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5.2.10 The BTS must set the correct acceptable range limits and performance
verification solution lot number in the instrument before proceeding with
evidentiary testing.

ldaho·Breath Alcohol StaDdatd Opera.ting Procedure
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6.

Evidentiary Testing Procedure
Proper testing procedure by certified Operators is necessary in order to provide
accUrate results. Instruments used in Idaho measure alcohol in the breath, not the blood.,
and report results as grams of alcohol in 210 liters of breath.
Prior to evidentiary breath alcohol testing, the subjectlindividual should be
monitored for at least fifteen (15) minutes. Any material which absorbs/adsorbs
or traps alcohol should be removed from the mouth prior to the start of ti!-e 15
minute waiting period During the monitoring period the subjectlindivi~),uld
not be allowed to smoke, drink, eat, or belchlburp/vomitlregurgitate. ~

6.1

~~ty

NO.TE: If a foreign objectlmaterial is left in the mouth during 1hF
of the
.15 minute monitoring period., any potential external alcohol c~Ya&ination will
come into equilibrium with the subjectlindividual's body wa~\paror dissipate so
as not to interfere with the results of the subsequent breath ~~ol test
6.1.1
6.1.2
6.1.3

The breath alcohol test must be administer~an Operator currently
0
certified in the use of the instrume~

False teeth, partial plates, or b~ in~~~or prescribed by a dentist or
physician do not need to be ~ved ~tain a valid test

The Operator may electrl~od te~ place of the breath alcohol test if
there is a failureAc()'rJIDpI~e fifteen minute monitoring period
successfully.
* ~

V

. thoe m~nn
",OA.' ~
6.1.4 During
d, the Operator must be alert for any event
that might ~n~ curacy of the breath alcohol test

6.1.4..~OOp¥ must be aware of the possible presence of mouth

0''JI=~co
indicated by the testing instrument If mouth alcohol is
. s
ed or indicated, the Operator should begin another 15~

e waiting period before repeating the testin~ sequence. .

~~) If, during the IS-minute w.aiting period, the subject/individual

o

<§

~efJ
,-

~U
•.~. ~
~.. .
~ -.....; .
El
.

.

vomits or regurgitates material from the stomach into the
subjectlindividual's breath pathway, the IS-minute waiting period
must begin again.

6.1.4.3 If there is doubt as to. the events occurring during the IS minute
momtoring period., the officer should look at results of the
duplicate breath samples fot evidence of potential alcohol
contamination. For clarification see section 6.2.22.

Idaho Breath Alcohol Stimda:t4 operating Procedure
Issuing Aufuority.-ISPFS Qwility Manager
Revision 1 Effective 8/27/2010
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6.2

A complete breath alcohol test includes two (2) valid breath samples taken.
during the testing sequence and preceded by air blanks. The
duplicate breath samples should be approximately 2 minutes apart
to allow for the dissipation of potential mouth alcohol
contamination.
NOTE: A deficient or insufficient sample does not automatically invalidate a test
sample.
6.2.1

If the subject/individual fails or refuses to provide a duplicate, a...~ate
sample as requested by the Operator, the single test resuIN1mll be
considered valid.
~\J
6.2.1.1

~.e

Operator may repeat the testing

CIrcumstances.

.

6.2.1.2 The Operator should use a new

~

tests.

seque~~ required by

«)\ ~
mOllt~e for each series

eJ2

of

6.2.2 A third breath sample is req~e ~o results differ by more than
0.02.
~
~~
6.2.2.1 Unless mouth

al~ ~ in~ted

or suspected, it is not necessary
to repeat ~@.~jnJl.i:Maiting period to obtain a third breath

0 V ~~'
6.2.2.2 Th,~tsfi9&licate breath samples should c~LTe~ate :vithin
O.~'0: ~~e the abse:ilce of alcohol contamInatlOn m the
sample.

o"\d;livciV
L

62.3

,JdtiJect/~dual's breath pathway, show consistent sample
and indicates the absence of RFI as a contributing factor
to ~~eath results.

Th~atc:r

should log test results and retain printouts, if any, for

~~bt~ use ill court

6.2'0'Qia SUbject/individual fails or refuses to provide a dupli~te, adequa~e
CJ sample as requested by the Operator, the results obtained are still
~..
considered valid by the ISPFS, provided the failure to supply the
"\. requested samples was tlie fault of the subject/individual and not the
.~U·
Operator.

..

.

~.s>

6.2.5 If the second or third samples are lacking due to ins1rument failure, the
Operator' should attempt to utilize another instrnment or have blood
drawn.

IdahO Breath Alcohol Standard Operating Procedure
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7.

Troubleshooting Procedure
Proper testing procedure by certified Operators is necessary in order to provide
accurate results.
7.1

Performance verification: If, when performing the periodic performance
verification, the instrument falls outside the limits of the verification, the
troubleshooting guide should be used..
N?TE: .This. is. a guide for troubles~ooting performance verific:ations ou1ki~the
verification limits and the procedure 1S recommended to streamline ~~1~ the
potential cause of the problem. Strict adherence to the guidelines is ~~ed..

7.1.1

7.1.2

perfo~~e

The three sources of uncertainty when
periodic
performance verifications are in the simulator ~ and Operator
technique, the simulator performance verifica~ solution, and the
instrument calibration itself
~0

~ the first performance v~rifi.ca~s out~the ve~fication ~ts, ~e

sunulator setup and techni~e ~e. Q1l.~or performmg the verifica:lO.n
should be eValuated..~e
s
0t ~ be evaluated to ensure that It lS
hooked up properly, . . ort li'bs€s, is properly w81med, is within
temperature, the Op.
·lo~que is not too hard or soft, and that
the Operator does ~ p ~g until after the s8lUple is taken.

7.1.2.1 The

P~e~rificatiOnShOuld be run a second time

~~perJ'3...,~

7.1.2.2
verification is within the verification limits on
~ se~, the instrument passes the performance verification.
7.1.3

If

Qse~performan?e v~rificatio~

is outside the verification limits,

thena~fformance venfication solution should be evaluated next

i...&;j1 The performance verification solution should be changed to a :fresh

~O

solution.

1'>9o 7.1.3.2 Th: solution should b~ w~ed for approximate~y 15 min~t~, or

.. ~'<.I

"U'
.

~.

«VV

~

until the temperature IS Within range, and the sunulator hd
WaIlllas the simulator jar.

IS

as

7.1.3.3 The performance verification may then be repeated..
7.1.4 If the thirdperfonnance verification is outside the verification limits, the
instrument must be taken out of Service and sent to the ISPFS or an
approved service provider.
7.15 Upon return from service, the instrument should be recertified by ISPFS
before being put back into seIVice.
Idaho Breath Alcohol standatd Operating ProcedJn-e
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7.2

Thermometers:
7.2.1

If a bubble forms in the thermometer. the Operator or BTS can place the
thermometer in a freezer to draw the mercmy (or equivalent) into the bulb
of the thermometer. This should disperse the bubble.

.

~o Breath Alcohoi Standard Operating Procedure
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8.

IV[]PIMIC Procedure
The previous version of tlris section has been withdrawn from publication and will
be replaced by an updated version that is pending statutory and legal review. Please
disregard and destroy any copies of the previous version of this section.
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IV.
FIELD SOBRIETY TEST

1

2
3

4
5

The court has the ability to review the video tape regarding the field sobriety test.
On the horizontal gazenystagnus, the officer's testimony was that Mr. Besaw's pupils did
not appear to be the same size. The testimony indicated that the National Highway Traffic

6

7

Safety Administration Manual notes "If the eyes do not track together, or ifthe pupils are

8

noticeably unequal in size, the chance of medical disorder or injuries the nystagnus is

9

present". In this case, the pupil size was obviously noticeable because the arresting officer

10

put that in his police report, which he testified to at the time of the hearing. Therefore,

11

12

allowing the horizontal gaze nystagnus in as evidence would be improper. Scientific aura

13

behind the testing would prejudice that. With regard to the "walk and turn" the court can

14

note the slope that was present. The surface was not reasonably dry, wasn't level and it

15

was certainly slippery based on the amount of water that was present. The same can be
16

17

said for the "one-leg stand". The officer had no prior experience with Mr. Besaw and

18

would not know what his ability was to perfonn these field tests in nonnal conditions. It

19

was raining heavily in January 2011. During the course of the field sobriety test, the court

20
21
22

23

can note everything on the video tape. The court can also note the difference in what the
trooper was wearing and what Mr. Besaw was wearing.
The State should be allowed to introduce evidence on the field sobriety tests on the

24

grounds of foundation, relevance, and that its probative value is substantially outweighed
25
26
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1

by the danger of unfair prejudice. Allowing such evidence violates Mr. Besaw's

2

confrontation rights under the Idaho and United States Constitutions. In one study, over

3

98% of roadside HGN tests were detennined to be not properly conducted. See "End-

4

5

Position Nystagmus as Indicator of Ethanol Intoxication", Science & Justice Jouma1200 1.

6

See United States vs. Hom, 185 F Supp 2d 530 (D.Md. 2002) ( a copy of which is

7

attached hereto as Exhibit B) and State vs. Lasworth 42 P.3d 844 (NJv1. App., 2001) (a

8

copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit C). The appropriate test for measuring the
9

10

reliability of evidence is Rule 702 of the Idaho Rules of Evidence. See State vs. Gleason,

11

123 Idaho 62,65,844 P.2d 691 (1992). In that case, the Idaho Supreme Court questioned

12

the precedential value of State vs. Garrett, 119 Idaho 878, 811 P.2d 488 (1991). The

13

14

Gleason Court affinned that at most the arresting officer could testify that a nystagmus

15

may only be an indicator of intoxication, not that it is conclusive evidence. Moreover,

16

such evidence cannot be used "to establish or infer any particular correlative BAC level

17

because nystagmus does stem from other causes other than the ingestion of alcohol." See
18

19
20

21

Schultz vs. State of Marvland, 665 A.2d 60, 77 (1995) and a study by Spurgeon Cole,
attached hereto as Exhibit D. Also see the Affidavit of Harold P. Brull in the case of
United States vs. Horn, attached hereto as Exhibit E and also see the Affidavit of Joel P.

22

Wiesen, Ph.D., attached hereto as ExhibitF. See Idaho Rules of Evidence, Rule 104. In
23
24

a more recent Court of Appeals decision, State vs. Parkinson, 128 Idaho 29, 909 P.2d 647

25
26
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1

(Ct.App.1996), the Court cites Gleason to say that the admission of expert testimony

2

regarding scientific evidence is governed by Rule 702, but goes on to "articulate the

3

inquiry envisioned by Rule 702" discussing Daubert vs. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals,
4

5
6
7

8

Inc., 502 U.S. 579, 113 S.Ct. 2786,125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993), for guidance. 128 Idaho, at
p. 34. Such inquiry requires,
a preliminary assessment of whether the reasoning or methodology
underlying the testimony is scientifically valid and of whether that
reasoning or methodology properly can be applied to the facts and issues.

9

10
11

12

(quoting Daubert) (emphasis added)
The Trial Court must make a preliminary assessment. Factors to be evaluated
include:

13

14
15

16

Whether the theory or technic in question can be tested, whether it has been
subjected to peer review and publication, its known or potential error rate,
the existence and maintenance of standards governing its use, and whether
it has attracted widespread acceptance within a relevant scientific
cOlmnunity. (quoting Dauber)

17

128 Idaho, at p. 34
18

19
20

21
22

23
24

The Court then synthesized, "other courts sand commentators" in listing these additional
factors:
1) The presence of safeguards and the technique,
2) Analogy to other scientific techniques whose results are admissible,
3) The nature and breath of inferences drawn,
4) The extent to which the basic data are verifiable by the court and jury,
5) Availability of other experts to test and evaluate the technique,
6) The probative significance of the evidence and the circumstances of the case.

25
26

(Cites omitted) Id.
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II

II

1

However, the limitation in Parkinson, "just scientific expertise" has been done

2

away with the decision in U. S. Supreme Court case, Kumbo Tire vs. Carmichael, 119

3

S. Ct. 1169 (1999). In that case, the Supreme Court answered the question posed by Justice

4

5

Rehnquist's dissent in Daubert vs. Merrell regarding scientific evidence. Answering

6

affirmatively, in a fairly resounding decision, Justice Breyer authored the near unanimous

7

decision. The Court decided "how Daubert applies to the testimony of engineers and other

8

experts who are not scientists." Id., at p. 1171. Answering this question, resolved a circuit
9

10

split, where several circuits, notably the Third, Fifth, and Eighth had indicated that

11

Daubert applied to all expert testimony while the Second, Ninth, Tenth and Eleventh

12

Circuits held that Daubert applies only to the admission of "scientific" expert testimony.

13
14

15
16

The Court concluded that Daubert's strictures apply not just to "scientific" evidence, but
to all forms of proposed expert testimony. Kumbo 119 S.Ct., at 1171, 1175.
The Court, in stressing the importance of the gatekeeping function of a trial judge,

17

noted that its objective was to:
18

19
20

21
22
23

"ensure the reliability and relevancy of expert testimony, to make certain
that an expert, whether basing testimony upon professional studies or
personal experience, employs in the courtroom the same level of intellectual
rigor that characterizes the practice of an expert in the relevant field."
Id., atp. 1176.
In order to ensure this level of reliability, Daubert's teaching and tests must be

24

applied to all expertise, whether it be scientific or "technical" or "other specialized"
25
26
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1

knowledge. Kumbo, at p. 1174. These requirements must exist because all experts, not

2

just scientific ones, unlike ordinary witnesses are given this wide latitude to offer opinions

3

- including those not base upon firsthand observations or knowledge. Kumbo, at p. 1174.
4

5

While the Idaho Supreme Court has used a Rule 702 case-by-case test of reliability

6

for admission of expert testimony, the Court of Appeals has used Daubert, 509 U.S. 579

7

(1993) and similar factors, which include:

8
9

10
11

12
13
14

a) Whether the theory or technique in question can be tested;
b) Whether it has been subjected to peer review and publication;
c) Its known or potential error rate;
d) The existence and maintenance of standards governing its use; and
e) Whether it has attracted widespread acceptance within a relevant
scientific cOlmnunity.
The Idaho Court of Appeals uses the following criteria that a trial court might
consider when analyzing scientific evidence:

15
16
17
18
19
20

21

a) The presence of safeguards in the teclmiques;
b) Analogy to other scientific techniques whose results are admissible;
~) The nature and breadth of inference drawn;
d) The extent to which the basic data are verifiable by the court and jury;
e) Availability of other experts to test and evaluate the technique; and
f) The probative significance of the evidence in the circumstances of the case.
State vs. Konechny, 3 P.3d 535, 134 Idaho 410 (App.Ct.2000); Kumbo Tire vs.
Cannichael, 119 S.Ct. 1169 (1999); State vs. Parkinson, 909 P.2d 647, 128 Idaho 29,

22
23

(Idaho App. 1996).

24

25
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1

The field sobriety tests administered in Mr. Besaw's case do not meet the

2

requirements of Daubert, Kumbo or Rule 702, nor can the arresting officer lay a sufficient

3

foundation to admit such evidence. Further, Mr. Besaw has no way to confront or

4
5
6
7

challenge the officer's observations ofthese presumed psychological or psychophysical
reaction of eyes, therefore, such evidence should not be allowed.
In using the case law set out above, the Court must detennine that the field sobriety

8

tests result lack reliability and do not follow the requirements of the Rule 702 standards.
9

10
11

12

The factors, as noted above, cannot be met by the State in this case. Mr. Besaw requests
that evidence obtained against him be suppressed on the grounds that his due process and
other constitutional rights, as protected under the Idaho State Constitution and the United

13
14

States Constitution, were violated. The Court can also note cases from Kansas and Ohio.

15

In State vs. Witte, 836 p.2d 110 (Kansas 1992), the Kansas Court criticized states like

16

Idaho for accepting field sobriety tests based on State vs. Superior Court, 718 P. 2d 171

17

(Arizona). The Kansas Court noted:

18
19
20
21
22
23

"The Idaho Supreme Court also followed the Arizona opinion. The Idaho
Court noted that no evidence or publication had been presented that refuted
the Arizona opinion." State vs. Garrett, 119 Idaho 878, 881, 811 P.2d 488
(1991).
At pp. 1118 and 1119.
The Kansas Supreme Court went on to criticize the Arizona Court by outlining

24

several contrary scientific studies that dealt with the horizontal gaze nystagmus test. The
25
26
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1

2

3
4

5

Kansas Supreme Court concluded:
"If the Arizona Supreme Court had had the evidence before it, it may not
have held that the HGN evidence satisfies the Frye admissibility
requirements. The reliability of the HGN test is not currently a settled
position in the scientific community."
Atp.1121.

6

7

The Court may be better able to understand Mr. Besaw's position by looking at

8

Judge Lansing's dissenting opinion in State vs. Mazzuca, 132 Idaho 868, 979 P.2d 1226

9

(Ct.App. 1999). This case dealt with the Intoxilyzer 5000 and the foundation for the

10

evidence allowing the breath result in. Judge Lansing stated:

11

12
13
14

"To bolster its holding that this foundation suffices, the majority opinion
relies upon several cases from other jurisdictions where the expert testimony
was more complete. In my view, this reliance is misplaced, for expert
testimony given in other cases cannot substitute for an evidentiary
foundation properly presented before the magistrate."

15

16
17
18
19

20
21

At p. 872.
Judge Lansing then went on to criticize the State vs. Garrett, supra, decision. She stated:
"Since then, the Idaho Supreme Court has made it crystal clear that the Frye
test is not to be utilized as the standard for admission of scientific or
technical evidence. See State vs. Faught, 127 Idaho 873, 876,908 P .2d 556
(1995). Rather, the proper standard is stated in I.R.E. 702."
At p. 872.

22
23
24

Judge Lansing concluded her dissenting opinion by stating:
"Thus, the admissibility ofthe Intoxilyzer 5000 test at issue here turns upon
the sufficiency ofthe foundational testimony presented to the magistrate in

25
26
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1

this case, not information contained in decisions from other courts."
(emphasis original)

2
3

Atp.872.

4

The Court's attention can also be drawn to a recent Eighth Circuit case, U. S. vs.

5

Iron Cloud, 171 F.3d 587, (8 th Cir.1999). In this case, Iron Cloud requested a Daubert

6
7

hearing on the reliability of the portable breath testing device. Said evidence being an

8

Alco Sensor III. The trial judge in Mr. Iron Cloud's case took the accuracy ofthe portable

9

breath test device for granted and he ignored the established procedure. It is interesting

10

that several states do not allow an Alco Sensor III to be used at trial, holding that the

11

12
13
14

preliminary breath tester may only be admissible to establish probable cause. See Boyd
vs. City of Montgomery, 472 So.2d 694, 697 (Ala.App.1985). Patrick vs. State, 750
S.W.2d 391, 394 (Ark. 1988), State vs. Strizich, 952 P.2d 1365, 1371 (Mont. 1997),

15

Thompson vs. State Department of Lie ensing, 960 P.2d475, 477 (Wash. App. 1998). The
16

17

govermnent argued in Iron Cloud that the District Court was correct in admitting the

18

results of the portable breath testing device without a Daubert hearing because the

19

technology had been in use for an extended period of time. The Court noted, however,

20
21
22
23
24

25

"the mere fact that a test has been used for a long time does not make it reliable." At. P.
591. The Eighth Circuit goes on to state:
"The experts disagree orr the reliability of the intoxilyzer test. The defense
counsel challenged the accuracy of both the PBT and the intoxilyzer test.
CLOSING ARGUMENT
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1

2
3

4
5

The intoxilyzer test is measured from the use of the breath, not the blood,
so a ratio must be applied to get the results in the form of the blood alcohol
level. The defense contended that this ratio can lead to inaccuracies. The
government's expert conceded on cross-examination that the blood test was
the most reliable of the three tests and that the intoxilyzer tests brought
many variables into play."
At p. 592.

6

Moreover, the Court must note that nothing in Daubert, Kumbo, Parkinson, and
7

8

Rule 702 require the Court to admit opinion testimony that is connected to existing data

9

only by the ipse dixit of an expert. Kumbo, at 1179.

10

In the case at bar, the government can not satisfY the reliability, accuracy, or

11

12
13

14

relevancy predicates for the admission of "expert" officer opinion testimony for the
standardized sobriety tests given or the Defendant's performance on them for the
following reasons:

15

1.

There is not a substantial basis as to what an average intoxicated person's
performance would be where a pretest practice session was not allowed;

2.

There is not a substantial factual basis as to what an average non-intoxicated
and uncoordinated persons' performance would be where a pretest practice
session was not allowed;

3.

There is not a substantial basis for believing the tests can distinguish
between an intoxicated person's perfonnance and the nonnal metal andJor
physical faculties, of a normally coordinated and) or normally uncoordinated
non-intoxicated persons performance of the tests;

4.

There is not a substantial factual basis for believing the witness possesses
any specialized medical/scientific training to proffer an expert opinion;

16
17
18
19
20

21
22
23
24
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1

5.

There is not a substantial basis for knowing what the defendant's nonnal
mental andior physical faculties were supposed to be at the time of police
testing in order to properly and relevantly compare his nonnal unpracticed
performance and the perfonnance observed;

6.

There is not a substantial basis to believe that these tests were medically
tested to be medically reliable and accurate;

7.

There is not a substantial basis to believe that these tests have been
subj ected to meaningful peer review;

8

There is not a substantial basis for believing that these tests have been
universally accepted within the medical andior scientific community as
being accurate and reliable indicators of a person being intoxicated to the
exclusion of other non-intoxicated reasons for not having the same normal
mental andior physical faculties of a perfectly average person;

9.

There is not a substantial basis for believing that either the methodology or
techniques utilized by the witness can be correlated to explicitly
distinguished between the test performance of an intoxicated person and a
perfectly average non-intoxicated person, and then to implicitly correlate
those performances and the performances of the defendant in this case.

2
3
4

5

6

7
8
9

10
11

12
13
14
15

In State vs. Homan, 732 N.E.2d 952, 89 Ohio St. 3d 421 (Ohio 2000), the Ohio
16
17
18
19
20

21

Supreme Court stated in discussing the field sobriety test:
"The small margins of error that characterized field sobriety tests make
strict compliance critical."
Atp.956.
The Court continued:

22
23

"The HGN test is not the only field sobriety test that required special care
in its administration."

24

Atp.956.
25
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1

The Court concluded its holding by stating:
2
3

4

5

"In contrast we fmd that strict compliance with standardized field sobriety
testing procedures is neither unrealistic nor humanly impossible in the great
majority ofvehicle stops in which the policy choose to administer the test."
Atp.957.

6
7
8
9

10
11

12

The Court can also look at State vs. Evtchison, 136 Idaho 210,30 P.3d 988 (Idaho
App.,2001). The Court of Appeals in cOlmnenting on the use of an expert indicated:
"The admissibility of expert testimony is governed by Idaho Rule of
Evidence 702."
At. p. 990.
The Trial Court in Mr. Besaw's case is required to conduct a Rule 702 Parkinson,

13
14

Kumbo, hearing to determine whether or not in this particular case field sobriety tests are

15

settled science, as required in Rule 702 and Idaho Criminal Rule 12(b). The Court of

16

Appeals in the Eytchison case commented on the change of the Federal Rule 702

17

regarding expert testimony. See p. 990, footnotes 1 and 2. See also changes to Idaho
18
19
20

21

Criminal Rule 16(b )(7).
The Federal Judicial Center has developed a Reference Manual on Scientific
Evidence as a result of the several federal cases that have developed regarding Rule 702

22
23
24

25
26

which have been cited above. The manual states in pertinent part:
"Obj ections to expert evidence relating to admissibility, qualifications of
a witness, or existence of a privilege should be raised and decided in
advance of trial whenever possible."
At. p. 53.
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1

The manual cites, in a footnote, Daubert vs. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, supra:
2
3
4

5

"Before admitting expert testimony, the trial court must make a 'preliminary
assessment of whether the reasoning or methodology underlying the
testimony is scientifically valid'." (emphasis added)
At p. 53.

6
7

8
9

10
11

12
13
14

The manual also states:
"In a criminal case in which the defense challenges the prosecution's expert
testimony, a trial court may choose to proceed differently than it would in
a civil case, in light of factors such as the narrower scope of discovery, the
defense's lack of resources and need for expert assistance, and the
Government's role in developing the expertise that is now in question. AS
in civil cases, the Court must take into account the particular facts of the
case. 'Whatever the District Court does, a clear message that emerges from
the Court's remarkably detailed factual analysis in Kumbo is that the
District Court must explain its choices so that the Appellate Court now has
an adequate basis for review."

15

Atp.29.

16

The manual also states:

17
18
19
20
21

"Of course, even if a court has no objection to the particular methodology's
relevance in proving causation, it may disagree with how it was applied in
the particular case. As the Supreme Court said in Joiner, 'Nothing ....
requires a District Court to admit opinion evidence which is connected to
existing data only by the ipse dixit of the expert'."
At. p. 33.

22

A North Dakota Law Review (Vol. 71, No.3, 1995) article strongly criticizes the
23
24

North Dakota decision in City of Fargo vs. McLaughlin, 512 N.W.2d 700, (N.D. 1994)
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26
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1

and the use of such cases as the State vs. Superior Court, supra, regarding field sobriety

2

tests. The Law Review article, after an extensive review of field sobriety tests and the

3

horizontal gaze nystagmus test, concluded:

4
5
6
7
8

"The scientific foundation of the HGNT is at best weak. Although
NHTSAs work claims to have found a correlation between BAC and HGNT
performance, this research has not been replicated by independent
investigators. The lack of evidence makes the continued use ofHGNT's
grounding in scientific principles, the admittance of such evidence in the
courtroom suit should be subject to the standards of admissibility of
scientific evidence."

9

10

Atp.694.
The article indicated there has been minimal peer review and publication and that

11

12
13
14

the lack of interest in the area and the misunderstanding of findings had lead to a lack of
agreement within any scientific community which could be considered appropriate. The
last sentence of the article states:

15
16
17

"Therefore, the North Dakota Supreme Court erred in not requiring proof
of scientific validity through expert testimony prior to the admittance of
HGNT results for the purpose of showing circumstantial evidence of
intoxication. " (emphasis added)

18

19
20

21

Atp.696.
The science behind the field sobriety tests used in Mr. Besaw's case must be
analyzed by the Trial Court.

22
23
24

State vs. Witte, 836 P .2d 110 (Kansas 1992) and State vs. Homan, 732 N.E.2d 952,
89 Ohio St.3d 421 (Ohio 2000) which was cited above, support Mr. Besaw's argument

25
26
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1

that cases like State vs. Superior Court and the City of Fargo vs. McLaughlin, do not meet

2

the requirements of Rule 702 of the Idaho Rules of Evidence. The State will not refute

3

the criticisms raised by State vs. Witte, nor will the State refute the North Dakota Law

4

5
6

Review article criticizing the North Dakota Supreme Court's decision regarding the
horizontal gaze nystagmus test.

7

In State vs. Garrett, (supra) the Court in a plurality opmlOn, determined the

8

scientific reliability of the horizontal gaze nystagmus. Chief Justice Bakes concurred in
9

10

the opinion while Justice McDevitt concurred in the results only. Justice Boyle filed a

11

special concurring opinion rejecting the use of the

12

dissented.

Em standard and Justice Johnson

Justice Johnson advocated a standard of independent reliability. Justice

13

14

Johnson's dissent reflects what has been done by the Idaho and Federal Courts in recent

15

cases like Parkinson and Eyichison, Daubert and Kumbo. In State vs. Garrett, the Court

16

stated:

17
18
19

"Because the reliability of a test based on a scientifically tested phenomenon
should not vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, we examine what other
jurisdictions have done when HG test results are offered as evidence in DDI
cases. "

20

21
22

23
24

25

At p. 880.
In Footnote 3, the Court states:
"Such' decisions' are persuasive only as they contain analysis and reasoning
which recommend itself to this Court."

At p. 880.
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t u(

1

2
3

4
5

The Garrett Court cited State vs. Superior Court:
"We have been furnished with no publications or other authority which
refutes the reasoned decision of the Arizona Court."
At p. 881.
It is submitted that Mr. Garrett's counsel did not provide an adequate argument

6

7

regarding filed sobriety tests. Mr. Besaw should not be held accountable for the failures

8

of Defendant counsel from a 1991 decision. Justice Johnson, in his dissent, lists succinctly

9

the problems ofthe holding of the plurality when he stated:

10
11

12
13
14
15

16
17
18
19

"Ifthis {the testimony ofthe arresting officer} establishes the reliability for
admissibility for expert opinion based on new scientific methods, then we
must be prepared to accept the admissibility ofthe results of the polygraph
examination based on the testimony of polygraph operators, the
admissibility of DNA tests based on the testimony oflaboratory technicians
who conduct the tests, and the results of other fonus of' scientific' testing
based on the testimony of those who conduct the tests. In my view, this is
not the type of reliability that we should require before allowing testimony
of the results of tests conducted based on new scientific methods. The
foundation should be laid by experts who have researched the tests and are
available to testify as to the scientific basis for the test." (emphasis added)
At p. 885.
The State ofIdaho has never provided said foundation with regard to field sobriety

20
21

tests. There has never been a true Rule 702 hearing as envisioned by Daubert, Kumbo,

22

Parkinson, or Konechy. The Garrett and Gleason cases are bad law and should be

23

overturned.

24

25
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08

1

The Court may also want to look at State vs. DuffY, 778 A.2d 415 (N.H. 2000). In

2

that particular case, Mr. Duffy was arrested after perfonning field sobriety tests. The New

3

Hampshire Supreme Court indicated:

4

"The defendant also argues that the results ofthe HGN test were improperly
admitted. Because this issue is likely to arise on remand, we will address
it. (Cite omitted). New Hampshire Rule of Evidence 702 requires that
opinion evidence based upon scientific principles, must meet a threshold
level of reliability to be admissible. (Cite omitted). This Court has never
decided if the HGN test is based on scientific principles within the meaning
of Rule 702. The trial court did make any preliminary determination in this
regard. Rather, with respect to the evidence, the court noted, "It is very,
very, subjective in this Court's opinion ... .It's a question of what weight I
give it, I guess." On remand, if the State intends to offer evidence of the
HGN test, it should note that this court recently ordered, in a factually and
procedurally similar case, that the Concord District Court hold a hearing
regarding the reliability of the HGN test and whether Rule 702 requires
preliminary fmdings prior to its admission."

5
6
7
8
9

10
11

12
13
14

At pp. 418-419.

15

In State of New Hampshirevs. Michael Dahood, New Hampshire Case No. 99-510,

16

17

the Supreme Court remanded the issue of the HGN test to the District Court. It's Order

18

stated:

19

20

21
22

23

"In denying the defendant's motion to exclude the HGN testimony, the
district court relied upon the reasoning of the supreme judicial court of
Main in State vs. Taylor 694 A.2d 907 (Maine 1997), which took judicial
notice of the reliability ofthe HGN test. The district court also relied upon
the factual findings of a 1987 superior court order. The trial court did no,
however, hold a preliminary hearing to establish the reliability of the HGN
test."

24

See Order issued by State of New Hampshire Supreme Court, June 5, 2001.
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1

The Idaho Supreme Court in Garrett accepted standards that, even in the best

2

circumstances, (in the laboratory), have a 23% failure rate (HGN), a 32% failure rate

3

(walk and tum) and a 35% failure rate (one leg stand). There is a well written article by
4
5

6
7

Phillip B. Price and Sturgeon Cole in the April 21, 2001 magazine, The Champion
published by the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers. See Idaho Rules of
Evidence, Rule 104.

The authors criticize the National Highway Traffic Safety

8

Administration field sobriety test validation. The author states:
9

10
11

12
13
14
15
16

"There has been no attempt to establish norms for the SFST. Vie have no
idea how well a sober person can perfonn on the SFST. How does age or
gender affect performance? How does fatigue or practice affect
performance? If an individual perfonns poorly at a .11 % BAC, how does
that compare with his or her performance with aBAC of .OO%? Before any
individual's perfonnance can be considered at 'test', that particular
individual's baseline with no alcohol must be known and factored in.
Without answers to these basic questions, the SFST remains in the same
category as tarot cards." (emphasis added)
Atp.42.

17

The authors then go on to discuss the number of false arrests:
18
19
20
21

22
23

"Of the sober individuals that were involved in the Colorado, Florida and
San Diego studies, the officers falsely arrested 24%, 18% and 29%,
respectively. That is an average of23 .6% false arrest rate. What this means
is that if the SFST are used as a decision of whether to arrest an individual
for an alcohol related offense, one out of every four sober people will be
falsely arrested. " (emphasis added)
Atp.42.
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1

2
3

In the State vs. Gleason, case, no real "expert" was called. As Justice Johnson
indicated in Garrett, the "expert" in question was the individual who conducted the test.
In Gleason, Justice Bistline in his concurrence in result states: "The majority's bare

4

5

statement that LR.E. 702 is the appropriate test provides no guidance to the bench and bar

6

as to how to determine scientific reliability." Justice Bistline then questions the use of

7

Rule 702 by stating:

8

9

10
11

12

"Questions that come to mind include: What level of scientific reliability,
if any, is required before evidence will assist the trier of fact? What
constitutes scientific reliability? How reliable does scientific evidence have
to be before it is admissible? On whose scale do we measure the amount of
reliability? What unit of measurement is being used?"
Atp.67.

13
14

There is in Gleason no Rule 702 analysis. The Rule 702 analysis, missing from

15

Gleason and Garrett, is found in cases like Daubert, Kumbo, and Parkinson. In Gehring,

16

supra, the Court allowed Officer Carrington to testify about his assessment of a person's

17

sobriety, based on field sobriety tests, being95% accurate. Officer Carrington's testimony
18

19
20
21

is in stark contrast to the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration's testing noted
above and other current studies. (See Hom, supra.)
The State may argue that:Mr. Besaw is trying to overturn prior precedent. The use

22
23
24

ofIdaho Rule of Evidence 702 is supported by Gleason. However, the use ofa Rule 702
analysis is lacking, but can be expanded as required by federal case law and the Idaho
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1

cases that have accepted the federal court reasoning. A Trial Court must do more under

2

its gatekeeping function before any field sobriety test should be allowed before a jury.

3

What scientific publications the Garrett Court refers to is unknown and not set out.
4

5
6
7

In fact, the State will not be able to support its position by pointing to any scientific
evidence that supports the use of the field sobriety tests let alone the horizontal gaze
nystagmus.

8

In State vs. Torres, 976 P.2d 20 (New Mexico 1999), the Court had at issue the
9

10

admissibility of the horizontal gaze nystagmus test. The Court applied a Daubert analysis

11

and determined that:

12
13

14

"The better view, however, is that the Albericio-Daubert standard is not
limited to novel scientific theories." (Cites omitted)
At p. 30.

15
16

The Court detennined that the Trial Court, pursuant to the Rules of Evidence, must

17

ensure that any and all scientific testimony or evidence admitted pursuant to Rule 702 was

18

not only relevant but reliable. At p. 32. The Court stated:

19
20
21

"Our review ofthe record indicates that the trial court did not consider any
of the required factors for assessing the evidentiary reliability of HGN
testing in this case, nor was there an appropriate focus on principles and
methodology. "

22
23

Atp. Id.

24

25
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.

1

The New Mexico Court commented on State vs. Superior Court, the case that the

2

Idaho Supreme Court used in State vs. Garrett. The New Mexico Court noted that part of

3

the reason the Arizona Courts may regard additional expert testimony as unnecessary is

4

5

that in Arizona the Courts only admit the HGN evidence for limited purposes such as

6

establishing probable cause and corroborating the result of more reliable sobriety tests

7

such as chemical analysis of breath, blood or urine. (See Superior Court, 718 P .2d 181-

8

182) At pp 31-32. Will the Trial Court allow the use of the horizontal gaze nystagmus test
9

10

for more than probable cause purposes? In the Torres case, no chemical analysis of Mr.

11

Torres' BAC was provided. The Torres Court also concluded that the officer's training

12

and experience was not sufficiently probative ofthe test's evidentiary reliability.

13
14

The Court stated:
"Nevertheless, we find persuasive the reasoning of other courts which have
held that if police officers are not qualified to testify about the scientific
basis underlying the HGN test, they are not competent to establish that the
test satisfies the relevant admissibility standard. (Cites omitted)

15
16
17
18
19

Id.
The Torres Court also determined that it was improper to look for scientific

20
21

acceptance only from reported case law. At p. 32. Shouldn't Idaho and this Trial Court

22

do the same? In the Torres case, the arresting officer testified that the National Highway

23

Traffic Safety Administration accepted the HGN testing, that the test was nationally

24

certified, and that the test was given routinely. Even with that evidence, the Court found

25
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1

that his testimony was not sufficient to establish the evidentiary reliability required by

2

Daubert. The COUli stated:

3

4

5
6

7

"Officer Bowdich was not qualified to testify about the scientific basis of
HON testing and although his testimony let support for a conclusion that the
test was widely used - thus giving rise to an inference of general acceptance
- his testimony did not explain how the test proved intoxication. He,
therefore, did not assist the trier of fact in understanding the scientific
validity of the test"

8

Atp.33.

9

The Court also determined:

10
11

12

"We therefore detennine that judicial notice of the evidentiary reliability of
HON testing would be inappropriate at this time."
At p. 33.

13

14
15
16

The record reflects that the arresting officer did not follow the requirements of the
NHTSA manual. See State vs. Homan, 732 N.E.2d 952 (Ohio 2000).
The Torres Court also addressed the issue of harmless error and found that the

17

admissions of the horizontal gaze nystagmus was not harmless error. It stated:
18
19
20

21
22
23

"Error in the admission of evidence in a criminal trial must be declared
prejudicial and not harmless if there is a reasonable possibility that the
evidence complained of might have contributed to the conviction."
(emphasis added)
"We conclude that the error in this case was not harmless, because there is
a reasonable possibility that the admission of Officer Bowdich's HON
testimony might have contributed to Torres' conviction." (emphasis added)

24

Atp.36.
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1

The Court in Wilson vs. State, 723 A.2d 494 (Maryland App. 1999) also found that

2

the decision on the HGN from State vs. Superior Court was only sufficiently reliable to

3

be a factor in establishing probable cause. At p. 499. The Wilson Court also found that

4
5

6

the admission of horizontal gaze nystagmus was not harmless error. The Court stated:
"Because we cannot say the error did not contribute to the jury's conviction
as to the DUI charge, we must vacate the DUI conviction."

7

8
9

10

Atp.502.
The Court in State vs. Helms, 504 S.E.2d 293 (N.C. 1998) found that a police
officer could not provide adequate foundation for the correlation between intoxication and

11

12

13
14
15

nystagmus, and therefore his testimony was not adequate foundation for the admission of
HGN test results. The North Carolina Court concluded that:
"Until there is sufficient scientifically reliable evidence as to the correlation
between intoxication and nystagmus, it is improper to permit a lay person
to testify as to the meaning ofBGN test results."

16
17
18
19

Atp.295.
The North Carolina Court found that the arresting officer's testimony was that of
a lay person. The North Caroline Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals with

20
21
22
23
24

regard to the BGN test results being harmless error. The Court stated:
"\Ve conclude that, in light of the heightened credence juries tend to give
scientific evidence, there is a reasonable probability that had evidence of the
BGN test results not been erroneously admitted, a different outcome would
have been reached at trial."
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1
2
3

Atp.296. See also Statevs. Garrett, atpp. 881.
In the Montana case, Hulse vs. State Department of Justice, Motor Vehicle
Division, 961 P.2d 75 (Montana 1998), the Court followed the rationale from the above

4

5
6
7

8
9

10
11

12
13
14
15

16

cited case:
"No testimony was presented either through Officer Kennedy or another
expert witness describing the underlying scientific basis of the HGN test
other than Officer Kennedy's explanation that everyone's eye will exhibit
nystagmus at 'maximum deviation', but that '[w]ith the introduction of
alcohol into the system, the nystagmus becomes more prevalant and it
doesn't cease .... ' This testimony shows that Officer Kennedy was trained
to administer the HGN test and, in fact, administered the HGN test in
accordance with his training and, therefore, he was qualified to testify as to
both his administration of the HGN test and his evaluation of Hulse's
performance. However, nothing in the evidence establishes that Officer
Kennedy had special training or education nor adequate knowledge
qualifying him as an expert to explain the correlation between alcohol
consumption and nystagmus, the underlying scientific basis ofthe HGN test.
Accordingly, we conclude that there was insufficient foundation for the
admission of evidence concerning the HGN test and the district Court
abused its discretion when it summarily denied Hulse's motion in limine
and allowed Officer Kennedy to testify as to Hulse's HGN test results."

17

Atp.95.
18
19
20

21

In State vs. Ito, 978 P.2d 191 (Hawaii App. 1999) the Court determined that the
horizontal gaze nystagmus test had a 23 % error rate in detecting individuals with a BAC
of.l % or greater and a 35% error rate in detecting persons with a .08% BAC or greater.

22
23
24

At p. 203. The Hawaiian Court cited State vs. O'Key, 899 P.2d 687 (Oregon 1995). The
Oregon Court noted that part of the training the officers had to undergo required them to
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1

ask, before administering the HGN test, whether the person had a head injury, was ill or

2

was taking medication. The officer in Hawaii had a whole series of questions that were

3

required to be asked before the HGN test could be required. See page 204. No such

4

5
6

questions were asked of Mr. Besaw. The Hawaiian Court noted as to whether the HGN
test is susceptible to abuse, one of the criticisms leveled at the test is that,

7

"It is wholly subjective - the police officer has no physical sample to take

8

to the laboratory. Thus, the suspect is not able to have his or her expert
examine the evidence .... [and] cannot contradict the officer's testimony[.]
(Cite omitted), in our view, however, this concern is minimized as long as
the HGN test results are limited solely to probable cause detenninations."
(emphasis added)

9

10
11

12

At p. 204.

13

In Mr. Besaw's case, the State does not want the field sobriety tests limited to a

14

probable cause detennination, but used as evidence to prove intoxication beyond a

15

reasonable doubt. The Hawaiian Court noted that in Mississippi, the HON test was not
16
17

admissible at trial but that the Supreme Court of Mississippi held that the HON test results

18

were reliable for purposes of determining probable cause. At p. 706. The Hawaiian Court

19

in vacating the Trial Court's detennination of probable cause on the HGN test noted that

20
21

officers are required to check themselves "monthly with an [8x15 square template or

22

cardboard with a diagonal line drawn from one comer to another to demark 45 degrees]

23

to be sure that your accuracy has been sustained." Footnote 10 at p. 210. The Court also

24

noted the warnings set out in the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration manual:
25
26
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1

2
3

4

5
6
7

"ONLY WHEN THE TESTS ARE ADMIN1STERED IN THE
PRESCRlBED STAJ\TDARDIZED M.A]\JNER; AND ONLY WHEN THE
STANDARDIZED CLUES ARE USED TO ASSESS THE SUSPECT'S
PERF OR-MANCE; AND, ONLY W1IEN THE STANDARDIZED
CRITERlAARE EMPLOYED TO INTERPRET THAT PERFORMANCE.
IF ANY ONE OF THE STANDARDIZED FIELD SOBRIETY TEST
ELEMENTS IS CHANGED, THE VALIDITY IS C01'vfPROMISED."
At p. 210.
The opinion from State vs. Doriguzzi, 760 A.2d 366 (N.J. Super A.D. 2000) found

8

that it is unusual for an Appellate Court to exclusively on judicial notice and that,
9

10
11
12
13

14
15

16
17

"In the present case, a survey of the relevant decisions around the country
does not provide us with the level of certainty necessary to approve HGN
testing for future case. We also note that our ability to comprehend the
technical writings in this field or the interpretations of them by other
scientists is hampered by the very problem that cause our inquiry - i.e., we
are not scientists with technical backgrounds. \Vhile it may very well be
that the HGN testing can meet the Frve test, we believe that he case which
decides the issue for all other cases in New Jersey should be grounded in
sufficient expert testimony to assure defendants that the state alike that a
conviction for driving under the influence, when based in part on HGN
testing, is a conviction grounded in reliable scientific data. The
consequences of a drunk driving conviction are severe and may include
incarcerati on."

18

19
20

21

Atp.342.
The New Jersey Court then goes on to cite quite extensively from the Kansas
Supreme Court in State vs. \Vitte in its criticism of the State vs. Superior Court decision

22

used by Idaho to support its horizontal gaz nystagmus decision. The New Jersey Court
23
24

then noted an Illinois decision. The New Jersey Court stated:

25
26
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1

"The Kirk court stated:

2

Reliance upon other court's oprnlOns can be problematic: Unless the
question of general acceptance has been thoroughly and thoughtfully
litigated in the previous cases .... reliance on judicial practice is a hollow
ritual.' McCormick Section 203, at 870, n. 20."

3

4

5

At p. 346.

6
7

The Court then states:

8

9

10

"Judicial notice could become a yellow brick road for judicial acceptance
of bogus or at least unvalidated scientific theories or techniques."
At p. 346.

11

12

13
14
15
16
17
18

19

The New Jersey Court then commented on the Arizona decision by stating:
"The expert retained by the prosecution in Blake, Dr. Burns, was the
individual who conducted the study that lead to the National Highway
Traffic Safety Achninistration's adoption of the HGN test. Police
departments, in turn, have adopted the NHTSA's recommendations. In
Blake, Dr. Burns supported the NHTSA's manual and the fact that the test
is used by different police departments. By doing so, however, she in
essence referred back to her own conclusions, magnifying the opportunity
of error. We do not say that Dr. Burns' conclusions on the subject are
flawed, only that the issue has not been fully and thoroughly litigated."
At pp. 346-347.

20
21

The Court in the New Jersey case was also asked to find that the HGN test results

22

admitted to evidence would likely be harmless error. However, in the New Jersey case,

23

there was no breathalyzer result and the HGN test result was an integral part of the

24

decision in finding the defendant guilty. The Court then states:
25

26
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1

"'!'e know it a recurrent theme in the decision from other jurisdictions that

2

a jury may be inappropriate influenced by the apparent scientific precision
of the HGN testing or otherwise fail to properly understand it."

3

Atp.347.
4

5

The Court determined that it was not harmless error to allow the HGN test as

6

evidence and reverse the defendant's conviction. See State vs. Barcella, 135 Idaho 191,

7

199 (Ct.App. 2000).

8

u.

S. vs. Horn, 185 F Supp 2d 530 (D.Md. 2002) is also a case of extreme

9

10

inappropriateness and should be reviewed by the court regarding the experts call by both

11

sides, the state and the driver. The Court is asked to read this case as it has a complete

12

history of case reviews of the field sobriety tests throughout the Country.

13

V.
THERE IS NO 15 MINUTE WAIT

14
15

There are a number ofIdaho cases that are on point and are discussed below. There
16
17

has to be a 15 minute observation period prior to breath testing. See State v. Stump, 146

18

Idaho 857 (Ct. App. 2009). The Stump case is interesting because it points to the specific

19

standard of observation required. See also Wheeler v. Idaho Transportation Department,

20
21

(supra).

22

In Stump, the driver was transported to the Teton County Sheriff s office to test his

23

breath alcohol using an Intoxilyzer 5000. The arresting officer was in the same room with

24

Mr. Stump. The Court noted that there was no evidence in the record of any circumstances
25
26
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COURT MINUTES
CR-2011-0000419
State of Idaho vs. George Joseph Besaw Jr
Hearing type: Appellate Argument
Hearing date: 3/8/2012
Time: 10:11 am
Judge: JeffM. Brudie
Courtroom: 1
Court reporter: Linda Carlton
Minutes Clerk: PAM
Tape Number: Crtrm#1
Defense Attorney: Charles Stroschein
Prosecutor: Justin Coleman

10:11:22

Counsel are present in the courtroom.

10:11:28
Court reviews case. Case was appealed from Magistrate Court. Court has
transcript and briefs of parties. Court doesn't usually limit argument time but Court has to
be in Coeur d' Alene this afternoon for mediation.
10:12:18
Mr. Stroschein presents Appellate argument. He presents argument re: Rule
of Lenity. He presents argument re: solution used. A .2 solution should be used and it
wasn't. A .08 solution was used. He addresses CV11-00364 (ALS case with Judge Kerrick).
This case involved the same trooper as the Beyer case. He presents argument re: Rule of
Linearity. He presents argument re: 15 minute wait. He is not going to play video because
of time constraint of Court. He presents argument re: 702 challenge. The State hasn't met
their burden. Judge Gaskill should not have allowed field sobriety test in this case. He asks
Court to remand this case back to Magistrate Court for conviction to be undone. He
presents argument re: e-mails. He argues that 18-8004(4) has not been met. He asks Court
to remand back to Magistrate Court. The breath test should be based upon science.
10:29:22

Mr. Coleman presents State's argument.

10:29:51

Court questions Mr. Coleman re: verification checks.

10:29:58

Mr. Coleman responds.

10:30:05

Court further questions Mr. Coleman.

10:30:14
Mr. Coleman responds and presents argument. He presents argument re:
notice for license suspension.
Court Minutes

1

March 8, 2012

10:32:15

Court que~

Mr. Coleman.

10:32:26
Mr. Coleman continues with argument. He presents argument re: Standard
Operating Procedures and IDAPA. The e-mails are not relevant to this.
10:34:50
Linearity.

Mr. Stroschein presents rebuttal argument. He presents argument re: Rule of

10:38:19
Court responds. Appeal is under advisement at this time. Court will issue a
written rUling.
10:38:48

Court Minutes

Court in recess.
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE

6
7
8

STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff,

9

10

vs.

11

GEORGE J. BESAW, JR.,
12

Defendant-Appellant.

13
14
15

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

CASE NO. CR 2011-0000419

SUPPLEMENTAL AUTHORITY

COMES NOW, GEORGE J. BESAW, JR, the Appellant in the above-entitled matter
by and through his undersigned Attorney of Record, CHARLES M. STROSCHEIN, of the

16
17
18

19

finn of Clark & Feeney, and submits the attached authority for the Court's consideration
regarding the issue of the 15 minute observation period. The attached decision was authored
by Judge Stegner and dated March 2, 2012.

20

DATED this

'/ day of April, 2012.

~'
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day of April, 2012, a true copy
of the foregoing instrument
was: ~ Mailed
Faxed
Hand delivered
Overnight mail to:
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Justin Coleman
Deputy Prosecutor
Nez Perce County Prosecutor's Office
PO Box 1267
Lewiston, ID 83501
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHP~ IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LATAH

C. JACK PL;\TZ,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Petitioner,
VB.

IDAHO TRANSPORTATION
DEPARTMENT,

Case No. CV-2011-0795
MEMORANDUl\1 DECISION

______________~R~e~sp~o_n~d~e~n~t._______)
C. Jack Platz ("Platz") has petitioned this Court for judicial review of the
administrative suspension of his driver's license by the Idaho Transportation
Department ("the Department").

I.

BACKGROU~'D

On June 26, 2011, while traveling south on State Highway 3, near milepost
12, Platz was stopped by Idaho State Police Trooper Chad Montgomery ("the
officer"), for traveling above the posted speed limit. AR at 4. After being stopped,
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Platz admitted to the officer that he had consumed alcohol prior to driving. ld. at
5. The officer then asked Platz to exit his vehicle to perform Field Sobriety Tests.

Id; Pet. '$ Exhibit H ("video') at 19:47:25. Upon Platz exiting his pickup, the officer
had him open his mouth and checked for any substances. ld. at 19:47:38. Next,
the officer looked down at his watch and indicated that a fifteen-minute waiting
period was beginning. ld. at 19:47:45. Platz then submitted to the Horizontal
Gaze Nystagmus evaluation. ld. at 19:48:25

19:49:44. The officer then looked

down to demonstrate the Walk and Turn evaluation to Platz. ld. at 19:51:0219:51: 19. Platz performed the Horizontal Gaze Nystagmus, Walk and Turn, and
the One-leg Stand evaluations on the side ofthe highway and failed two ofthose
evaluations. ld. at 19:48:25

19:53:17; AR at 5.

The officer then informed Platz that he would have to submit to a breath
alcohol test. Vu:leo at 19:54:30. At that time, a second unidentified officer arrived
on the scene and engaged in a brief unrelated conversation with Platz. ld. at
19:55:21. The officer then read and explained the Idaho Code Advisory Form to
Platz while they were both standing alongside the highway in front of the officer's
patrol car. AR at 5; video at 19:55:44

19:58:35. Platz then blew into the Lifeloc

FC20 breath·testing instrument three times. Video at 20:02:45 - 20:07:30. Before,
and in between blows, the second officer and Platz continued their conversation.

ld. at 20:00:52 - 20:01:35. The Lifeloe machine measured Platz's breath alcohol
content at .201 on his first blow, indicated an insufficient sample on the second
blow, and measured Platz's breath alcohol content at .191 on the last blow. ld.
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The officer then arrested Platz for Driving Under the Influence of Alcohol. Video
at 20:08:18.
Platz later reQ1:18sted an agency hearing to challenge the administrative
suspension of his driver's license. AR at 10. At a telephonic hearing held July 18,
2011, Platz's counsel argued that the officer did not wait fifteen minutes before
having Platz submit to the breath-alcohol tests. Transcript tTr.'? at 4, lines 1-18.
Platz's counsel later submitted supplemental argument to the Department
alleging that because of the circumstances surrounding the fifteen-minute
monitoring period, the officer was not always in a physical position to visually
monitor Platz or to use his sense of smell or hearing to ensure that nothing had
occurred to affect the validity of the test results. AR at 26·27.
The Hearing Officer issued Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and
Order on August 4,2011, sustaining the suspension of Platz's driver's license. AR
at 45-53. The Hearing Officer made the following findings:
1. The affidavit submitted by Officer Montgomery states the evidentiary
test was performed in compliance 'with Idaho Law arid ISP Standard
Operating Procedures.
2. Idaho State Police Standard Operating Procedure, Rule 6.1, provides
that
.[p]rior to evidential breath alcohol testing, the
subjectfindividual should be monitored for at least fifteen (15) minutes.
This waiting period allows sufficient time for any mouth alcohol to
dissipate.
3. Counsel for Platz argues that all of the Standard Operating Procedures
"must" be observed for the test results to be admissible. However,
Standard Operating Procedure, Rule 6.1, sets forth recommended
language (,should") rather than mandatory language, and therefore,
strict compliance with the recommended language shall not bear the
sufficient weight to suppress the evidentiary test results.
4.
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5. An acceptable breath alcohol test normally includes two breath samples
separated by a difference of.02 or less, and if this conditions exists, the
consistent and similar BRAC results of .201 and .191 confirms that no
residual mouth alcohol was present nor was there any other foreign
substances present which may have skewed the breath test results or
influenced the reliability of the test.
6. . ... Based on the record and a review of the video/audio recording of
the investigation, it has not been definitively shown that Officer
Montgomery did not foHow the requisite procedures regarding the 15minute observation period. Brief conversations by Platz with a backup
officer did not significantly impede the ability of Officer Montgomery to
monitor Platz at the scene.
7. The Petitioner, Platz, did not affirmatively show by a preponderance of
the evidence that the test was not performed in compliance with Idaho
law and ISP Standard operating Procedures.
8. The evidentiary test was performed in compliance with Idaho Law and
ISP Standard Operating Procedures.

AR at 48-49. Following that adverse decision, Platz timely filed a Petition for
Judicial Review with this Comt. AR at 54.

II. STANDi\RD OF REVIEW
Pursuant to I.C. § 18-S002A, the Department must suspend the driver's
license of any driver who has failed an evidentiary test for breath alcohol
concentration administered by a law enforcement officer. After being notified of
the administrative license suspension, the driver may request a hearing before a
Hearing Officer designated by the Department. Wilkinson v. State Dep't of

Transp., 151 Idaho 784, 264 P.3d 680, 682 (Ct. App. 2011) citing LC. § 188002A(7). The driver has the burden to prove that one of the grounds for vacating
the license suspension under L C. § 18-8002A(7) exists by a preponderance of the
evidence. ld; I.C. § 18-8002A(7). Those grounds include, that "[t]he tests for
alcohol concentration, drugs or other intoxicating substances administered at the
MEMOR..,6,1\TDUM DECISION
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direction of the peace officer were not conducted in accordance ""ith the
requirements of section 18-8004(4), Idaho Code, or the testing equipment was not
functioning properly when the test was administered." I.C. § 18-8002A(7)(d).
Pursuant to LC. § 18-8004(4), the Idaho State Police ("ISP") were given the
responsibility of setting standards for alcohol testing. To carry out tbat
responsibility, the ISP have issued procedures for the maintenance and operation
of breath testing equipment. Wilkinson, 264 P.3d 680 at 683 citing IDAHO ADMIN.
CODE 11.03.01.014. Noncompliance with ISP procedures is one of the grounds for
vacating an administrative license suspension pursuant to I.C. § 18-8002A7(d). Id.

citing Mahurin v. State Dep't of Transp., 140 Idaho 656, 658-59, 99 P.3d 125, 127·
28 (Ct. App. 2004).
A court reviewing an agency decision, "shall not substitute its judgment for
that of the agency as to the weight of the evidence on questions of fact." I.C. § 675279(1). A court should defer to an agency's findings of fact "unless they are
clearly erroneous." Wilkinson, 264 P.3d at 682. An agency's factual
determinations are not clearly erroneous so long as the determinations are
supported by substantial evidence in the record. Marshall v. State Dep't of

Transp., 137 Idaho 337, 340, 48 P.3d 666, 669 (Ct. App. 2002) (citations omitted);
I.C § 67-5279(3)(d). The court's review of disputed issues offact "must be confined
to the agency record." I.C. § 67-5277.
A court must affirm the agency action under review unless it finds that the
agency's findings, inferences, conclusions, or decisions: (a) violate statutory
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or

constitutional provisions; (b) exceed the agency's statutory authority; (c) are made
upon unlawful procedure; Cd) are not supported by substantial evidence in the
record as a whole; or (e) are arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion. LC. §

67-5279(3). Marshall, 137 Idaho at 340, 48 P.3d at 669; Price v. Payette County
Bd. of County Comm'rs., 131 Idaho 426, 429, 958 P.2d 583, 586 (1998). The party

challenging the Hearing Officer's decision has the burden to prove "that the
agency erred in a manner specified by I.C. § 67-5279(3) and that a substantial
right of that party has been prejudiced." Bell v. Idaho Transp. Dep't, 151 Idaho
659, 262 P.3d 1030, 1035 (Ct. App. 2011) (citations omitted). If the agency's
decision is not affirmed, "it shall be set aside, in whole or in part, and remanded
for further proceedings, as necessary."

I.e. § 67-5279(3).

III. ANALYSIS
A. The Hearing Officer's conclusion that the officer sufficiently
monitored Platz during the fifteen-minute waiting period was
not supported by substantial evidence in the record as a whole.
The ISP Standard Operating Procedures ("SOPs") for breath-alcohol testing
state, "prior to evidentiary, breath testing, the subjectlindividual should be
monitored for at least flfteen (15) minutes." SOP § 6.1 (effective 11/01/2010).
During the fi:ft.een-minute pre-test waiting period, the test subject "should not be
allowed to smoke, drink, eat, or belchlburp/vomit/regurgitate." Id. The officer
conducting the fifteen-minute pre.test waiting period "must be alert for any event
that might influence the accuracy ofthe breath alcohol test." SOP § 6.1.4. And, if
"the subject/individual vomits or regurgitates material from the stomach into the
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subject/individual's breath pathway, the 15-minute waiting period must begin
again." SOP § 6.1.4.2. If the testing officer has any doubt "as to the events
occurring during the 15 minute monitoring period, the officer should look at the
results of the duplicate breath samples for evidence of potential alcohol
contamination." SOP § 6.104.3. Duplicate breath samples that correlate within .02
indicate the absence of alcohol contamination in the test-subject's breath pathway.
SOP § 6.2.2.2.
The purpose behind the monitoring period is to make sure the operator
observes the subject for any event that might make the results of the test
inaccurate through the introduction of mouth alcohoL State v. Carson, 133 Idaho
451,453,988 P.2d 225,227 (Ct. App. 1999). The monitoring period is "not an
onerous burden" unfairly foisted upon law enforcement officials. State v.

DeFranco, 143 Idaho 335, 338, 144 P.3d 40,43 (Ct. App. 2006). The operator is not
required to "stare flXedly" at the subject for fifteen minutes. Bennett v. State,

Dep't. of Transp., 147 Idaho 141,144,206 P.3d 505,508 (et. App. 2009) (citation
omitted). However, the monitoring must "be such as could reasonably be expected
to accomplish the purpose of the requirement." Carson, 133 Idaho at 453,988 P.2d
at 227. This requirement is ordinarily met if the operator "stays in close physical
proximity to the test subject so that the officer's senses of sight, smell and hearing
can be employed." DeFranco, 143 Idaho at 338, 144 P.3d at 43. Use of sight alone
is not enough. Bennett, 147 Idaho at 144, 206 P.3d at 508. Furthermore, when an
officer's sense of sight is impaired, he must be able to use his senses of hearing and
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smell to properly observe the subject. DeFranco, 143 Idaho at 338, 144 P.3d at 43 .

..'in officer's form affidavit is insufficient to support a finding that proper
procedures were followed "when specific credible evidence demonstrates a violation
of proper procedures." Bennet, 147 Idabo at 145,206 P.Sd at 509.
The officer did not sufficiently monitor Platz during the fifteen-minute
waiting period because he was not "alert for any event that might influence the
accuracy of the breath alcohol test," as required by SOP § 6.1.4. The officer left the
observation area when he walked to retrieve the breatbalyzer from his car.
During that time, neither he nor Platz was visible on the video. Video at 19:54:48
- 19:55:20. It is impossible to tell whetber the officer was in a position to visually
monitor Platz. In addition, the officer did several things during the observation
period, such as demonstrating the Walk and Turn evaluation, retrieving the
machine from his car,preparing the machine, and talking to the other officer, that
diverted his attention from the requirement that he monitor Platz. Video at
19:47:45 - 20:02:45. Furthermore, there were several factors during the
monitoring period that impeded the officer's ability to augment his sense of sight
with other senses, including: the noise from the numerous cars that passed by, the
noise from the airplanes flying overhead, the noise from the conversations between
the second officer and Platz, and the outdoor odors. Id .
. Lastly, the monitoring period in this case was fraught with the following
problems from the standpoint of monitoring the suspect: First, the officer and
Platz were not in a room designed for breath alcohol testing that was equipped
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with cameras. Instead, the observation took place along a busy highway with only
one camera available to record the observation. At one point, both Platz and the
officer are not within the camera's view. Video at 19:54:48 - 19:55:20. Second,
there were numerous noises throughout the outdoor observation period in this case
which could have concealed any burps or belches. In fact, at one point during the
observation, the officer noticeably raises his voice to overcome the noise. Video at
19:50:51. Finally, the second officer did not assist in the monitoring. The second
officer was never in very close proximity to Platz, did not pat him down, or ask him
if he had burped or belched. Rather, he merely engaged Platz in an unrelated

conversation. Video at 19:55:21- 19:55:36; 20:00:52- 20:01:35. The noise from
those conversations could have actually further impaired the officer's ability to
hear and distracted him from his visual observations.
In conclusion, the officer was not always in a position to employ his sense of
sight or alternatively, his sense of hearing and smell to be alert for any factors
that could influence the validity of the test results. By trying to do several things
at once, the officer did not sufficiently monitor Platz to ensure that the presence of
mouth alcohol did not affect the validity of the test results: The officer's form
affidavit is simply not enough to overcome the objective; credible video evidence
that showed the proper procedures were not followed in monitoring Platz. The
Hearing Officer's conclusion that the officer sufficiently monitored Platz during
the fifteen-minute waiting period was therefore, not supported by substantial
evidence in the record as a whole.
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B. The Hearing Officer held Platz to an inappropriate burden of

proof in reaching his decision.
At the agency level, the driver has the burden to prove by a preponderance
of the evidence that a basis exists for vacating his license suspension under I.C. §
lS-8002A(7). Wilkinson v. State Dep't of Transp., 151 Idaho 784, 264 P.3d 680, 682
(Ct. App. 2011); I.C. § 18-8002A(7). One such ground is to show that the tests for
alcohol concentration were not conducted in accordance Vi-'ith the requirements set
forth in LC. § 18-8004 and the ISP SOPs governing breath-alcohol testing. Id. at
6S3 relying on Le. 1S-S002A(7)(d)_ As explained above, the ISP SOPs advise that
"prior to evidentiary, breath testing, the subject/individual should be monitored for
at least fIfteen (15) minutes." SOP § 6.1 (effective 11/01/2010). During that period,
the testing officer "must be alert for any event that might influence the accuracy of
the breath alcohol test." SOP § 6.1.4.
In this case, Platz challenged the sufficiency ofthe fifteen-minute waiting
period at the agency level by arguing that it was not fifteen minutes in duration
and that during the waiting period, the officer was not always in a position to
monitor Platz to ensure that nothing had occurred to affect the validity of the test.

Tr. at 4, lines 1-18; AR at 26-28. Platz had the burden to prove that the
monitoring period was not conducted in compliance with Idaho Law or ISP SOPs

by a preponderance of the evidence. See I.e. §18-"8002A(7). However, in reaching
the conclusion that the officer conducted the monitoring period in compliance with
those standards, the Hearing Officer found the following:
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[b]ased on the record and a review of the video/audio recordffig of the
investigation, it has not been definitively shown that Officer Montgomery
did not follow the requisite procedures regarding the I5-minute observation
period.
AR at 49. This is a misstatement of the burden of p roof borne by Platz. Idaho

Code § I8-BOO2A(7) requires the driver to make a showing by a preponderance of
the evidence. The statute does not require the driver to "definitively show" that
the requisite procedures were not followed. The Hearing Officer's conclusion
regarding the sufficiency of the monitoring period was therefore, based upon a
finding that did not comport with I.e. § 18-8002A(7). Accordingly, this is an
alternative basis for tbis Court to vacate Platz's license suspension pursuant to
I.C. § 67-5279(3)(a).

IV. CONCLUSION
The Hearing Officer's findings are not supported by substantial evidence in
the record as a whole. In addition, the Hearing Officer applied the wrong burden of
proof when he concluded that Platz had not "definitively shown that Officer
Montgomery did not follow the requisite procedures regarding the I5-minute
observation period." Consequently, the Hearing Officer's decision is VACATED and
the case is REMANDED.
Dated this

1-~ay of March 2012.

9-t:

q ~

John R Stegner
District Judge
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ORDER FOR STAY ON CDL
LICENSE SUSPENSION

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that any license suspension of the Class A driver's
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license of George J. Besaw, JR., is stayed pending further Order of the Court.
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THEREFORE, it is in the interest of justice that the license suspension associated
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with the DT.Jl conviction be stayed pending the outcome of the appeal of the issues in this
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case. The Idaho Transportation Department is directed to stay the license suspension of
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Mr. Besaw's Class A license.
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LAW OFFICES OF

CLARK

AND

FEENEY, LLP

LEWISTON, IDAHO 83501

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE ECO
JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR
E COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE

STA TE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff,

v.
GEORGE J. BESAW, JR.,
Defendant.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

CASE NO. CRII-00419
MEMORANDUM OPINION
AND ORDER ON APPEAL

This matter is before the Court on Defendant's appeal of the magistrate court's ruling on
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss and/or Suppress and/or in Limine. The Court heard oral
arguments on this matter on March 8, 2012. Plaintiff State ofIdaho was represented by Nez
Perce County deputy prosecutor Justin J. Coleman. Defendant George 1. Besaw was represented
by attorney Charles M. Stroschein. The Court, having reviewed the record in the matter, having
read the transcript of the hearing in the magistrate court and the briefs of the parties, having
heard the oral arguments of counsel, and being fully advised in the matter, hereby renders its
decision.

State v. Besaw
Opinion & Order on Appeal

FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Defendant Besaw was stopped by Idaho State Patrol Trooper Jeffory Talbott in the early
morning hours of January 16,2011, after Trooper Talbott observed the Defendant fail to signal
and fail to maintain his lane of travel while traveling on 21 st Street in Lewiston, Idaho. As
Trooper Talbott talked to Besaw, he could smell the odor of an alcoholic beverage corning from
the vehicle and observed Besaw's eyes were bloodshot. After running a driver's check, Trooper
Talbott asked Besaw to perform field sobriety evaluations. Besaw agreed and got out of his
vehicle. Trooper Talbott checked Besaw's eyes for horizontal gaze nystagmus and had Besaw
perform a one-leg stand evaluation and a walk-and-turn evaluation.
Based on his observations, Trooper Talbott formed the opinion Besaw was under the
influence of alcohol. The trooper placed Besaw under arrest and, after handcuffing him, placed
him in the back of his patrol vehicle leaving the door open. Trooper Talbott leaned against his
patrol vehicle next to Besaw and, facing the Defendant, read him the advisory form and observe
him for IS-minutes before having him provide breath samples for testing. As Trooper Talbott
observed Besaw, he programmed the Lifeloc-FC20 breath testing instrument. During the 15minute observation period, Trooper Talbott was contacted by a Lewiston City Police officer and
a brief conversation ensued. Trooper Talbott's attention was also briefly directed toward a
passenger in Besaw's vehicle and to an individual who arrived to transport one of Besaw's
passengers.
After the IS-minute observation period, Trooper Talbott had Besaw submit three (3)
breath samples into the Lifeloc-FC20 instrument. The instrument tested Besaw's blood alcohol
content and reported results of 0.219 and 0.201, with a third breath sample testing as insufficient.
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Based on the results of the breath tests, Trooper Talbott informed Besaw he was under arrest for
driving under the influence of alcohol and Besaw was transported to the Nez Perce County jail.
On February 4, 2011, counsel for Besaw filed a Notice Pursuant to Idaho Criminal Rules
of Evidence Rule 803(24) that included a number of attachments. On February 15,2011,
Besaw's counsel filed a Motion to Dismiss and/or Suppress and/or in Limine. A hearing on the
Motion was held on May 6, 2011, during which Trooper Talbott was called to testify. The
magistrate court also had a large number of documents before it that had been submitted by the
Defendant. After the parties were given the opportunity to submit post hearing briefs, the
magistrate court entered its ruling on July 28,2011 denying Defendant Besaw's Motion. The
matter then went to jury trial and, on September 8, 2011, the jury returned a verdict of guilty of
DUI.
On November 2,2011, Defendant Besaw filed a Notice of Appeal. The Defendant listed
the following issues to be addressed on appeal: (1) whether the magistrate court abused its
discretion by not suppressing the breath test results; (2) whether the magistrate court abused its
discretion by admitting into evidence the field sobriety tests or by failing to limit the use ofthe
tests by the State; (3) whether the magistrate court abused its discretion when it failed to find a
lack of standards in breath testing as required by I.C. § 18-8004(4).

STANDARD OF REVIEW ON APPEAL
On appeal of a trial court's admission of evidence, the trial court will be reversed only
upon a showing the court abused its discretion. State v. Zimmerman, 121 Idaho 971, 973-74,
829 P.2d 861,863-64 (1992). Upon an assertion that the trial court abused its discretion, the
appellate court conducts a multi-tiered inquiry to determine: (1) whether the lower court
3
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correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) whether the lower court acted \vithin the
boundaries of such discretion and consistently with any legal standards applicable to the specific
choices before it; and (3) whether the lower court reached its decision by an exercise of reason.

State v. Hedger, 115 Idaho 598, 600, 768 P.2d 1331, 1333 (1989).
On appeal, the magistrate's record is examined to determine whether there was
substantial and competent evidence to support the magistrate's findings of fact and whether the
magistrate's conclusions oflaw correctly flowed from those findings. State v. Stump, 146 Idaho
857,859,203 P.3d 1256 (Ct.App.2009).

ANALYSIS
(A) DENIAL OF MOTION TO SUPPRESS BREATH TESTS
On appeal, Defendant contends the arresting officer failed to comply with the
performance verification requirements for the Lifeloc-FC20 as set out in the standard operating
procedures manual and that the officer failed to properly conduct the fifteen (15) minute
observation period prior to conducting BAC breath testing. The magistrate court disagreed with
the Defendant's position and denied his motion to suppress the breath test evidence.
Idaho Code § 18-8004 provides in relevant part:
For purposes of this chapter, an evidentiary test for alcohol concentration shall be
based upon a formula of grams of alcohol per one hundred (100) cubic
centimeters of blood, per two hundred ten (210) liters of breath or sixty-seven
(67) milliliters of urine. Analysis of blood, urine or breath for the purpose of
determining the alcohol concentration shall be performed by a laboratory operated
by the Idaho state police or by a laboratory approved by the Idaho state police
under the provisions of approval and certification standards to be set by that
department, or by any other method approved by the Idaho state police.
Notwithstanding any other provision of law or rule of court, the results of any test
for alcohol concentration and records relating to calibration, approval,
certification or quality control performed by a laboratory operated or approved by
the Idaho state police or by any other method approved by the Idaho state police
4
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shall be admissible in any proceeding in this state without the necessity of
producing a witness to establish the reliability of the testing procedure for
examination.
I.C. § 18-8004(4).
Evidentiary testing of blood, urine or breath done to determine the alcohol concentration
of a driver is admissible in a judicial proceeding without the need for expert testimony so long as
the testing was done in compliance with any method approved by the Idaho State Police. In the
instant matter, Defendant Besaw contends Trooper Talbott failed to comply with the standard
operating procedures ("SOP") promUlgated by the Idaho State Police relevant to performance
verification requirements for the Lifeloc-FC20. The Defendant contends the SOP requires a
performance verification utilizing the 0.20 solution within 24 hours of any test with results of
0.20 or higher. In the instant matter, Defendant Besaw's breath test results indicated he had a
blood alcohol content ("BAC") of 0.219 and 0.206. However, the performance verification that
was conducted within 24 hours of his testing was done utilizing a 0.08 solution. The State does
not dispute the results of Defendant Besaw's breath tests nor does it dispute that a 0.08 solution
was utilized for the performance verification done within 24 hours before or after Defendant
Besaw's test. Rather, the State contends the SOP only requires a 0.20 performance verification
once per calendar month, regardless of test results.
The Standard Operating Procedures manual in effect at the time of Defendant Besaw's
arrest addresses performance verifications on the Lifeloc-FC20 at section 5 of the manual and
reads:!

5. Performance Verification of Breath Testing Instruments

lDefendant's Exhibit #3, admitted at the May 6, 2011 Motion Hearing held by the magistrate court.
S
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Performance verifications aid the Breath Testing Specialist (BTS) and the
Idaho State Police Forensic Services (ISPFS) in determining if a breath testing
instrument is functioning correctly. Performance verifications are performed
using a wet bath simulator performance verification solution. The solution is
provided by and/or approved by ISPFS. The ISPFS analysis establishes the
target value and acceptable range of the solutions used for the verification and
includes the acceptable values on the Certificate of Analysis for each solution.
Note: The ISPFS established target values may be different from those shown
on the bottle label.
5.1

Alco-Sensor and Lifeloc FC20-Portable Breath Testing Instrument
Performance Verification

5.1.1

The Alco-Sensor and Lifeloc FC20 portable breath testing instrument
performance verification is run using approximately 0.08 and/or 0.20
performance verification solutions provided by and/or approved by ISPFS.

5.1.2

The performance verification using the 0.08 and 0.20 performance
verification solutions consist of two samples.

5.1.3

A performance verification of the Alco-Sensor and Lifeloc FC20
instruments using a 0.08 or 0.20 performance verification solution must be
performed within 24 hours, before or after an evidentiary test to be
approved for evidentiary use. Multiple breath alcohol tests may be covered
by a single performance verification. Reference 5.1.4.1 for clarification on
the use ofthe 0.20 solution in this capacity.
5.1.3.1 A 0.08 performance verification solution should be replaced with
fresh solution approximately every 25 verifications or every
calendar month, whichever comes first.

5.1.4

A 0.20 performance verification should be run and results logged once per
calendar month and replaced with fresh solution approximately every 25
verifications or until it reaches its expiration date, whichever comes first
NOTE: The 0.20 performance verification was implemented for
the sole purpose of supporting the instruments' results for an 188004C charge. Failure to timely perform a 0.20 performance
verification will not invalidate tests performed that yield results at
other levels or in charges other than 18-8004C.

5.1.4.1 The 0.20 performance verification satisfies the requirement for
performance verification within 24 hours, before or after an
evidentiary test at any level. The 0.20 performance verification
solution should not be used routinely for this purpose.
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The Lifeloc-FC20 performance verification portion of the SOP contains no language that
supports Defendant's asserted position. The SOP recommends a performance verification using
the 0.20 solution be performed once per calendar month and notes that the 0.20 performance
verification was implemented to support the instruments results when a test result shows a BAC
of 0.20 or greater in violation of I.e. § 18-8004e. 2 While the SOP requires a performance
verification be run within 24 hours of any test, it makes clear the 0.20 verification should not be
used for this routine performance verification, i.e. the 24 hour requirement. However, when the
0.20 verification is performed in order to meet the "per calendar month" requirement, any test
results obtained during the 24 hours before or after the monthly 0.20 performance verification
will meet the requirements for evidentiary use. The SOP notes that failure to timely perform a
0.20 performance verification, i.e. to perform a 0.20 verification once per calendar month, may
invalidate test results of 0.20 or greater, but will not invalidate test results below 0.20. Nothing
in the notation suggests that in order for a test result of 0.20 or greater to be valid, a 0.20
performance verification must be run within 24 hours before or after the test, as asserted by
Defendant.
Finally, the Defendant argued to the Court that the purpose of the performance
verification is to verify a test result is accurate, not to verify that the testing instrument is
functioning correctly. Defendant's argument runs contrary to the statement of purpose that
precedes the performance verification procedures. The SOP clearly states, "Performance
verifications aid the Breath Testing Specialist (BTS) and the Idaho State Police Forensic
Services (ISPFS) in determining if a breath testing instrument is functioning correctly."

2 Defendant does not dispute that a 0.20 performance verification was conducted once per calendar month during the
time in question.
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The court finds the SOP's are clear and unambiguous regarding the performance
verifications to be run on the Lifeloc-FC20 breath testing instrument. 3 A performance
verification must be run 'within 24 hours before or after an evidentiary test, preferably utilizing
the 0.08 solution. A performance verification using the 0.20 solution should be run once every
calendar month and, when conducted, can also be used to meet the 24 hour requirement,
eliminating the need to duplicate the performance verification with a 0.08 solution. The
magistrate court found the proper procedures had been followed in regard to performance
verifications. This Court agrees with the findings of the magistrate court.
Defendant next contends the breath test results should have been suppressed, as the
arresting officer did not properly conduct the fifteen minute observation period prior to breath
testing. The magistrate court, after reviewing the video from the officer's dashboard camera,
found the officer was at all times within two to three feet of Besaw, putting himself in a physical
position that allowed him to utilize not only his sense of sight, but all his senses to accomplish
the goal of the monitoring period. The trial court further found the officer's attention was not
impeded to such a degree that his various senses were diverted from the Defendant. After
viewing the video, this Court agrees.
During the fifteen minute observation period, the officer at all times stayed within two to
three feet of the Defendant and in a position where he was able to use his sense of sight, hearing,
and smell. He at all times remained focused on the Defendant, engaged in conversation with
Defendant in his briefing argues that the defmition of calibration in the Lifeloc Reference Manual, found as
Defendant's Exhibit 2 and admitted into evidence at the May 6, 2011 motion hearing, makes the logged dates of the
most recent 0.20 performance verification "suspect". The Court finds no "suspect" language in the manual
definition, but rather finds Defendant fails to distinguish between a password sensitive calibration that must be done
in the lab and a performance verification which checks the accuracy of the instrument by running a test against a
known sample. Defendant further argues that the procedural differences for breath tests done relative to a minor in
possession/consumption investigation versus a DUI investigation makes the standards suspect. The Court declines
Defendant's invitation to imply suspect motives to differences in procedure, as any differences are irrelevant to the
instant matter as it does not involve a charge of minor in possession/consumption.

3
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him, and the officer averted efforts by others to gamer his attention. The Court in State v.
Remsburg, 126 Idaho 338, 882 P.2d 993 (Ct.App.1994) and in State v. DeFranco, 143 Idaho

335, 144 P.3d 40 (Ct.App.2006), held that an officer need not stare fixedly at a driver during the
fifteen minute observation period, but may utilize all of his senses to observe the driver to assure
he does not burp, belch or vomit prior to performing breath testing. "So long as the officer is
continually in position to use all of his senses, not just sight, to determine that the defendant did
not belch, burp or vomit during the observation period, the observation complies with the
training manual instructions." State v. Stump, 146 Idaho 857,860,203 P.3d 1256
(Ct.App.2009).
In the instant matter, the officer clearly remained focused on Defendant Besaw at all
times and was in sufficient proximity to be able to use all his senses to assure no event occurred
that might skew the test results. The Court finds the magistrate court did not abuse its discretion
in denying Defendant's motion to suppress the breath test, as there is substantial evidence in the
record to support the trial court's finding that as a matter of law, the officer complied with the
requirements of the SOP by properly and timely performing performance verifications on the
Lifeloc-FC20 and in conducting the fifteen minute observation period.
(B) FIELD SOBRlETY TESTS

Defendant contends the magistrate court erred in allowing the officer to testify regarding
the field sobriety tests ("FST") performed by the Defendant. In particular, the Defendant
contends there was insufficient foundation laid, the FST's were irrelevant, and their probative
value was outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. However, rather than provide the Court
with facts and legal support relative to three grounds stated, the Defendant has chosen to
challenge the reliability of the science behind field sobriety testing, in particular the HON test.
9
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The issue of whether field sobriety tests are admissible as evidence at trial has been
addressed on numerous occasions by Idaho's Supreme Court and Court of Appeals. The most
challenged of the FST's is the horizontal gaze nystagmus test, or HGN. V\1hile it is the law in
Idaho that field sobriety tests are not admissible to show a degree or level of intoxication, it has
long been established in Idaho that the tests may be admitted as indicators of possible
intoxication for purposes of establishing probable cause to arrest. Idaho's Supreme Court long
ago ruled the tests scientifically sound and ruled them admissible through the testimony of a law
enforcement officer who has been trained in conducting and evaluating the tests. See State v.

Garrett, 119 Idaho 878, 811 P.2d 488 (1991) and State v. Gleason, 123 Idaho 62,844 P.2d 691
(1992). The trial court correctly analyzed the admissibility of FST's and recognized the limits to
be placed on testimony regarding FST'S.4
Finally, Defendant's contention that the trial court was required to conduct a Rule 702
hearing to determine the scientific reliability ofFST's is without support in the law. Rule 702 of
the Idaho Rules of Evidence reads, "If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will
assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness
qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto
in the form of an opinion or otherwise." As long as a proper foundation is laid establishing an
officer as an expert on the subject ofFST's based on his knowledge, skill, experience, training or
education, the court may allow such evidence to be presented to the jury if it is determined such
evidence will assist the trier-of-fact. The Court finds the trial court made a reasoned analysis

In briefing, the Defendant takes issue with the trial court's failure to address the National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration standards regarding field sobriety tests. The Court finds no error on the part of the trial court for not
addressing standards that are without legal effect in Idaho other than as they have been incorporated into Idaho case
law, statutes, rules, and regulations. The admissibility question in regard to field sobriety tests has been resolved by
Idaho's Appellate Courts, making analysis under NHTSA standards unnecessary and irrelevant.
4
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regarding FST's and correctly determined they were admissible within the limitations established
by Idaho's Appellate Courts.
(C)

THE IDAHO STATE POLICE STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES MANUAL
The Defendant contends the most recent revision of the SOP manual should be found by

the Court to violate the duties given to the Idaho State Police ("ISP") in I.e. § 18-8004, wherein
ISP is charged with the duty of promulgating standards for the administration of breath alcohol
testing. The Defendant raised this issue with the trial court and now argues the court abused its
discretion by failing to find the SOP revision resulted in there being essentially no standards as
required by Idaho Code. This Court, however, concurs with the magistrate court's ruling.
The Defendant contends the revisions by Idaho State Police Forensic Services were not
based on science, but on finding ways to eliminate challenges in court. The Defendant's
argument relies primarily, if not solely, on interdepartmental email exchanges relative to revising
the SOP manual. While the Court is sensitive to Defendant's concern that certain procedural
standards were revised by eliminating mandatory language such as 'must', and replacing it with
non-mandatory language such as 'should', the Court is unable to find such changes problematic
without evidence that it reduces the scientific reliability of test results.
Like all technology, breath testing is ever evolving and hopefully improving. While the
trial court and this Court have been presented with no evidence that the revisions are the result of
improved technology, neither has any evidence been presented indicating the changes reduce the
reliability of test results obtained with the Lifeloc-FC20 breath testing instrument. The role of
the courts is not to dictate to ISP how they are to fulfill their statutory duties, nor has the
Defendant presented any authority that would allow the Court to do so. For this Court to say
there are no standards merely because revisions have been made to some, but not all, portions of
11
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the SOP manual, without evidence that the changes negatively affect test results, would work an
absurdity. Therefore, the Court declines the invitation to second guess Idaho State Police
Forensic Services.

ORDER
The ruling ofthe magistrate court denying Defendant Besaw's Motion to Dismiss and/or
Suppress and/or in Limine is hereby AFFIRMED.

/hIL

Dated this

daY~12.
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Admitted

Exhibit Vault

Assigned to:

Coleman, Justin J

Admitted

Exhibit Vault

Assigned to:

Stroschein, Charles M

Admitted

Exhibit Vault

Assigned to:

Stroschein, Charles M

Admitted

Exhibit Vault

Assigned to:

Stroschein, Charles M

Admitted

Exhibit Vault

Assigned to:

Stroschein, Charles M

Admitted

Exhibit Vault

Assigned to:

Stroschein, Charles M

Admitted

Exhibit Vault

Assigned to:

Stroschein, Charles M

Admitted

Exhibit Vault

Assigned to:

Stroschein, Charles M

Defendant's Exhibit 8; Notice of
Suspension dated 01-16-2011;
Admitted 05-06-2011

Admitted

Exhibit Vault

Assigned to:

Stroschein, Charles M

Defendant's Exhibit 9; Certificate
of Service and Subpoena Duces
Tecum for Jeffory Talbott;
Admitted 05-06-2011
State's Exhibit 1; Lifeloc
Technologies, Inc. readout dated
1-16-11; Admitted at Jury Trial on
9-8-11.
State's Exhibit 2; Copy-DVD
L 11000068 George J. Besaw Jr.
(video of stop); Admitted at Jury
Trial on 9-8-11.
Defendant's Exhibit B; 6.0 Idaho
Standard Operating Procedure Breath Alcohol Testing - ISP;
Admitted at Jury Trial on 9-8-11.

Admitted

Exhibit Vault

Assigned to:

Stroschein, Charles M

Admitted

Exhibit Vault

Assigned to:

Coleman, Justin J

Admitted

Exhibit Vault

Assigned to:

Coleman, Justin J

Admitted

Exhibit Vault

Assigned to:

Stroschein, Charles M

Defendant's Exhibit 6; Simulator
Solution Log solution lot # 10802
bottle # 0353; Admitted
05-06-2011
Defendant's Exhibit 7; Video of the
traffic stop; Admitted 05-06-2011
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Defendant's Exhibit C; Instrument
Operations Log; Admitted at Jury
Trial on 9-8-11.

Admitted

Exhibit Vault

Assigned to:

Stroschein, Charles M
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Destroy
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE
I

STATE OF IDAHO,
SUPREME COURT NO. 39874
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
GEORGE JOSEPH BESAW! JR.

CLERK!S CERTIFICATE

Defendant-Appellant.

I, Patty O. Weeks, Clerk of the District Court of the Second
Judicial District of the State of Idaho, in and for the County of
Nez Perce! do hereby certify that the foregoing Clerk's Record in
the above-entitled cause was compiled and bound by me and
contains true and correct copies of all pleadings, documents

I

and

papers designated to be included under Rule 28, Idaho Appellate
Rules, the Notice of Appeal, any Notice of Cross-Appeal, and
additional documents that were requested.
I further certify:
1.

That all documents, x-rays, charts, and pictures offered

or admitted as exhibits in the above-entitled cause

l

if any,

will be duly lodged with the Clerk of the Supreme Court with
any Reporter1s Transcript and the Clerk/s Record.
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE

660

IN WITNESS WHEREOF I have hereunto set my hand and affixed
the seal of said court this

3 tJ

day of May 2012.

PATTY O. WEEKS, Clerk

CLERK'S CERTIFICATE

,

BCl

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE
STATE OF IDAHO,
SUPREME COURT NO. 39874
Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

GEORGE JOSEPH BESAW, JR.
Defendant-Appellant.

I, Patty O. Weeks, Clerk of the District Court of the Second
Judicial District of the State of Idaho, in and for the County of
Nez Perce, do hereby certify that copies of the Clerk's Record
were placed in the United States mail and addressed to Kenneth K.
Jorgensen, Deputy Attorney General, P. O. Box 83720, Boise, Idaho
83720-0010 and hand delivered to Charles M. Stroschein, P 0
Drawer 285, Lewiston, ID

83501 this

1/

day of June 2012.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF! I have hereunto set my hand and affixed

II

the seal of the said Court this

day of June 2012.

PATTY O. WEEKS
CLERK OF THE DISTRICT COURT

By____________________________
Deputy
1

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN &~D FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE

STATE OF IDAHO!
SUPREIVIE COURT NO. 39874
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.

GEORGE JOSEPH BESAW, JR.

AlVIENDED CLERK'S CERTIFICATE

Defendant-Appellant.

I, Patty O. Weeks, Clerk of the Dist
Judicial

ct Court of the Second

strict of the State of Idaho, in and for the County of

Nez Perce, do hereby certi

that the foregoing Clerk's Record

the above-entitled cause was compiled and bound by me and
contains true and correct copies of all pleadings, documents, and
papers designated to be included under Rule 28,

Idaho Appellate

Rules, the Notice of Appeal, any Notice of Cross-Appeal, and
additional documents that were requested.
I further certify:
1.

That all documents, x-rays, charts, and pictures
offered or admitted as exhibits in the above-entitled
cause, if any, will be duly lodged with the Clerk of the

AMENuED CLERK'S CERTIFICATE

Supreme Court with any Reporter's Transcript and the
erk's Record.
That in addition the Transcript of the Motion Hearing dated
May 6, 2011 will be sent to the Supreme Court as an exhibit to
the record.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF I have hereunto set my hand and affixed

the seal

said court this

~

day

Of~.

PATTY O. WEEKS, Clerk

&tL~~
Deputy Clerk

AMENDED CLERK'S CERTIFICATE
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